

THE BROTHERHOOD OF COCONUTS:  
TOURISM, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MALINDI, KENYA

By  
David Jamison

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL  
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1993

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor and chairperson, Professor Ronald Cohen, for his never-ending support and guidance throughout this project. I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to all the members of my doctoral committee. I would like to express special thanks to my friends and family for their support and encouragement throughout this process. Also, I wish to especially thank my parents, Leonard Jamison and the late Jean Jamison. Finally, my deepest, heartfelt appreciation and love go to my wife and closest ally, Lesley.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	vi
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Preface.....	1
Organization.....	17
Notes on Language Use.....	23
2. ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY.....	25
Modern States and Multi-ethnicity.....	25
Nationality and Modern State.....	29
Nationalism and the Third World.....	33
Inter-ethnic Tensions in Nation-States.....	38
Ethnicity and Identity.....	43
Role of the State in Decreasing Ethnic Tension.....	51
3. THE FIELD SETTING.....	67
Site Description.....	67
Beginnings of Swahili Civilization....	72
The Portuguese Period.....	76
Arab Influence.....	78
The British Period.....	79
Contemporary Developments.....	83
Tourism and the Future.....	88
4. THE COASTAL PEOPLES.....	93
The Swahili.....	94
Contemporary Swahili Residential Patterns.....	98
Swahili in Malindi.....	104
Domestic and Economic Life of the Swahili.....	110
The Mijikenda.....	113

	Contemporary Economic Status of the Mijikenda.....	116
	Mijikenda/Giriama Social Status in Malindi.....	119
5.	WATU WA BARA.....	124
	The Kikuyu.....	124
	The Kikuyu in Malindi.....	128
	The Kamba.....	131
	The Kamba in Malindi.....	134
	The Luo.....	138
	The Luo in Malindi.....	144
	The Maasai.....	145
	The Maasai in Malindi.....	150
	The Kalenjin.....	154
	The Kalenjin in Malindi.....	158
6.	WAGENI.....	160
	Watalii.....	161
	Matrevella.....	163
	The Tourists.....	170
	The Expatriates.....	181
	Expatriate Families.....	189
7.	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	195
	Ethnographic Method.....	198
	Social Distance Scale.....	200
	The "Kenyaness" Scale.....	202
	The Survey Instrument.....	203
8.	RESULTS AND ANALYSES.....	219
	Social Distance Scale.....	220
	The "Kenyaness" Scale.....	228
9.	DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS.....	236
	Axes of Identification.....	239
	Case Studies.....	267
	Conclusions.....	290



## APPENDICES

A	SURVEY.....	293
B	RESPONSE FREQUENCY FOR ETHNIC DISTANCE SCALE.....	298
	REFERENCES.....	300
	BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.....	313

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School  
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE BROTHERHOOD OF COCONUTS:  
TOURISM, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY  
IN MALINDI, KENYA

By

David Jamison

December 1993

Chair: Ronald Cohen, Ph.D.  
Major Department: Anthropology

This study examines ethnic identity and inter-ethnic contact in Malindi, Kenya. The particular focus of this study is the effect of high levels of ethnic diversity on the formation of new identities in Malindi. Specifically, the effect of high levels of ethnic diversity and inter-ethnic contact on the formation and development of Kenyan national identity.

The diversity present in Malindi is both caused and compounded by the seasonal presence of relatively large numbers of American and European tourists. Therefore, an examination of the dynamics of tourism and the effect of tourist contact on ethnic identities within the local community is included.

It is hypothesized that individuals experiencing high levels of inter-ethnic contact, both with foreign tourists and indigenous people, are more likely to express feelings of national identity. The operationalization of this concept includes an extension of rights and privileges to Kenyans, regardless of ethnicity, and the exclusion of outsiders from sharing in those rights.

A social distance scale and an index of Kenyan national identity were constructed to measure variation in response to both measures. Differences in the determination of ethnic distance and identity among different members of the community were analyzed in relation to a series of key variables which were hypothesized to affect the formation and maintenance of ethnic boundaries. Ethnographic data provided information about community perceptions of multi-ethnicity and the norms of behavior which result. Ethnic stereotypes were compared to actual behavior by members of several ethnic groups toward others.

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

### Preface

On the evening of August 7, 1992, I was sitting with friends at the Zanze-Bar Jazz Club, a very popular after hours spot in downtown Nairobi. At one point in the evening, the usual fare of live and recorded jazz music stopped and the attention of everyone in the house was drawn to several television sets strategically placed around the large room. The televisions were tuned to the local broadcast of the Barcelona Olympics. Three Kenyans were about to compete in the 3,000 meter steeple-chase. As the competition got under way, the noise and excitement level in the room increased steadily as, with each passing lap, it became increasingly apparent that the three Kenyans were the class of the field. As the three Kenyans crossed the finish line far ahead of the other competitors, wild cheers of "one, two, three!" and "gold, silver, bronze!" could be heard from all around the room along with slaps on the back, handshakes, toasts (of course) and the occasional shrieks from some female members of the audience.

It was at this moment that it occurred to me that I was witnessing (and participating in) a process that had drawn me to Kenya to do research in the first place, the expression

of national unity and national identity that, for a brief second, at least, overcame ethnic identity. This phenomenon was especially poignant, for me at least, because it was happening in Nairobi with a largely Kikuyu audience cheering wildly for three Kalenjin athletes. Barely two months earlier, several Kalenjin were murdered gratuitously on the streets of Nairobi by Kikuyu mobs seeking vengeance for the death of several Kikuyus and the displacement of dozens more following the "ethnic clashes" that had recently terrorized Rift Valley residents.

Granted, the crowd at the Zanze-bar (a clearly "yuppie" establishment) were light years away from the mobs that stoned Kalenjins to death in Eastleigh and on River Road. Yet, the sentiments of anger and frustration at the "ethnic clashes" and the resentment harbored by the Kikuyu community, and other communities, toward the apparently political nature of the clashes and, for several other reasons, toward this particular ethnic group, were felt among all circles of the community, as witnessed by newspaper editorials and my own conversations with a number of Kikuyus.

So, why were these people suddenly and enthusiastically going wild over these Kalenjin athletes. The answer, I reflected, could be found in the fact that for at least this particular moment the three athletes were not Kalenjins and the audience was not Kikuyu. The victory had been won over athletes from several countries and had been broadcast to and

seen by millions all around the world. As the three athletes made their victory lap holding high three large Kenyan flags, the pride beaming from the faces of the people at Zanze-Bar was not a pride in being Kikuyu, or Luo or Swahili, but in being Kenyan. Whether this momentary solidarity is transferable to the streets, the home, or the work place, I do not know, but, at least for a brief moment, I'm sure it was felt everywhere, even in Eastleigh.

The title of this dissertation, "The Brotherhood of Coconuts" is taken from the Swahili proverb "Undugu wa nazi hukutani chunguni" which means, "the brotherhood of coconuts is formed in the pot."<sup>1</sup> Like most Swahili "methali" this proverb has a number of possible meanings. I interpret it in two ways; that different self-contained entities unite under stressful conditions, the heat of the pot. This unity of different entities is artificial being brought about by the action of placing them together in the pot, but also permanent. Another interpretation is analogous to the American aphorism "in order to make eggs, you have to break some shells." For the Swahili proverb, one can say that once the coconuts are opened and the contents placed in the pot, you cannot tell the difference between the formerly unique individuals. In the emotional hot-pot of national pride and

---

<sup>1</sup>I was first made aware of this proverb after reading "The Way the World Is: Cultural Processes and Social Relations among the Mombasa Swahili." by Professor Marc Swartz (1991, University of California Publishing). The proverb is used as a title of one of Professor Swartz's chapters in that book.

international competition, the audience at Zanze-Bar formed, at least for an instant, a common bubbling Kenyan broth.

I wish to adapt this "methali" somewhat in my discussion of ethnicity and social change in Malindi in order to fit this very old East African proverb into the nomenclature of twentieth century western intellectual tradition by suggesting that "the brotherhood of coconuts is formed in the melting-pot."

This dissertation is about inter-ethnic relationships and the dynamics that determine those relationships in a multi-ethnic developing African state. It is also about the social and cultural changes that accompany and, in some instances, catalyze interethnic relationships, setting conflict, change, and the emergence of new features hitherto unknown.

Briefly stated, the central question examined in the following pages is whether inter-ethnic contact leads to increased national identity. More specifically, I wish to examine whether the following conditions hold; as the strength of individual ethnic identity decreases in magnitude (as is assumed to occur under conditions of (a) increased instances of inter-ethnic contact and (b) increased integration into a national or international culture), does national integration (described here as a feeling of "Kenyaness") increase?

These questions will be examined here through the analysis of instances of inter-ethnic contact and the

concurrent effect on members of the Malindi community as a result of the development of tourism in the town. However, on a much less ambitious and more personal level, this dissertation is also about a rapidly growing community whose life's blood, in a very real sense, depends on the continuing promotion of contact and change in the form of international tourism.

In writing this document, I am faced with the fundamental conflict of interests and motivation faced by all students of anthropology who have done fieldwork and who have tried to write about it soon after leaving the field-setting. How does one expand upon the very real, very personalized day to day events, relationships and feelings experienced by a community and observed and experienced by the anthropologist to the necessarily more impersonal and de-personalized level of macro-theory?

This conflict, or duplicity, and its resolution are especially important, I feel, for both the writer of this particular document and any potential readers to recognize from the beginning. The choice of Malindi as a research site was based upon observations and experiences from my first visit to Kenya in 1988. In fact, without the experience of having previously visited Malindi in a nonresearch oriented mode, I would probably not have pursued research in the area of tourism at all. Even my outlook on research in ethnicity would probably have been different.



In the short time that has elapsed, the Malindi of my first visit in 1988 had physically grown in every possible way. As I traveled down the main street in Malindi, Lamu Road, on the evening of February 1, 1992, the first thing that struck me about the place was the gaudiness of the neon lights and large lighted signs which now adorn this main "tourist strip." A casino had been erected since my last visit and across from it, a shopping plaza, which was in the process of construction in 1990, was now completed. My first, admittedly very subjective impression of the town was that tourism had taken over completely.

I am sure that if I waited another one and a half years before revisiting the town, I would barely be able to recognize it. Along with a massive proliferation in the number of building structures, the local population of Malindi have also increased dramatically, witnessed by the severe housing shortage about which everyone, even foreign expatriates, complained. The type of growth experienced by Malindi over the course of my three visits there, and indeed, as will be documented later in this dissertation, over the last twenty-five years, is not without effect on the social landscape as well as its physical appearance.

International tourism has been described as a form of class division in and of itself (V. Smith 1989). Tourism creates and perpetuates a category of individuals interacting on a more or less permanent basis with host communities. In

Malindi, and elsewhere, these divisions are replicated onto already existing social divisions and patterns. Particularly pervasive has been the influence of foreign nationals. It is said only half in jest that the town has begun to be referred to as "Little Naples" by expatriate Europeans and indigenous Kenyans alike. Possibly the most important factor, in the context of my fieldwork, is this type of increased personal contact, in all of its forms, between the tourists and their hosts. As I will show, it is at this level of contact that categories and conceptualizations are created, maintained, and perpetuated. It is these perceptions and stereotypes, and their determinants, that lead to the changes in national identity which I observed in Kenya.

One specific anecdote stands strongly in my mind with regard to the changes taking place in the town, and the response of individual Kenyans to it. One day, one of my friends went to visit a friend, and I went along. I had learned from my friend that the woman we were going to see was the product of an Indian-Kikuyu marriage. After visiting with the woman for a while, her telephone rang. The woman picked up the phone and began a conversation in quite fluent Italian. The woman runs a popular tourist excursion package of a seafood lunch on a secluded beach not far from Malindi. When the woman finished her conversation, she said something in a very frustrated tone to my friend in Kikuyu. Up until this point, our conversation had been, for my benefit, in

Swahili and English. Later, I learned that the woman spoke German just as fluently as she did Italian. All the while, in the background, an Elvis Presley Christmas album was playing, it was July in Kenya. In the space of a few moments, I was exposed to multilingualism, linguistic specificity, inter-ethnic marriage, westernization (musically), and the changing economic and social role of women.

Also, among the most influential factors in my decision to follow this line of research on changes in ethnic identity was the response the members of the Malindi community made to what they perceived as ambiguity of my own ethnic identity. I am still in the process of trying to categorize all of the responses, questions and conclusions drawn by Kenyans in Malindi toward my presence there and what they interpret as my identity. African-Americans are not unknown in Malindi. But, like any other understanding about Westerners, knowledge of African-Americans depends largely on frequency of contact with outsiders, education, and local stereotypes.<sup>2</sup>

Local knowledge notwithstanding African-Americans are not a common site around Malindi. Over the course of my three visits to Malindi, I knew of only one other African-American (a Peace Corp volunteer) who had spent any significant amount

---

<sup>2</sup>Mombasa, about seventy miles away, experiences periodic visits of large numbers of African-Americans through the auspices of the U.S. Military. These visits are infrequent (averaging maybe two or three to five day visits a year) but the drinking and spending sprees, sexual exploits and general rowdiness of all of the U.S. servicemen on shore leave are legendary.

of time in the area. During my own year long stay in Malindi, I was made aware of the presence of any Western blacks by my connections in various tourist venues without even soliciting the information. I estimate that the number of Western blacks in town during the course of my eleven month stay was less than twenty-five.<sup>3</sup>

The presence of not only an African-American, but also one with a reasonable command of Swahili, was a cause of some confusion for some. For others, I stimulated their already well-developed curiosity about the West and the position of blacks in the West. For me, African-American identity helped create an entree into people's perception of ethnic identity, its importance in social relations, and its value as a reference point in both instances.

For many of those with little contact or knowledge about the West, I was one of the strangest of anomalies, an African without a tribe.<sup>4</sup> For others, my identity was even more

---

<sup>3</sup>This number does not include the presence of "inter-racial" children having one Kenyan and one European parent. Many of these children spend significant amounts of time in Europe with a significant number being raised there. However, I do not count them among the Western blacks referred to above for two reasons. Firstly, their African parentage gives them some frame of reference in to a knowable African ancestry and a recognizable ethnic group, Secondly, in many ways, because of their physical appearance and other factors, they have begun to form, I believe, an ethnic category unto themselves. I will return to this issue in more detail later.

<sup>4</sup>There were, however, several rumors regarding my identity circulating around town. These included a rumor that I was really a Zairian trying to impress people by saying that I was an American.

ambiguous. On several occasions I heard myself referred to or described as a "mzungu mweusi" a term which I gloss as "a black whiteman."<sup>5</sup> What intrigued me about the responses to my identity was the way in which they illustrated the malleability of identity on a very personal level. This also included a solidarity and bonding that could be forged based on a common shared aspect of "ethnic" categorization.

Despite being a "mzungu mweusi" to some, my physical "Africaness" in my opinion and in the opinion of many of my informants, made me less Western (and thus less threatening) than some of the other Westerners they had come across. Interestingly, my lack of tribal identity did not enhance my foreignness. Instead, I believe it made me nonthreatening from the standpoint of inter-ethnic competition. My status left this irritant out of the interaction even though my color suggested the issue. It is my own perception that people were constantly remarking and commenting on ethnic stereotypes. Whether this claim is merited must be judged by the reader based on the quality of the ethnographic material that follows.

The first thing anyone with an eye for such things would notice in Malindi is the almost incredible ethnic diversity present in the town. A further look reveals that the

---

<sup>5</sup>"Mzungu" does not literally mean whiteman, it means clever person (sometimes described as deviously so) and was used to describe Europeans at least as far back as the 19th century. The term has come to be associated solely with Europeans and Americans through common usage.

diversity lies below even the most obvious surface differences. Malindi is caught between several distinctive worlds of personal and community identity. It is both African and, in a day-to-day sense, European, Third World certainly but, in many ways, First as well, traditional and culturally conservative, while at the same time constantly evolving.

As an anthropologist faced with all of this rather kaleidoscopic diversity present in the community, I was forced to some basic questions about the processes and directions of change. The diversity and its context are constant stimuli to change, making it one of the fundamental characteristics of the community.

Just to adequately describe the complexity of these interlocking and, yet in many ways, contradictory characteristics of the Malindi community is no small task. Understanding the effects of the various interlocking and often contradictory identities of the community and its individual members is, however, the key to understanding the ways in which identities are able to inter-connect, overlap and eventually lead to new and overarching levels of ethnic inclusiveness.

Despite the sheer number of differing ethnic groups, ethnic divisions in Malindi are the easiest to comprehend and to document. However, language, occupational and residential segregation, race and religion divide the town into a number of several smaller sub-populations. Underlying this

diversity, however, are the processes of competition and conciliation that make everyday life in such a diverse environment possible. And both within and across these divisions, affecting them deeply, are the even more subtle divisions of class and caste.

What I have attempted to do in this dissertation is reconcile the conflicts (for me) in doing and then of writing about fieldwork, by maintaining a constant bridge between the personal world of fieldwork and the impersonal world of theory. The ethnographic data as well as the data from survey research and the statistical analyses which follow are presented here as evidence of my own observations and conclusions about the direction of change in ethnic identity taking place in Malindi. More abstractly, they point to more general questions of ethnic identity, social change and national integration relevant for a much wider world than that of this single case study.

In order to maintain this bridge between theory and fieldwork, I intend to move very directly between observations, descriptions and analyses (ethnography), to theory throughout the organization of this dissertation. The goal will be to present the reader with a very clear sense of where the generalizations come from and how they can be extrapolated to macro-level theory. At the same time, I will provide a sense of place in the real world of the particular

research site that exists objectively, as I have presented it and its people.

The research upon which this dissertation is based was undertaken over a period of thirteen months, two months during the Summer of 1990 and about 11 months in 1992. The research methodology entailed several related components, chief among which was participant observation within several different, and indeed, distinctive aspects of community life. The work involved participating, observing and recording aspects of community life in Malindi, as wide ranging as traditional wedding ceremonies and funerals to helping my consultants sell curios to tourist. As a Western outsider, I was also able to participate in and to react as an outsider to tourists as people and their activities and to reflect on them both in the roles of a tourist and a researcher.

The data gathered from participant observation at the initial stages of fieldwork during both my first research visit to Malindi in 1990 and during the first few months of fieldwork in 1992 formed the basis for systemized data collection which marked the second major division of fieldwork. The specific design of the surveys which were utilized in obtaining the data presented here on ethnic identity, social distance and the effects of outside contact came as much from "traditional" ethnographic interviews and participant observation as it did from pre-fieldwork theoretical orientations.



An example from my first days of fieldwork in Malindi is illustrative of this point. I became involved in a conversation with several policemen who were sitting after work at a pub near a police outpost after a friend introduced me as an American. The men insisted that I take beer from them and join in their conversation. Of the five men sitting at the table, two were Kikuyu, two were Kalenjin and the fifth was a Giriama. The friend who introduced me was a Kamba. Very quickly, and without specific input from me, the conversation turned to the matter of ethnic relationships in Kenya.

After about an hour of drinking, one of the men began questioning me about ethnic relationships in the states. After my attempt to answer his questions, he revealed to me his opinion that ethnic strife in Kenya was a matter of political machinations and that, left to their own devices, individual Kenyans can and do get along with each other quite well. It was this man who revealed to me the ethnic identity of himself and of his compatriots (although I had already made an accurate guess).

Thus, quite by chance or being at the right place at the right time or both, I was exposed to a real-world, fieldwork example of the effect of formal (the men all worked together) and informal association (they often drank together after work) on the diminution of ethnic antagonisms.<sup>6</sup> This

---

<sup>6</sup>The political relationship between Kikuyus and Kalenjins has been notoriously antagonistic dating from the time of Moi's ascension to power in 1978. It became worse during the

situation was repeated before me countless times during the course of fieldwork.

I have attempted to accomplish the research goals by presenting the data that follow in a more or less traditional anthropological fashion. The theory is presented and evidence is given which, I hope, supports my conclusions to the satisfaction of the reader (Jacobson 1992). A significant amount of the evidence presented here, however, has as much to do with the nature of the community (i.e., the make-up of the population and its infra-structural dependence on tourism) as the nature of the theoretical problem.

Research methods, as well as research results, were highly influenced by the conditions under which fieldwork has to be done in Malindi. Much of what goes on there must be accepted and described as not quite "above board." In Malindi, prostitution, narcotics and every type of con-game are among the social ills and skills that go hand in hand with the economic benefits of tourism. Corruption, cultural degradation<sup>7</sup> and expanding economic dependence on the tourist

---

course of my fieldwork due to politically motivated ethnic clashes following the advent of multi-partyism. A discussion of these clashes and their effect on relationships between the two groups appears later.

<sup>7</sup>"Cultural degradation" in the sense of (a) a perceived loss of cultural identity or the specifics of traditional knowledge and mores through contact with groups that do not share such aspects of cultural identity and (b) degradation in the sense of behaviors which transgress against the traditional accepted norms of behavior for the particular community. Numerous examples occur in the pages that follow.

industry are among the more subtle social ills brought on by the rapid development of the tourist industry.

This underground and partly illegitimate character of tourism in Malindi, as described in the pages that follow, demand careful discretion in some areas. At the risk of sounding too clandestine, certain segments of the population and segments of the local economy have a great deal to gain and a great deal to lose through becoming too obvious in their day to day operation. Indeed certain segments of overall community life are totally out of reach to outsiders. Obviously, I recognize that this is a danger in all anthropological research. For this reason, as well as the sheer complexity of such a culturally diverse setting, I can not even begin to imagine any middle-length anthropological fieldwork, such as my own, producing a complete picture of every detail of community life. However, Malindi's economy particularly juxtaposes great, freely liquid wealth from tourists with the infinitely lower income of the host community. Temptations are great and people are constantly drawn to supplying demands no matter what their legitimacy.

Having said that, however, I believe that my own fieldwork has produced a reliable picture of those aspects of social and cultural life I set out to study and provided clear links and suggestions for conclusions at more general levels.

One further disclaimer/caveat will be returned to in the conclusion of this dissertation. The political environment in

Kenya has also undergone major changes during the course of my fieldwork. It would be a massive understatement to say that the advent of multi-partyism and, at least theoretically, its accompanying cultural ideology of political pluralism, has had a major effect on the political atmosphere of the entire country. I also assume, given what has happened, that the evolving political situation in Kenya has had a major effect on the ways Kenyans perceive their own and others nationalism. Both these assumptions will be examined in more detail in the chapters that follow.

#### Organization

This dissertation is organized into three major sections. The first section consists of a relatively exhaustive literature review and critical discussion of multi-ethnicity and national identity. The three major areas of interest outlined are (1) multi-ethnicity and national identity (2) ethnic boundaries and cross-cutting cleavages and (3) "layers of ethnicity" in the development and reformation of ethnic categories.

Building on the work of others, this review develops the argument that the circumstances of multi-ethnic contact are vital determinants in the creation, retention, and reorganization of individual ethnic group identities. Although well known and widely accepted, this relation still needs filling out in comparative terms. I further argue that the most developed, positive outcome (in the sense of the

direction of development, i.e., integrative vs. disintegrative) of these processes is the formation of a broad based national identity that overrides, but not necessarily obliterates, individual ethnic group identity.

This literature review\discussion forms the basis for the introduction of the research question: does increased multi-ethnic\multi-national contact lead to a diminution of ethnic "distance." It closes by presenting the proposition that tourism, given its conditionalities, is another category of inter-ethnic, international contact. But that it acts as a catalyst for some of changes in ethnic identity presented here.

A description of the field setting, which follows, presents the specific context of inter-ethnic contact that is the theme of this dissertation, beginning with an examination of the socio-cultural and historical "environment" within which the dynamic processes of ethnic continuity and change are occurring. In addition to a physical description of Malindi and its surroundings, it also provides an overall setting in which to fit the more detailed analysis.

The first section also presents an outline of the history of Malindi town from its earliest inception up to the present. This historical outline is divided into three major sections each representing key stages in Malindi's evolution: (1) the foundations and origins of Malindi and other Swahili coastal urban centers; (2) contact with the West characterized by

Portuguese incursion followed by British colonialism; and (3) Malindi's growth into a major tourist center in post-colonial Kenya. Although primarily a historical discussion of the major events of these three stages, this chapter also focuses on the nature of ethnic relationships that have been shaped by history.

This discussion will provide the second half of a two part literature review and critique of primary sources, the first half being presented in the earlier review of the "ethnicity and nationalism" literature. This discussion, focuses heavily on the tourism literature in order to provide the background for my proposition that tourism is a form of culture-contact that, like other forms of large-scale contact (i.e., peaceful or nonpeaceful immigration) often leads to swift, massive changes to, and responses by, the host community.

The first section concludes with an examination of three main areas of touristic involvement: (1) tourism and the economy of host communities; (2) tourism and its impact on the environment; (3) tourist motivations and expectations; and (4) the socio-cultural impact of tourism on the host community.

The second section presents the ethnographic context. I discuss multi-ethnicity in Malindi by presenting ethnographic materials on each of several categories of actors within the Malindi community. Following an ethnographic summary of each group, I look at the integration and current status of each

group discussed within the wider community. This provides a stage setting for the ethnic units whose interaction in the community is discussed later on.

Each sub-section in this second part provides ethnographic data on each of the groups discussed and the history of their presence on the coast. Special emphasis is given to migration experiences, language acquisition and use, residential patterns, economic specialization and socio-economic status.

The first groups discussed are the major Coastal peoples, the Swahili and the Mijikenda. Because "Swahili identity" has been the subject of much discussion and confusion among scholars of East Africa, I intend to spend the majority of this section discussing its amorphous quality, its historical foundations, and the implications of this identity in terms of relations with other Kenyan groups.

The second part of this section describes the major non-coastal Kenyan ethnic groups present in Malindi. Special consideration is given here to their socio-economic adaptation to, and status within, the community. I then describe the expatriate and Kenyan born European communities. The German, British and Italian local communities are viewed in relation to their different histories and patterns of settlement. A final sub-section returns to a discussion of tourism, this time using "tourists" as a local ethnic category. This section will return the reader to the previous discussion of

tourism using specific examples of tourism in Malindi to analyze tourist types, behaviors, motivations, and their effects on the overall community socially, materially and in terms of perception.

The second section concludes with specific examples of the relationships among the many ethnic groups residing in Malindi. Here, I examine the dynamic processes that result from inter-ethnic contact by examining relationships among Kenyans and between Kenyans and non-Kenyans. Popular ethnic stereotypes are also introduced to show how these processes occur on the ground, especially as they pertain to the relationships among Kenyans of differing ethnic identities.

The section concludes with a summary. This involves the variation among types of ethnic contacts in Malindi while giving the reader a sense of the variety of multi-ethnic contacts and associations experienced everyday by individuals. This summary is used as an introduction to the research methodology, analysis and discussion that follow later on.

The final section begins with a restatement of the research question presented earlier, based on the presentation of ethnographic materials in the preceding sections. This section then turns to a discussion of the specific data gathering techniques used (i.e., questionnaires) and the reasons for their inclusion. I intend to do this at two levels. First, through a discussion of the types of data obtained through the use of each tool. Secondly, through a



discussion of how the specific items in each of the several questionnaires were derived.

By engaging in these two discussions, I plan to "come clean" concerning my own ideological and theoretical bent, as well as re-emphasizing the extent to which previous experience in the community influenced the direction of the study at a very basic level. Ethnographic justifications for the inclusion and exclusion of certain items in the questionnaire are presented here.

The third section concludes with the results of the data analysis. The findings of two surveys are placed into context based on ethnographic data and other sources, including the overall discussion of the thesis and its broader implications.

Specifically, this subsection attempts to ask and at least partially answer through survey results three questions: (1) does increased inter-ethnic contact lead to a decrease or increase in the number of and "distance" between ethnic categories; (2) does increased multi-ethnic\multi-national contact increase feelings of national identity; and (3) can tourism be considered one of the forms of inter-ethnic contact that has some effect on either of the above?

In considering the three questions above, I intend to make full use of the structural data alluded to above and ethnographic detail in order to provide alternative interpretations of the results. I will use these alternative explanations both to support and to reject theoretical

results. All the arguments derived from the data will be used, toward the end of this chapter, to restructure the question of multi-ethnicity and nationalism. This issue is addressed more fully in the concluding chapter.

Notes on language use:

Throughout the course of this dissertation, I take license with the proper use of KiSwahili nouns referring to ethnic groups and individuals. For the sake of simplification, I have omitted the proper "m(w)" (a single person) and "wa"(many people) KiSwahili prefixes in the naming of ethnic groups. For example, for the purposes of this dissertation, "Giriama" refers to a person or people from the Giriama tribe as opposed to the proper "Mgiriama" or "WaGiriama." The Giriama language or an aspect of "Giriama-ness" is also referred to as "Giriama" as opposed to the proper "KiGiriama." The meaning in each case is clear in context. Where this is not the case, footnotes point out exceptions. Thus, "many Swahili can understand and speak Giriama," as opposed to "many WaSwahili can understand and speak KiGiriama."

In several other cases, the proper form of a KiSwahili noun referring to people is left in the correct form because of its value in illustrating some special historical or cultural context of the term itself. For example, "mamen", a relatively new term which refers to African-Americans, is given in quotes and footnoted because of its value in

illustrating an aspect of language acquisition and ethnic identification which is lost in a simple translation. This consideration is also given in the case of nonpersonal nouns and verbs that illustrate some special quality or that do not have a direct translation into English.

## CHAPTER 2

### ETHNICITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

The goal of this dissertation was to examine changes in ethnic identity in relation to national identity among the individual members of several ethnic groups in the small, but rapidly growing town of Malindi, Kenya. In order to place the very specific research experiences and results that follow into a wider context, the ways in which ethnicity as a concept articulates with nationality and the state should be examined at the onset.

#### Modern States and Multi-ethnicity

Ethnicity and nationhood have long been used interchangeably and, to some degree, erroneously. The confusion largely derives from the use of ethnic markers and claims about the primordial nature of ethnicity in the conceptualization of a common identity which, in the context of state level political organization, is defined as nationhood.

State level societies date back thousands of years and have developed independently in several different corners of the world (Claessen and Skalnik 1978, R. Cohen and Service 1978). Early state level political systems differed from their modern predecessors in both size and the degree of political integration of local communities.

Early states were concerned and involved with matters of resource distribution, typical vertically, through the use of coercive power to an extent that other, earlier forms of political organization could not. Coercive power was often derived from supernatural justifications (and vice versa) which made both the state and its rulers, sacred. Expansion of territory and the subsumation of nonstate level societies made early states a prime catalyst for the diffusion of material and social culture into other areas (Navari 1981). This characteristic also included, of course, the integration of ethnically diverse communities under the umbrella of state control and influence from the very beginning of state level political organization (R. Cohen 1993).

The political entity known as the modern state is, by definition, a somewhat recent phenomenon. The difference that separates the modern state from earlier forms of state level political organization is the elaboration of its service providing activities, the presence of a range of economic, occupational and social classes, the predominance of the market economies, a rapidly increasing degree of industrialization beginning in the 19th century, and the predominance of secular as opposed to sacred authority (Navari 1981).

Scholars variably place the origin of the modern state in the French and American revolutions and/or to less specific developments deriving from the Age of Enlightenment in Western

Europe (Tivey 1981). Access to political power and secular, as opposed to supernatural, legitimacy are some of the keys. Modern state systems also add the dimension of class stratification to intra-national relationships and divisions.

Multi-ethnicity inevitably is tied to the development and perpetuation of modern state level political systems. The state is the political reality of the contemporary world. Almost all human beings alive today live within the confines of some state level political system. Concomitantly, almost every state in the world claims a multi-ethnic population under its auspices. Multi-ethnicity is the norm that provides the rule (R. Cohen 1993). Over 5,000 different ethnic groups live within the boundaries of the 200 or so contemporary nation states (Stavenhagen 1990).

Probabilities for conflict and the breakdown of state level cohesion along ethnic fault lines, given the tendency of states toward multi-ethnicity, are manifold. Ethnically based political rivalry within states can lead and has led to the revival or the initiation of group antagonisms that may be expressed in everything from political powerbrokering to openly violent confrontation, any of which can threaten the legitimacy of the state as the political embodiment of the people.

The options for modern states in dealing with the potentially fissioning effects of multi-ethnicity and in

developing a supra-ethnic sense of nationality that legitimizes and begins to ethnicize the state itself are limited. Multi-ethnicity can be, theoretically, eliminated through a program of "ethnic-cleansing", as attempted with some degree of success in Nazi Germany, Burundi and elsewhere, and underway in the former Yugoslavia, resulting in, temporarily at least, a single ethnic state.<sup>1</sup> Individual ethnic groups can peacefully subdivide the state's territory in order to provide political autonomy to ethnic group members. Or, the state can actively or subtly promote the breakdown of the specifics of ethnic identity (i.e. linguistic, religious, class-based, "racial" and other differences) in order to leave a vacuum in identity to be occupied by newly ethnizing nationhood (Bell 1974, Bendix 1964). Relatedly, the state can promote a sense of nationhood that recognizes, welcomes and relativizes ethnic differentiation, but that views national identity as one of the several essential characteristics of a polity of societal actors (Cole 1989).<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>I say temporarily for two reasons. Firstly, because from a historical perspective states which are not geographically isolated eventually undergo processes of immigration which result in ethnic minorities in fact being part of the state whether they are so in name or not. Secondly, the nature of ethnicity itself is such that ethnic identities can and do undergo processes of fragmentation in which classification based on any number of in-group differences result in differential categorization.

<sup>2</sup>"The concern of the state, as an association including all sorts and conditions of men, must be with things which concern them, broadly speaking, in the same way, that is, in

The answer to the problem of cohesiveness among ethnic groups provided by almost every modern state is the development and promotion of the latter answer to nation-building as a means of insuring cohesion (Toland 1993). The simple recognition of national identity, however, is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the types of loyalties and cooperation needed by the state to remain solvent. To accomplish the goal of solvency, a developing national identity, in some but not all cases, must actively seek to replace ethnicity as the most salient identifier in terms of the perception of common goals, expectations and indeed common cause.

#### Nationality and the Modern State

Nationality is colloquially thought of as a condition of political and social community resulting from a set of "primordial" ties that are believed to exist between individuals (A. D. Smith 1986, Breuilly 1982, Tivey 1981). These ties, to paraphrase Geertz and Isaacs, are often largely based on the perception of real or imagined shared language, religion and region. Together, these ties forge individuals into a community of commonly held identifications (Geertz 1973, Isaacs 1975).

Nationhood itself is, however, a highly subjective, political expression of, at best, pseudo-ethnicity. A nation

---

relation to their identity and not to their points of interest" (Cole 1989:77).



exists theoretically as a "natural" product of common language, residence and to some extent, culture (A.D. Smith 1986). The reality of linguistic, cultural and class diversity is superseded by the myth of common history, origins and relationships (Tonkin, Chapman and McDonald 1989). According to identification theory, nation-building requires that such natural ties be recognized, and the resulting allegiances maintained in order that "The individual actually experiences the state and this experience is such as to evoke identification." Further, "that this experience will come about if the symbols of the state present a mode of behavior or a set of attitudes the adoption of which will enhance identity and psychological security" (Bloom 1990:61). The internalization of national identity, according to Bloom, occurs when "symbols of the state present an appropriate attitude in situations of perceived threat" and "symbols of the state behave beneficially toward the individual" (ibid).

These symbols may include such obviously evocative elements such as flags or national anthems. They also may include state agencies that embody the state's intrusion into private life, benevolence and control over resources. Contact with members with these symbols makes individuals feel responsible and obligated toward the state.

Added to these conceptualized commonalities and the inter-responsibilities they imply is the imposition of law and custom that extends theoretically to every member of the

nation. This is one of the most salient defining characteristics of the individual's identity within the nation. It is also a defining characteristic of a closely related identity, citizenship. Fellow nationals are granted certain pan-ethnic rights and responsibilities, under law, constitutional ideology and practice, by virtue of their nationality that do not attain necessarily to those outside the nation (Bendix 1964, R. Cohen 1993).

In multiethnic states, nation-building requires that individuals are also made to recognize the existence of others who share the same responsibility and obligation. The fact that these others may speak a different dialect or language, live in a separate region, or practice a different religion are overshadowed, theoretically, by common commitment to the state and a common dependence on the state's redistributive powers (Thompson and Ronen 1986).

Because of the imprecise ways in which nationality has been determined, the discourse of nationality and, more specifically, of the nation-state, depends heavily upon the manipulation of identities and the ability to create and maintain the previously mentioned allegiances among the constituent communities (A.D. Smith 1981, Birch 1989). A potent way of accomplishing this is to refer to a real or imagined community of memory which links, historically, ethnic groups to the state. Mythic forbearers of the nation and national symbols serve to make sacred in the minds of people

the legitimacy of their "belongingness" to a nation (A.D. Smith 1979).

A more objective examination of nationality in the twentieth century reveals that the "primordial" sentiments involved are often the result of very specific historic circumstances (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1989). These circumstances themselves have, in many cases, been manipulated for the expressed purpose of creating a national identity directed toward some specific political goal (Anderson 1983, A.D. Smith 1981).

So, if nationality is not the natural, primordial condition of human societies then what is it and why is it important to the current discussion? The answer to this question is to be found in the very nature of the modern state. States in the twentieth century, and especially those in the Third World, owe their very existence to their ability to propagate and constantly foment allegiance among their populations. Without such loyalty, the very legitimacy of the state as an intrusive force in the lives of individuals and communities is in question (Paden 1980, Stavenhagen 1991). Of course states can survive, for a while at least, on coercive power alone, yet, the cost effectiveness of this strategy and the ultimate survivability of coercive states are coming increasingly into question. For example, witness Eastern Europe and the Communist Block.

Ultimately the state relies on some type of support from its constituent groups based on some shared idea about the value of the state and of the legitimacy of common loyalties and inter-relations among sub-groups (Bloom 1990:56, A. D. Smith 1986). To encourage these types of allegiances, states expend much time and energy in the promotion of the idea of nationality. Nationality is the feeling of belonging to an extended political community and of recognizing this belongingness as important and in some ways "natural" (notice in our own language foreigners can become "naturalized" citizens of their new countries) (Anderson 1983).

Strategies for promoting feelings of national identity include the adoption and promotion of national symbols, such as a flag and national anthem (witness America's own experience of national reaffirmation in the wake of the Gulf War); using the power and wealth of the state to address local concerns (i.e., making at least an appearance as a benefactor); and diluting the saliency of potentially conflicting or conflicting allegiances and identities, including ethnicity (R. Cohen and J. Toland 1988). I will return to these issues later.

#### Nationalism and the Third World

Benedict Anderson puts forth an interesting argument for the growth of nationalism in Western Europe and its subsequent adoption elsewhere. Anderson bases his accounting on the spread of literacy and capitalism in Western Europe and the

convergent decline of religious authority. These elements, according to Anderson, led the way for inter-state competition and the development of national consciousness among the populations of Europe at the time (Anderson 1983).

Anderson further postulates that the development of the print media led to widespread literacy in local vernaculars as opposed to the previous pattern of literacy for the social and religious elites in Latin. As vernaculars increasingly became the medium of communication, secular works in the vernacular became more prevalent.

According to Anderson, literacy and the use of print vernaculars affected the rise of nationalism in three ways. First, they created "unified fields of exchange below Latin and above local vernaculars." The restrictive influence of localized dialects were then overcome by the appearance of a standardized form of a language that linked the different linguistic and ethnic communities. Secondly, languages were less vulnerable to change because of the fixity of the printed standardized version. Thirdly, a "language of power" was created in which dialects furthest from the standardized form used in political administration and by political elites, lost prestige (Anderson 1983:48).

Others have developed similar theories explaining the spread of nationalism. A. D. Smith, for example, adds to the expansion of vernacular literacy the rise in territorialism and inter-state conflict among medieval European nations. To

maintain the integrity of political boundaries, these early polities found it necessary to mobilize increasing numbers of subjects for defense purposes. Mobilization of local communities and diverse ethnic groups within the polity, necessarily meant the promotion of the idea of national unity in the face of outside intruders (A.D. Smith 1986). The development of capitalist economies and international divisions of labor have also been cited as potential catalysts for the rise in nationalistic sentiment in the last century (Bloom 1990, Enloe 1986, Howard 1989).

The key to most of these theories is the development of consciousness of community and identity outside the local community or ethnic group in relation to similarly developing identities elsewhere. Literacy in the vernaculars had the effect of impressing upon the individual the notion of connectedness with thousands or millions of other individuals sharing knowledge of the standardized vernacular and, to an extent, common cultural heritage. Military and political mobilization in the face of a common threat implies at the very least a community of interests (Peterson 1975). The integration of the national economy meant that individual communities were forced into a degree of inter-dependence with other communities.

The emergence of European colonialism during the late 19th century saw an importation of the ideas of European inspired nationalism throughout the globe. Colonial

territories and protectorates were formed without regard for previously existing ethnic or state boundaries. As a result, diverse communities were suddenly thrust into single administrative communities linking them, sometimes for the first time in their respective histories (Van de Berghe 1981).

In Africa, this process was especially true of the colonial period.<sup>3</sup> The European powers themselves often displayed a kind of cultural and political chauvinism that reinforced ideas of European racism, the comparative superiority of their own nations, and of the importance of maintaining nationhood (Anderson 1983). The rhetoric of British colonizers was filled rationalizations of colonialism. They saw it as their right and duty as the most evolved of the highly evolved "civilized" nations of Europe to introduce English culture through exposure to British values, customs, religion and education to their colonial dependents.

However, the contradiction was evident in the lack of citizenship rights either in their own country or in the metropol. For the French, colonialization meant a true "evolve" of the backwards nations of the colonial world into French language, culture and citizenship, with the goal of

---

<sup>3</sup>Indeed it has been well documented that in many cases throughout the continent, colonialism not only enhanced ethnic rivalries, but in some cases created new ethnic groupings where no evidence of such groupings had been found before. Either as a result of a directed policy or as an reaction by indigenous people to the exigencies of colonialism. In Kenya, for instance, the Luyha, now the second largest ethnic group in the country, did not exist before the 1930s (Southall 1976).

reproducing France throughout the colonies (Mazrui 1983). In practice, neither model introduced the alleged benefits of colonialism, and metropol culture, to the masses of the colonized nor succeeded in fostering national allegiance to the metropol among them.

The leaders of independence movements in the twentieth century used similar tactics that expounded the sanctity and historical legitimacy of their cultures and political forms in the development of nations. Many of these leaders experienced first hand 20th century European nationalism either through Western education or living experiences within the metropol countries (Anderson 1983, A.D. Smith 1986, Enloe 1983). The model of European nationalism, which stressed national autonomy as a determinant of future prosperity, was exported to the colonies along with European styles of dress, etiquette, etcetera. The contradiction inherent in becoming more European but remaining subjugated under colonial rule became more untenable and certainly helped foster the logic behind independence movements (Hodgkin 1956, Bell 1974).

The educational factor in the rise of nationalism among ex-colonials was a key factor (Anderson 1983). Educational systems set up by Europeans not only exported Western style education, they also exported new class and status positions among the educated elite of the colonies (Hodgkin 1956, LeMarchand 1986:190). The extent of advances within this class and status strata ended, however, at the administrative



capital. Local intelligentsia and elites thus looked toward these centers as targets of opportunity for the formation of the "imagined community" of nationhood (Anderson 1983:127).

Having achieved independence from the colonial powers, this strata of educated elite faced the challenges of nation-building. In Africa, as well as Southeast Asia and the Near East, the strain of keeping together the diverse colonial administrative units often foreshadowed all other concerns (Anderson 1983, Bloom 1990, Howard 1989, McClellen 1988, A.D. Smith 1981). Violent government reaction to ethnic separatist movements in Nigeria, Ethiopia and elsewhere are brutal reminders of this expediency (Horowitz 1985).

#### Inter-ethnic Tensions in Nation-States

The problem with the creation of the new communities alluded to above is that, increasingly, the types of allegiances and loyalties needed in their creation have been interrupted or superseded by ethnic allegiances. Integration within a national community is interrupted when one or more ethnic groups place their specific group interests above those of the national community. These claims by ethnic groups are most often focused around issues of political alienation or lack of access to scarce resources. In situations in which no one ethnic group is able to dominate completely politics or economics, these types of tensions are especially pronounced (Keller 1983, A.D. Smith 1981).

The presence of a domineering ethnic group (especially one that identifies itself as the distinctive, nation-defining ethnic group) can lead to political alienation by ethnic subgroups (Roosens 1989). The process of political alienation, like that of economic alienation, is a matter of relative deprivation. Ethnic group members may see themselves as disadvantaged or disempowered because of differences in social stratification, education and other factors in relation to other groups who are seen as advantaged (Ross 1980:174-75).

In relatively young, Third World states, this type of alienation is especially dangerous. Stratification can be seen as part of a system of unequal access to the already strained Third World economies due to educational, occupational, and/or political favoritism left over from colonial policies favoring one ethnic group over another (Bates 1983). The Hausa in Nigeria and the Chinese in Burma are good examples of this type of favoritism effecting post-colonial access to power (Horowitz, 1985:190).

The loss of privileges by Hausa, as they experienced during brief takeover of Nigeria's government by the Igbo in 1966, can result in the type of antagonism noted above. As a result of these legacies and/or the gross differences in access to state resources and apparatus, current political and economic conditions can be seen as illegitimate and therefore, open to challenge. The fact that in many of these areas, the state is of the "soft" variety characterized by an absence of

discipline in the public sector, uneven administration of laws and policies, and dominated by an economy of affection, adds to the potential for conflict (Chazan 1986, Enloe 1974). Commenting on the threat of this condition in the absence of a market system, Hyden states;

The threat to state coherence in this type of situations that public resource allocation is out of the public eye. Nobody really knows what is happening with available resources and rumors flourish . . . . Because people tend to assume that everybody favors his own group in such a situation, the danger of enhanced ethnic competition and conflict is also real; the opportunities of effectively dealing with it, short of armed confrontation, are reduced. (Hyden 1983:79)

The tendency to express political grievances in ethnic terms becomes especially pronounced in an atmosphere of perceived ethnic-specific deprivation. The ultimate result of ethnic political mobilization can be the formation of ethnically based political parties or, in the extreme case, ethnic separatist organizations seeking increased autonomy, self-governance or independent statehood (A.D. Smith 1981:34, Birch 1989).

Sikh separatism in India, for example, is based on religious and alleged cultural differences which are seen as incompatible and irreconcilable given the prejudices and discrimination faced by Sikhs from other Indians. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that Sikhs are not unfairly discriminated against in either economic life or politics, in fact they may be over represented in political appointments and educational attainment (Young 1976:113).

The lack of articulation between real world conditions and their perception, and actual inequalities present in the system of resource allocation, can take on serious consequences. If the cause of a perceived inequality is ethnic identity, the result can be ethnic separation which ostensibly defends the ethnic identity. That such movements often point to cultural degradation (i.e., the loss of the ethnic group identity and cultural practices through assimilation) as a rallying cry for membership should not be surprising considering the force of such claims on the emotions (including fear) of fellow-ethnics. Separatism can take the form of a pre-emptive defensive mechanism against future ethnic antagonism (Birch 1989).

Recent events in India illustrate that it is not always the minority population that perceives threat in the face of growing multi-ethnicity. Hindu extremists have recently become very forceful in their antagonism towards their Muslim counterparts. The claim put forward by Hindus is that Muslims tend to be wealthier and politically influential and that they disrespect the numerically dominant Hindu culture. Recent efforts to force the Indian government to adopt Hinduism as the only state religion reflects more so on the concerns stemming from ethnic competition than from religious zealotry.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>During the course of my research stay in Kenya, I had the opportunity to talk to several members of the nascent Islamic Party of Kenya. An extreme view held by some members

If complete secession or segregation is, for various pragmatic reasons, not likely to become an option, another process can occur in which ethnic groups use their ethnicity as a means of mobilizing for increased status and opportunity within the political system. Ethnic groups undertaking this strategy may see the present level of ethnic competition as a natural consequence of ethnic diversity within the system despite historic disadvantages. Again, "cultural" reasoning may be alluded to in the defense of ethnic powerbroking. The preservation of tradition and the value in holding on to often idealized assets of the ethnic culture may be used as a means of gaining increased self-governance over the ethnic community (Roosens 1989:92). Black Power movements of the 60s increasingly focused on these types of issues in the U.S. as the decade drew to a close (Cruse 1975). These types of strategies are again gaining acceptance in the African-American community.

The fact remains that ethnicity is a viable and highly effective means of motivating populations towards political and economic goals. Group interests can be defined in ethnic terms with an emotional, personal force that is fundamentally more individualized than claims made to political party, class, or almost any other possible claim on the individual.

---

was that the Kenyan Coast should be declared an Islamic zone in order to safeguard against the cultural degradation that was occurring as a result of tourism and upcountry immigration. I will examine this movement in more detail later.

This has to do, more than anything else, with the affective nature of ethnicity itself.

### Ethnicity and Identity

Ethnicity has increasingly become the means by which group dissatisfaction and demands on the state are expressed in many areas of the world despite a liberalist assumptions of the mid-20th century regarding its imminent decline (Shils 1978). It was assumed that ethnicity, as an organizing principle, would swiftly give way to class and pan-human market principles. Increasing international contact, globalized forms of media and continued industrialization were to decrease the salience of ethnic markers for people for whom the world was increasingly becoming a smaller and more familiar place (Stack 1986, A.D. Smith 1981). The opposite trend has occurred in several of today's international "hotspots". Despite the increasing internationalization of economies, state-level politics and media, ethnicity, as a motivating and organizing principle, continues to find an enthusiastic audience.

Given the continuing and indeed (in some areas) growing expediency of the ethnic factor in state political systems, an understanding of why ethnicity provides the emotive function it does in individual and group dynamics must be established. The reality of ethnicity is evident in the day to day actions of individuals. However, ethnicity, being a product of both individual and group awareness of self, creates problems in

analysis that can only be partially resolved through operationalization.

A review of the major scholarly literature of the last twenty years reveals increasing interest in the ways in which ethnic differences effects social organization. Theories have been developed which address the process of ethnic group formation and the dynamics involved when ethnic groups find themselves in contact with other ethnic groups.

The literature on ethnicity can be roughly divided into three main areas of focus, (1) those dealing with the psycho-social aspect of ethnicity and problems or group versus individual identity, (2) those focusing on the creation and maintenance or social boundaries between geographically proximate groups, and (3) those focusing on the function of ethnicity in securing advantages in resource competition.

#### Psycho-social Aspects of Ethnicity

In regard to the psycho-social aspect or ethnicity Isaacs states, "the function of basic group identity has to do most crucially with two key ingredients in every individuals life experience an personality his sense of belonging and the quality of his self-esteem." (Isaacs 1973). In general terms, this "primordial" characteristic of ethnicity postulated by Shils and later expanded upon by Geertz in "The Integrative Revolution" (Geertz 1973, Shils 1972) and places ethnicity on a level of saliency to the individual similar to that of kinship (Stack 1986).

To a greater degree than kinship determinations, however, ethnic identities and inter-ethnic relationships are based upon characteristics of social living that inherently include ambiguity and changing social realities and perceptions. Ethnicity is, to a degree that kinship has never been, malleable and subject to perception and re-definition (Remnick 1983, Keyes 1976). It is hard to imagine kinship determinations radically changing for a group of people over the course of one or even a few generations. Ethnic identity, as determined by both the group and outsiders can be transformed almost overnight, as is the case with the Coastal Swahili of East Africa outlined later in this document.

It is the nature of ethnic determinations to change with and to react to different times and circumstances. Ethnic identity consists of subjective emblematic uses of certain aspects of culture that may include any of a number of individual and group characteristics. For example, in the U.S. a great deal of research has suggests that there are very few "cultural" differences between black and white Americans in terms of cultural values and expectations when class and regionality are taken into account (Glazer and Moynihan 1963, Liebow 1967). Yet, popular stereotypes concerning black and white American culture stimulate their divisiveness and enhance the ideology of separate ethnicities for the two groups. This example is, of course, confounded by the issue of race and the unique history of African-Americans.



Increasingly, however, as aspects of "black culture" become part of general popular culture, white people who "act black" (and vice versa) point to a more profound determination of what constitutes ethnic identity in this country.<sup>5</sup>

De Vos uses a psycho-social approach to define ethnicity broadly as "a self perceived group of people who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by others with whom they are in contact" (De Vos 1975). Folk religion and beliefs, language and historical forces are among the most important of these binding forces.

Ethnicity operates by amplifying characteristics that are binding due to their perceived similarities as opposed to any meaningful cultural dissonance they may in fact imply between those who share and those who do not share a common set of cultural characteristics. Subjective, personal experiences of ethnicity are the focal domain of inquiry, according to De Vos. Structural features of personality determine how individuals perceive and adapt to changing identities and in turn are effected by changes in the larger society (1975).

The assumed primacy of subjective psycho-social experience of ethnicity leads to the idea that ethnicity stems directly from the need to articulate personal and group identity in relation to other persons or groups. Identity,

---

I once heard the African-American author James Baldwin say that it is the miracle of America that English, Scottish, French etc. immigrating to this country and Ibos, Ga, Fulanis etc., brought as slaves, became "whites" and "blacks" upon setting foot on American soil.

according to Devereaux, is both the result and the cause of the individual's "absolute uniqueness defined by "a induplicable accumulation of imprecise determinations." (1975:51). These determinations effect class or category formation into which individuals and groups are placed according to criteria which often marks their uniqueness from others in the same class, a fundamental characteristic of the human thinking process (Labov 1989).

Using category differentiation as the major criteria, ethnic identity can be logically deduced from two symmetrical specifications; "A is an X" and "A is not a non-X (Devareaux 1975:53). Ethnicity therefore stems from cultural categorizations which ultimately stem from individual and group "personalities", and from the need in the human mind to classify. In short, specifications as to what constitutes ethnic identity develops only after an ethnic group recognizes the existence of others who do not belong to the group (1975:54).

#### Ethnic Boundary Approach

Barth's edited volume (1969) is perhaps the most quoted work on ethnicity to appear in the anthropological literature. Barth sees ethnic identity as a means of creating and maintaining "boundaries" between competing or potentially competing spatially proximate groups. The sharing of a common culture, which is widely seen by anthropologists as the basis for defining ethnic groups, is seen by Barth as a result or

implication, but not necessarily a primary definition, of ethnic group organization. "The differences that are taken into account [in categorizing ethnic groups] are the sum of objective differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant"(1969:14). These significant differences provide a means of governing interaction in plural settings.

Again, subjective classification plays a major role in the determination of ethnic groupings, this time in a more narrowly defined setting of what amounts to resource competition between groups occupying the same geographical niche. Ethnic identities are born, evolve and sometimes disappear depending upon the level and type of contact with representatives of other ethnic groups. In essence, the context of external stimuli results in a response in the form of ethnicity (Stack 1986:5).

#### Resource Competition

Perhaps the most intellectually and theoretically fruitful approach to studying ethnicity has been the resource competition approach. Glazer, Moynihan and others, postulated that both the welfare state in the developed world, and the socialist state in the under-developed world were particularly responsive to pressure for resources that could be leveled by ethnic groups, and, that ethnic politics would become more and more of a factor in the way in which resource were distributed. Cultural differences are again, according to

this perspective, largely symbolic and serve as the basis for the mobilization of the group. Religion, language, and national origin "became effective foci of group mobilization for concrete political ends challenging the primacy of class on one hand and nation on the other" (1975:18).

The focus of this idea is as follows. Ethnic group identification provides for individuals, a functional means of mobilizing as a group for access to the resources distributed by the welfare state. Modern states imply multi-ethnicity (as will be discussed later) as well as a proliferation of interest groups, classes and other "natural" political and social associations all of which, at some levels, vie for a piece of the national pie.

Individuals acting as members of an ethnic group, in situations of perceived group interest or threat to interests, can call on group loyalties that are more salient and powerful than membership, say in a political party or a labor union, can (Stack 1986). Depres' edited volume (1975) includes several case studies dealing with the ways in which resource competition enhances ethnic identity and group formation. It includes case studies in a variety of geographical settings which demonstrate the ways in which ethnic identities ebb, flow and can be manipulated according to the group interests being served.

Related to the debate over resource competition and its effect in plural societies is Kuper and Smith's work on

pluralism in Africa (1969). More recent formulations of the question of competition include Banton's work on rational choice theory (1978), which combines some of the perspectives of the psycho-social approach with resource competition, and Roosen's work on ethnogenesis and the creation of "natural" symbols (1988). Both point out the elasticity of ethnic boundaries.

Ronald Cohen (1978) gives the subject similar treatment and comes up with similar ideas about the elasticity of ethnic boundaries but is more concerned with the ways in which these boundaries are relate to pre-existing stratification. In this he is somewhat in line with Marxist formulations of the problem which see ethnicity, especially in the twentieth century, as largely a product of class conflicts and the unequal distribution of resources that are the basis for stratification and competition along ethnic lines.

Cohen (1978) postulates the existence of cross-cutting cleavages that serve to weave some of the potential conflict of belonging at once to many different social groupings together. Membership or interest in non-ethnic specific activities or concerns such as a social class, labor unions, occupational classes or religious organizations are but a few examples of the numerous potential cross-cutting associations that can mitigate against ethnic-specific motivations and political mobilizations.

What is inherent to each of the above formulations of the problem is the existence of ethnicity as one of a number of characteristics used by individuals to identify themselves in relation to others. Ethnic identity is one of several sometimes overlapping responses made by human beings to the question "who am I?" An individual acts as a member of an ethnic group while acting as a member of other social groups at the same time. The individual's identity as a family member, a kin group, a labor organization, a political party, a nation, ad infinitum, is part and parcel of his or her everyday determination of action and reaction.

The position I take in this discussion is, in some ways, a combination of these three broad approaches. Ethnic identity, like other forms of identity, both constrains and motivates individual actors in the everyday expression of behaviors and attitudes towards those around them. The context of ethnicity and its expression determines, to a large extent, the ways and means by which individuals acting in social relationships perceive of their roles and the roles of others.

At the most basic level, ethnic identity provides one of the "we-they" dichotomies, like kinship determination, that are the basis for social living and thus human society itself (Young 1976). The fundamental function of ethnicity and of ethnic group determination is to create and maintain

distinctions that relate the individual or the group to some others (Patterson 1977).

### The Role of the State in Decreasing Ethnic Tension

It is in the interest of multiethnic states to promote common citizenship and common loyalties amongst its constituents. Such loyalties are required not only to engender a willingness to defend and to support the state, but also to establish its legitimacy. To the extent that the promotion of these ideas and associated behaviors is possible, the state has the capacity to constrain factors generating some of the problems of inter-ethnic competition within its boundaries.

In order to survive, state systems must find a way to balance ethnic allegiances with national allegiances given the overwhelming potential of ethnic identity and mobilization to disrupt the process of nation-building in both developed and for developing multi-ethnic states. A major key to this process is the creation of a national identity that overrides or supplements previous identities in matters of national interest and community integration (Thompson and Ronen 1986, Bell and Freeman 1974, Bendix 1964).

The accomplishment of these goals is, admittedly, a tall order. However, there are processes and conditions that seem to facilitate nation-building and the creation of new identities. I will conclude this part of this discussion by briefly outlining some of the conditions under which ethnicity

loses some of its salience in the face of the interests of the national community and the development of national citizenship.

### Education

A key resource available to the state is the educational system. It provides the most direct means for instilling common symbols of nationhood into potential consumers. It also provides a common basis for linguistic and social unity amid cultural diversity as well as a common theory of civics. It is also a primary source for early socialization among younger citizens. The singing of national anthems and the focus on national heroes and histories are very directed exercises. Citizens educated in a common educational system are likely to share political and social outlooks as well as the feeling of commonality with others participating in the educational process. According to Anderson, this common educational linkage was one of the major factors in the rise and spread of independence movements among elites in former colonies (Anderson 1983:89).

Besides promoting a common political culture, national educational systems bring together, physically, future leaders of their respective ethnic groups meet and study together often for the first time and bring back to their respective communities first hand impressions and knowledge of their fellows (Chai 1978). The assumption is that ethnic prejudices and antagonisms will decrease as individuals began to interact



with their fellow citizens and become aware of the value of diversity (McKown 1974). Education will, in effect, make up for the otherwise irrational persistence of ethnic antagonism among fellow citizens while simultaneously promoting the positive and productive values of national citizenry.

Evidence as to the effectiveness of education in promoting a political culture and decreasing ethnic antagonism is decidedly mixed. While it is often true that individuals express less ethnic prejudice and more understanding and appreciation of the role as citizen as their educational attainment increases, the effects of this trend on actual behavior is unclear (Fischer 1980, Sawyer, 1980, McKown 1974).

Individuals who attain very limited access to the educational system are unlikely to identify with other benefits of the national government. Often, access is limited by lack of development in concerned areas. As a result, education, as well as other services of the state are in scarce supply. Individuals in these peripheral areas are therefore less likely to display concern or allegiance to a common citizenship compared with their more centralized fellows.

Education also exists as a resource like other, more material resources. Access to the educational system, especially university education, is often the key to obtaining not only positions in the commercial marketplace, but also more powerful and better paying positions in government.

Where jobs and places in universities are limited, access to a university education can mean everything to an individual and an ethnic group. As such, it is among those valuable and scarce resources that can be correlated to ethnicity by those who benefit. Places in the university, investment in localized schools and training institutes and access to scholarships and educational grants can be right up there on the agenda with political representation and economic investment.

In order to exploit the potential of a state sponsored educational system in nation-building, leaders must insure that ethnicity does not compromise the neutrality of the state in dealing with ethnic competition. The danger to national identity becomes real when particular ethnic groups are denied access to educational resources while at the same time other groups benefit disproportionally from the benefits that result from access to the educational system. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, (including, remoteness, urbanization, and differential contact among other factors) educational disparity and access to educational systems are more the rule than not.

#### The Market

Because so much of the rationalization of inter-ethnic conflict is based on the unequal distribution of and access to goods and services provided by and within the state, a logical means of combating the tendency for ethnic antagonism is to even out some of the distributional inequalities. The multi-

ethnic state has the responsibility to create at least the appearance of open access and opportunity to participate in the market system. The appearance of anything less invites challenges by disgruntled and disadvantaged groups.

This is perhaps even more true in situations where resources are especially scarce. In relatively affluent societies, enough resources exist so that eventually, some "trickle down" to even the most disadvantaged segments of society. Individual members of these segments are able to take advantage of the resources available to the whole society in numbers sufficient enough to create an appearance of fair access, despite actual biases. The individuals who achieve success within the economic system represent to those left behind and to the more advantaged segments of the society, proof that the system is fair and that it "works".

In less affluent societies, the resources available are often so scarce and the access to those resources so much centered in the hands of elites, that little trickles down to the masses. Unfortunately, Third World regimes, are notorious in their control over economic processes within the state. These policies often alienate the average person from both the state government and the "legitimate" market (Hyden 1983).

Political expediency may dictate that allocated resources and advantages are dispersed to fellow elites and others in a position to take advantage of the control exercised by the state. As a result, there is no model of the system being fair

and open to every citizen. Members of a disadvantaged group, as stated before, may take recourse by directly challenging a system which is seen as perpetrating their disadvantage (Nagel and Olzak 1982).

The market has a chance to remedy this situation and to create national identities in several ways according to Hyden (1983). Open access to the market creates groups with an economically rational stake in its preservation and smooth operation. Ethnic tensions are lessened by the recognition that intense competition could result in the dissolution of the economic and political system to the detriment of all parties concerned.

In addition, contact with the market fosters an awareness and appreciation for the state system in which the market exists. The regulation of the market by the state gives the state and the ruling regime a perceptible identity with its regulatory capacities. The state thereby becomes "visible" as a function of its taking on a role in resource distribution (Hyden 1983).

The market is also instrumental in developing class-based social identities, which cross-cut ethnic identities. By creating access to market-like distribution, the market stimulates class-like occupational structures theoretically open to all participating in the system. All of this depends, of course, on the availability of resources spread throughout the system and the equal access to those resources by members

of a society. Even if fair and open markets could be fostered in such societies by the state, historical and contemporary circumstances guarantee that historically disadvantaged groups or disadvantaged regions continue to lag behind.

### Political Participation

States that would be nations are constantly faced with the possibility of ethnic tensions getting out of hand, especially in situations where political representation and participation is stratified and monopolized along ethnic lines. Even in the many one-party governments so characteristic of Third World states, perceived alienation from political reward quickly becomes a focus of protest and resentment among ethnic elites. Without representation, i.e. a voice in the state system, access to the type of control regimes have over redistribution is cut off.

As for the development of state-focused loyalties which can override ethnic allegiances, alienation from the political process has an exactly opposite effect. The state itself may be seen as an instrument of exploitation by outside forces which have no contact with or concern for the ethnic masses. The historical and contemporary example of the Creole/native conflicts in Liberia is an outstanding example of this type of alienation becoming intolerable. In other words, the degree of participation in the political process predicts to loyalty and identification with the state.

Numerous examples exist of attempts to remedy this concern in multi-ethnic states and to represent, to a relatively fair degree, the ethnic milieu. The Nigerian Constitution of 1979 guaranteeing somewhat proportional representation in government, is an excellent example of this strategy. Other states in Africa and elsewhere have taken an opposite approach by very deliberately leaving any reference to ethnicity out of their constitutions or by adding provisions which, at least on paper, explicitly discourage the promotion of ethnic politics (Omoruyi 1986).

Relatedly, ethnic language policies have taken one of two possible tracks in order to focus away from the appearance of political favoritism. One strategy is to promote an official state lingua franca in a non-native vernacular, such as English in Kenya, or, to promote a native language that is politically "safe" in that native speakers of the language have little political power, as is the case with Swahili in Tanzania (Whitely 1969). A third strategy may be added in which the official policy is bi or multilingualism as in the case of Canada and Belgium (Birch 1989).

Fair access to political representation for all ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic state also has its problems. Ethnic differences officially recognized as such can lead to the formation of politicized ethnic "blocks" which vie for power and control based on the continued strengthening of ethnic

sentiments, eventually realizing the potential for ethnic nationalism (A.D. Smith 1979).

State level policies restricting the formation of ethnically based political parties may subvert this tendency if opportunities for political representation are not restricted as a by-product. However, the accomplishment of this task requires the formation, at some level, of multiethnic coalitions which have, as the impetus for their formation, some idea of common long-term goals and strategies for obtaining those goals (Horowitz 1985).

#### Cross-cutting Cleavages

More or less consciously directed actions by the state are not, however, the only factors that mitigate towards the goal of state cohesion. In fact, I contend that the very nature of the multi-ethnic state may, in and of itself, lead to the types of processes and societal evolution on the group and individual level that creates and sustains nationhood.

What I mean by this is that through the very nature of multi-ethnic societies and the increased level of contact and need for inter-ethnic cooperation that is implied in the multi-ethnic state, the prominence of nationhood can, and has in the past, resulted in the types of changes in perception and attitude which are of vital importance to the maintenance and perpetuation of the state.

In addition to the reformulation of "we-they" categorizations pertaining to fellow nationals of any

ethnicity, increased contact can also lead to the breakdown of cultural institutions held by individual members of ethnic groups that are the measure by which ethnic distance is made. Migration to urban centers, the opening up of ethnic frontiers and the rise of intra-national and international media forms often results in changes in language use, cultural values and social expectations. Also, the frequency of inter-ethnic marriages and other forms of more or less permanent social relationships and increased personal knowledge of other ethnic groups often increases as the level of multi-ethnic contact increases (Forbes 1985, Rothberg 1978).

The implied similarities of interests and motivations inherent to these increasingly common identities for individuals result in "cross-cutting" cleavages in identity formation. In other words, individual interest in some aspect of social or economic life often coincides with the interest of other individuals within a society regardless of specific ethnic identity. These similarities of interest, under certain circumstances, "cut" through real or perceived differences in other areas of identity, including ethnicity (R. Cohen 1978).

Thus, all teachers or all factory workers share, to some extent, a commonality of interests within their profession. All Catholics share some fundamental aspects of political and social motivation based on religiosity despite their ethnic or national origin. Furthermore, these commonalities provide for



individuals, modes of behavior for action and reaction any situation, but especially in situations of economic imperatives. For instance, in a situation in which the interests of teachers are under attack, say in matters of salary or licensure, being a member of that profession is more salient than being of a particular ethnicity. Or in a debate over abortion rights or religious education, being a Catholic may more so determine the stand that an individual takes than being a member of a particular ethnic enclave<sup>6</sup>.

As has already been discussed, such commonalities of interests may not be sufficient to override ethnic identity in matters of group mobilization, but they do provide the basis from which a comparative algebra of action in a given situation may be derived. For instance, mass labor movements and union action, in almost every state society, are typically multi-ethnic where ethnicity is not very closely related to ethnic stratification. The inter-ethnic cooperation and co-dependency that often form the basis for more politically based organization towards common goals.

It is these types of non-state directed, "naturally occurring" phenomena which are the subject of this discussion. The position that I have undertaken in my research and in this document is a two-fold one. One, that inter-ethnic contact

---

<sup>6</sup>Of course religious identity or social status may be part and parcel of ethnic identity and thus indistinguishable as an organizing principle. Jewish identity is an extreme example of this conjuncture of religious and ethnic identities

leads to and necessitates the types of inter-ethnic cooperation and shared interests that breaks down internal ethnic barriers under conditions of a proliferation of ethnic types available for classification and re-classification. And, given this condition and others that will be expounded upon later, an increased sense of national identity fills the void left by the breakdown of the "cultural" aspects of ethnic identification and aids in making sense of the proliferation of ethnic identities and the loyalties and expectations they imply.

The adverse may, of course, also prove true. Despite the presence of cross-cutting cleavages, such as those discussed above, the creation of a national identity may be confounded by the overwhelming loyalties presented by ethnic identification, especially in cases where ethnic groups that make up a nation have no historical experience of cooperation or co-dependency or where historical animosities get in the way of contemporary cooperation and the reduction in the importance of ethnic identity in national affairs (Mackey and Verdoodt 1975).

Scholars have long recognized the potential for this latter hazard in the Third World states of Africa, Latin America and Asia. These nations, it was thought, were particularly in danger of dissolution along ethnic lines because of their relative newness and because of the arbitrary way in which their colonial boundaries sometimes ignored

historical ethnic allegiances and animosities in the formation of new territories. Recent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union prove that the potential is not limited to the Third World.

The types of naturally occurring processes discussed earlier may in fact lead to further disintegration of the national community. This trend is especially true when one or a combination of several internal characteristics of multi-ethnicity are present. For instance, when ethnic groups or sub-groups feel that their ethnicity is the cause for discrimination or otherwise unequal access to the state's resources. When one or more ethnic groups perceive of themselves as the true heirs and representatives of the nation to the exclusion of other "foreign" ethnic groups. And, when ethnic identity is used as the exclusive basis of political mobilization (Freeman 1974, Rothchild 1986).

While most of the perspectives outlined above tend to focus on the internal dynamics of state-level multi-ethnicism, I am concerned here with the overall development of national identity from a perspective of the conditions under which these identities become relevant. If ethnicity is indeed subject to re-interpretation and processes of relativism and reductionism, at what point does this reductionism result in more or less permanent determinations of interests and loyalties. This concept is key to studying multi-ethnicity and nations throughout the globe. At some level of

interaction the boundaries of ethnicity must expand to provide the most adaptive as well as the most individually relevant identities possible.

I contend that contact with people outside of both the ethnic universe contained within a nation and outside of the political sphere of the state determines, to a large extent, the direction of inclusive and exclusive multi-ethnicity in relation to national identity. The degree of shared identity in relation to others who do not share that identity is of vital importance in two ways.

First, it provides a unifying national identity and an identity of shared interests which, at least on some occasions and for some purposes, bind together for the sake of mutual interests, the members of the state. The Nyayo credo "Love. Peace, Unity" along with the national motto "Harambee" (communal sacrifice) are political manifestations (at least in words) of the recognized importance of maintaining feelings of inter-ethnic nationalism for Kenyans interested in development.

Secondly, it provides a relative scale of distance by which identities are ranked in terms of degree of difference. Unlike the conscious effort of maintaining national identity, this process occurs on the more subtle and perhaps more powerful and permanent level of changes in classification and categorization mentioned earlier in this chapter.

In the present case study, non-Kenyan nationals, and in particular Western tourists, provide the class of outsiders to which these determinations of external distance, and the assumed decrease in the articulation of internal ethnic distances, occur. Western tourists especially not only differ from the local population in every measure of ethnicity, including race, language and regional origin, but also in terms of material wealth, social motivation and cultural values. The implication is that ethnic identity gives way to national identity under such circumstances.

Inevitably, a kind of reductionism in scale occurs in which the distance becomes relative to the level of more nominal differences. It's all a matter of degree. The challenge presented to states is to insure that the degree of distance becomes robustly permanent, powerful and inclusive.

### CHAPTER 3 THE FIELD SETTING

Malindi lies directly on the Indian Ocean about ninety miles north of Mombasa, Kenya's second city. Wide white sanded beaches make up the seafront of the town for a distance of about five miles interrupted only by an large outcropping of rock about 50 feet high at about the three-quarter point headed north. Tradition has it that it is here where Vasco de Gama first set foot in what is now Kenya and a large monument in the shape of a white cross, visible for miles on either side of the beach, marks the spot.

An almost continuous line of palm trees border the end of the beach and the beginning of the contemporary town. On either extreme end of the beach, the beach-chairs and the beachside bars of tourist hotels also serve to mark the ocean-side border of the town. In between, small Swahili fishing boats (mashua), representing a more traditional economy, lie strewn in various stages of preparedness waiting for the tide to lift them onto the waves. A long, rarely used jetty stretches out to greet the occasional larger ship. Separated from the Swahili fishing boats by the jetty is the unused portion of the beach that borders the backside of the Malindi Curio Dealer's Market.

The north and south roads are separated by the District Officer's office, formerly the British colonial office, and a small public garden called Uhuru Park. Stretching a half-mile westward from Uhuru Park is Jamhuri Road and the main business section of town. It is along this road that the bus stage and the central market combine to make this area the most trafficked in Malindi. Travellers, retailers and shoppers crowd the relatively small area between the bus stage and the market from sun-up to sundown busy and intent in their own affairs. The half-mile or so strip is interrupted by the road leading to Mombasa at the rear of the market.

The town itself stretches back about three square miles in a variegated pattern. Just behind the palm trees, on the northern half of the town runs Lamu Road, the only thoroughfare leading to the north coast of Kenya, Lamu Island and eventually, Somalia. It is along this road that tourist activities and attractions are most highly concentrated. The estates of the old British "macoloni" or colonists occupy lands that are slightly further north and inland from Lamu Road.

At the Southern half of the town, an un-named road begins at the rear of the Old British Colonial office, now the District Officers offices, continues past the Curio Village and the Friday Mosque, in front of the ancient Swahili neighborhood of Shela and in back of Silver Sands, there is a beachside camping site very popular among younger travelers.

The beach narrows at this point but widens after about 300 yards to reveal the second major concentration of tourist hotels. This side of the beach belongs almost exclusively to Italian owned interests. Finally, Marine National Park with its spectacular coral reefs mark the end of the town on the southern side.

The municipality itself is made up of several "mitaa" or neighborhoods that have evolved out of the original settlements in what is now the Shela and Maweni sections on the southernmost side of town. Today, they branch out in a fairly even, but variegated pattern of dwellings for about three miles inland. The concentration of residential structures gradually blend into the surrounding countryside where Mijikenda and Swahili small scale farmers and squatters work to produce corn, banana, coconuts, tomatoes and a variety of other crops.

Importantly, for tourism, Malindi is blessed with predictably moderate weather all year long. The temperature in and around the town rarely gets below a mean of 75 degrees even during the three month long rainy season between March and May. The rains are associated with the end of the high tourist season. A corresponding slowdown in the overall life of the town is extremely noticeable during the rainy season. The daily heavy showers that are characteristic of the high rainy season gradually give way to the "short rains" of June and July in which the occasional and brief afternoon showers



brings pleasant, refreshing relief to the increasingly warm temperature. The more than adequate annual rainfall gives the surrounding country-side a lush, tropical appearance. A characteristic often remarked on by first time visitors.

In addition to the hospitable climate and, by now, the considerable tourist accommodating infrastructure devoted to Malindi, tourists and its other visitors are also attracted by the presence of an airport large enough to accommodate Kenya Airways Fokker aircraft as well as smaller private and charter flights. The presence of five bus company offices in the middle of town provides the other major artery for the going and comings of tourists and indigenous Kenyans. Indeed, the bus lines provide contact, through connections in Mombasa, with every other part of Kenya from Kisumu in the far West to Garissa in the north.

Despite the importance of the town as a tourist center and as hub for travellers from the north to other parts of the country, the material conditions of roads, housing standards and other "developmental" characteristics in the local neighborhoods remains relatively poor, compared to those devoted to tourists. This contrast in infra-structural development further heightens the other obvious contrasts between tourists and the host community explored below.

The older neighborhoods of Shela, Maweni and Kibokoni are characterized by narrow, winding, dirt streets with stone and occasionally, mud-packed houses. Telephone and electrical

wire run along the tops of housing in seemingly random order but historically the result of the time each line was connected from the mains running along the major streets. Larger, better paved thoroughfares mark the boundary between one neighborhood and the other but inside the neighborhoods themselves, vehicular traffic conditions are poor.

The much newer (in terms of dates of construction) neighborhood of Kisumu Mdogo suffers similar problems of crowding, lack of paved roads, and sidewalks. The major street to Kisumu Mdogo is virtually impassible during the rainy season without walking through knee deep water much of the way. Many of the homes in Kisumu Mdogo do not have electricity or indoor plumbing at all because of their distance from mains.

Frequent, town wide power outages make the contrast between the local neighborhoods and the tourist area seem even greater. The immediate cause is over consumption and the overloading of outdated transformers, and water shortages due to lack of water pressure or the blockage of the only pipe leading from the Sabaki River four miles away from Malindi. Tourists do not suffer as much due to such inconveniences because the major hotels all have wells dug on their property and generators in case of electricity failures. I will return to these contrasts later.

Before I discuss the role of tourism in the continuing development and current character of Malindi any further, I

will first briefly outline some of the historical factors that have shaped the development of the town. Malindi has a long and interesting history, which, in my opinion is important in understanding contemporary developments. Contemporary ethnic relations, and particularly relations between Kenyans and non-Kenyans in the town can only be understood by analyzing the historical position of both groups in the development of the town.

For purposes of this discussion, I will divide the history of Malindi into five historical periods. These mark significant changes in the social and economic development of the town. They include (1) the early beginnings of and florescence of Swahili civilization (2) the Portuguese intrusion (3) the era of Omani hegemony (4) British colonialism and (5) the contemporary post-independence period.

#### The Beginnings of Swahili Civilization

The history of Malindi is tied very closely to the historical development of other Swahili East African coastal centers.<sup>1</sup> These urbanized settlements were marked by a large degree of dependence on foreign trade (mostly with the Middle-

---

<sup>1</sup>I will continuously refer to "Swahili" culture and civilization throughout this discussion. However, I must call to the readers attention the fact that, in many ways, Swahili ethnic identity is a constructed identity that may have held no concrete meaning to the people about whom this historical outline is being written. The name "Swahili" itself is thought to be a corruption of the Arabic word for coast, "sawahil", and was not used by coastal peoples or outsiders until the early 19th century when Omanis began using it to describe members of East African coastal urban societies (Nicholls 1971:19).

East) and the material influences such trade implies. Social life within these Islamic towns were characterized by distinctive social stratification based upon mercantilism, family wealth, genealogy, and an outward socially recognized display of legitimate religious adherence. Relatively constant economic and political competition were also characteristic of life within and between the urban-centers (Middleton 1993, Swartz 1992, Maxon 1975).

The importance of such urban centers and the importance of maritime trade in their development is crucial to understanding Swahili cultural development. Ethnic groupings which, to a greater or lesser degree, coalesced into Swahili ethnicity, soon shared a common ancestry linguistically and culturally with other Sabaki speakers before their migration to the Coast (this includes the Mijikenda, who were to follow centuries later). Upon their arrival and subsequent exploitation of maritime industries, including trade with the wider world, the course of Swahili cultural history and identity seems to have diverged markedly from that of their close Coastal relatives.

An exact date for the establishment of Swahili urban centers along the coast and islands of Kenya and Tanzania still eludes us. Much of the information regarding the establishment of such legendary places as Kilwa and Pate are tied very closely to cultural myths. It seems relatively certain, however, that there were large trading settlements on

the East African coast as early as the ninth century, based on reports by Near Eastern and Chinese traders and travelers (Martin 1973).

Therefore it is now widely accepted that by the beginning of the eleventh century, contact and trade between East Africa and the Middle East had led to a proliferation of trading towns on the Coast. Mogadishu, Mombasa and Kilwa were among the largest and most well known of these tribe-based city-states occupied by Swahili speakers (Nurse and Spear 1985:80).

The ability to exploit maritime industries not only assured Swahili contact a the wider world, it also allowed the Swahili to maintain contact with each other over long distances. Swahili were able to move relatively easily from town to town taking advantage of trading opportunities as they arose. The need and ability to travel by sea allowed these scattered communities to maintain contact and develop a common identity based on language and custom that overshadowed the distance between the communities (Nurse and Spear 1985:67).

The maritime nature of early Swahili towns and their involvement with overseas commerce are at the same time causes and reactions to their continued growth throughout their early history. Swahili society developed in response to this early exploitation of Indian Ocean trade while at the same time stimulating this trade through its increasing appetite for outside goods and its market-like competitiveness for the

riches its exports supplied. Among the most important of these exports were ivory, gold and later, slaves. These goods were exchanged for Islamic pottery, Chinese porcelain and cotton cloth from the Near East and China (Curtin et al. 1989:143).

Patterns of trade winds linking the Near East and Africa made this long distance trade was both possible and profitable, and led to the formation of Swahili Coastal towns. The Northern Coast of East Africa was favored by these winds that allowed Arab ships to head South from December to March and return between April to August (Curtin et al. 1989:141). The northern ports, such as Mogadishu and Lamu, offered the first and easiest points of access through trade to the exports of East Africa. The towns further south, such as Kilwa and later Zanzibar, offered access to the increasing quantities of gold being exported from Zimbabwe within the one year cycle of trade winds (Curtin et al 1989:140).

The earliest reliable recorded account of a town called Malindi seems to have been made by Islamic travelers and geographers in the 12th century (Martin 1973:10). At that time it was a fairly prosperous trading and farming community competing with the larger and more prosperous towns of Kilwa and Mombasa for the growing lucrative trade with the outside world.

The Swahili towns that had started off as isolated communities of Afro-Arab traders and travellers in the early

8th century A.D. had over the course of several centuries developed a language, culture and society that was well-established with its own traditions and history. The small trading villages had grown into the metropolis' of East Africa so that by the beginning of the 14th century, ships traversed the Indian Ocean from as far away as China to deal with them. It was at this point that During the mid-14th century, the Portuguese first arrived on the Southern East Africa coast.

#### The Portuguese Period

The earliest Portuguese contacts with East Africa came in the form of increasingly enterprising Portuguese presence in the 15th century. Malindi became the center for Portuguese activity in the northern half of Eastern Africa almost from the onset. Vasco de Gama is said to have personally enlisted the aid of Malindi in his fight against the ruler of Mombasa (it may also have been the case that the ruler of Malindi enlisted De Gama's assistance in an ongoing feud against Mombasa) (Berg 1971).

The Malindi that the Portuguese found upon arrival was already a multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan community. In addition to the indigenous Swahili and other coastal African ethnic groups, there was a considerable Arab presence along with others from India. The Arab/Swahili part of town was surrounded by a wall and had stone, sometimes multi-storied housing, for the most part. The housing outside of the wall was made of mud. Styles and materials that indicate the

presence of other African groups (Segecu) as well as poorer Arabs and Indians. Trade in the town was brisk and a number of native industries were soon exploited for trade.

When the Portuguese arrived on the scene, rivalry between the rulers of Malindi and Mombasa was already intense. The ruler of Malindi had previously befriended Vasco da Gama during his first visit to East Africa in 1498. Upon his return, with a larger fleet, Malindi offered da Gama and the Portuguese aid during their first siege of Mombasa in 1505. After the final defeat of Mombasa in 1593, the ruler of Malindi was made the ruler of Mombasa in return for aid shown to the Portuguese (Berg 1971:125, Curtin et al. 1989:178). It was at this time that the Portuguese constructed Fort Jesus in order to establish a more permanent presence in Mombasa.

The amount of control by the Portuguese over Swahili economies increased as their physical presence increased, resulting in increasingly greater conflict and resentment from the Swahili (Berg 1971:130). However, the Portuguese physical presence was limited to several relatively small garrisons backed up by naval power that could be called upon from Southern India and their cultural influence remained small throughout their presence on the coast (Strandes 1961, Freeman-Greenville 1973).

As the seventeenth century drew to a close, the control exercised by the Portuguese over East Africa began to wane as a result of competition from other European powers elsewhere



in the world and also as a result of competition from Middle Eastern powers, such as Oman, in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Portuguese were never able to fully contain sporadic attempts at rebellion from the Swahili and their allies or the influence exerted by fellow Muslim Arabs in the region. By the end of the seventeenth century, the stage was set for the arrival of a new foreign power in East Africa. One destined to have a lasting and more extensive influence on the cultural and social development of the region.

#### Arab Influence

Malindi's economic fortune began to decline as Portuguese influence in the region waned. By 1593 the Portuguese had moved their administrative base from Malindi to Mombasa due to the better harbor offered by Mombasa and its more strategic position as a hub of East African commerce. The Sultan of Malindi was made the Sultan of Mombasa and he too moved south to that city. Moving the administrative capital from Malindi to Mombasa resulted in loss of revenues in taxes and excise duties initiated by the Portuguese. Labor eventually followed the transferal of the administrative center. Finally, the Portuguese themselves were forced out of East Africa by Omani intrusion at the end of the 18th century.

Malindi's declining population and importance as a center of culture from the late 16th century to the mid-seventeenth century in favor of Mombasa, eventually led to its near abandonment (Martin 1973:46). The population of the town

gradually declined over the course of the 18th century to the point that some scholars have determined, through contemporaneous evidence, that the town was in fact deserted for much of the 18th and early 19th centuries (Martin 1973:45).

The Omani Sultanate based in Zanzibar decided in 1861 to sponsor the re-establishment of the town. To this end, the Sultan sent 150 Baluchi troops and several hundred slaves to commence repairs, rebuilding and replanting. Arabs from Lamu joined in the enterprise in the same year and began extensive cash crop cultivation of the surrounding country-side in the same year. Malindi once again began a prosperous town and grew in prosperity until the arrival of the British.

#### The British Period

British involvement with the development of Malindi began as it did elsewhere in East Africa; with the imposition on the Zanzibar Sultanate of the abolition of the slave trade. Malindi, like other trade and agriculture centers of the Swahili/Arab coastal city-states, depended heavily on slave labor for agricultural production. The loss of this labor was immediately felt throughout the realm of the Omanis and fundamentally changed the entire labor/production structure of the East African coast (Cooper 1981).

With waning Omani economic power came waning political influence. The Imperial East Africa Company soon became Britain's official representative on the Kenyan coast as early

as 1888. The I.B.E.A. oversaw the lucrative agricultural export market in cotton, sisal, sesame and a variety of other agricultural products. However, due to lack of organization and investment capital, the I.B.E.A. was forced to withdraw from the coast and was replaced by an official protectorate status and colonial administration.

Eventually, the power of the Sultanate was confined to the infamous ten-mile strip which included the island of Pate, Lamu, Mafia, the towns of Kismayu and Mogadishu in Somalia and coastal Kenya and Tanzania as far south as Kilwa. By the 1920s, the little remaining authority invested in the Sultan of Zanzibar was officially supplanted by the British Colonial Government (Cooper 1980; Maxon 1986).

In Malindi, changing economic and political realities led to a breakdown in the patterns of social stratification, population movements and political organization. The ethnic makeup of the town and its environs also underwent transformation. With the end of the slave trade, Arab and Swahili land owners were forced to look elsewhere for the where-with-all to make a living. Many of the poorer Arabs went into trading locally, joining the Indians that had began moving to Malindi as early as 1890.

The Giriama also appeared on the scene around this time and indeed their presence was one of the major factors behind the growth of agricultural production on the coast that attracted the I.B.E.A. in the first place. The Giriama were

not, however, interested in or submissive working as labor in the plantation system practiced by both Arab and British aristocrats, despite efforts by both groups at coercion. The record of the colonial administration in dealing with the Giriama, was, to say the least, far from exemplary and may have set the stage for the attitude of the Giriama towards their contemporary inferior, social, political, and economic condition in the town.

Trade led eventually to settlement and ultimately to conquest, and, with the advent of British colonialism throughout Kenya, large numbers of Europeans began appearing on the coast for the first time. Organized tourism began in earnest to Malindi following the depression of the 1930s. Agricultural production and profits decreased dramatically, for example, total coastal trade went from 202,000 pounds to 159,000 pounds within the 20-year period between 1924 and 1944 (Martin, 1973).

Initially, tourists attracted to Malindi were coastal and upcountry British aristocrats. On their part, the relatively small town was a welcome retreat from the increasingly hectic confines of Mombasa and Nairobi. Malindi's good beaches, deep-sea fishing<sup>2</sup>, excellent weather and, beginning with Brady's Palm Beach Hotel in 1932, comfortable accommodations

---

<sup>2</sup>Ernest Hemingway first visited Malindi in 1934 and stayed at Brady's Palm Beach Hotel (now called The Blue Marlin Hotel). Hemingway's Hotel in nearby Watamu was named to exploit the favoritism shown by the author to the area.

made it the favorite choice for holiday among European settlers of the 1930s (Martin 1973:103).

After world War II, tourism in Malindi began to expand in earnest as did the with an increasing number of permanent settlers, mostly retirees or small business people from Great Britain. Several new hotels opened during this period. But with growth in the tourist industry came growth in the infrastructure of the area. During the early 1950s, a private airfield was established taken over later by the government and expanded, the major roads in the town and the one connecting Malindi and Mombasa were improved or constructed, electricity and water fed into the town via pipes from the nearby Sabaki River, gave the town, at least the tourist areas, both amenities for the first time(Martin 1973:111).

Martin describes the type of people coming to Malindi during this period of rapid growth;

The type of European who came for a holiday or to retire in the 1940s and 50s was a curious sort. He was most likely a wealthy farmer from the European highlands. Most of these farmers were Englishman, some of them true aristocrats. Many of those who were not acted like ones when they came to Malindi. Black ties for men and long formal dresses for ladies were de rigueur in the evening. The farmers who came down to Malindi probably had not seen many of their neighbors for months...they made up for the lack of companionship upcountry by entertaining almost every night in Malindi. The bars in the four main hotels were always filled and Malindi rightly earned the reputation as a partying town. (Martin 1973:106)

Contemporary Developments

The current phase of Malindi's growth is almost totally the result of Malindi's favored status as a tourist destination. Tourism has surpassed coffee and tea as the number one earner of foreign exchange in Kenya, more than doubling in the four year period between 1985 and 1989 (Table 3:1). Coast Province and the coastal zone have been host to a share of tourist visitation (as measured by the number of hotel rooms available and occupied) increasingly approaching 50% of the nationwide total during this same time frame (Table 3:2).

Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1990s, Malindi's favorable location along the coast, its pre-existing and relatively high level of infra-structural development and its former status as a British administrative center all favored the town during the years of Kenya's growing popularity as a international tourist destination.

TABLE 3:1

FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS AT CURRENT PRICES, 1985-1989.  
(In Millions of Kenyan Shillings).

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Tourism	209	250	292	349	432
Coffee	203.5	388.5	194.5	244.5	203.8
Tea	191.6	172.7	163.3	185.2	271.8

Source: Economic Survey 1990.

International investment in Malindi has been especially important. The major international investors in Malindi over the last decade have been the Italians, and, surprisingly enough albeit for totally different reasons, those from various Middle Eastern countries.

TABLE 3:2

COAST PROVINCE SHARE OF HOTEL BED CAPACITY, 1984-1988.

Year	Total Number of Beds Nationwide	COAST Share
1978	20,159	41.5%
1979	22,036	42.6%
1980	22,808	42.0%
1981	23,367	42.3%
1982	24,715	45.0%
1983	25,210	45.2%
1984	25,213	44.5%
1985	24,725	45.2%
1986	25,675	46.3%
1987	25,970	47.2%
1988	26,587	47.6%

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.

The impact of European, and especially Italian investors, although limited to "tourist" ventures is the most apparent. Since 1985, seven new hotels have opened in Malindi on the southern end of the town and in the formerly British north end. These newer hotels are medium to small sized for the most part and employ between 20 to 100 local employees apiece. They are also notorious for being "self-contained." By this

I mean that most of the guests at these medium-sized hotels come directly to the hotel on a tour package booked in Italy. All arrangements for safaris and other excursions are made through the hotel or its local agent with the sponsoring tour company in Italy. The guest are provided with all of their meals at the hotel and in fact, do not have to leave the hotel for anything. Italian investors are also major players in the Malindi Casino, the Sabaki Shopping Center and the Malindi's Members Club.

In addition to the actual tourist facilities, foreign investors have interests in many of the satellite industries servicing tourism. These industries include construction and building supply, food preparation and provision services, upscale souvenir shops and the very lucrative tour-guide business. My own survey of tour guide companies revealed that only four of the fourteen companies in Malindi surveyed are totally owned by Kenyans.

Restrictions on foreign investment in Kenya require that Kenyan citizens own at least 50% of any investment in Kenya over 5 million shillings. To get around the restrictions, many of these investors are widely said to be owners in name only having put up very little of the capital themselves. Control, however, remains in the hands of the foreign investor. This situation is further exacerbated because of widespread governmental corruption which allows investors to by pass the need to have an actual co-investor and/or by local



and national government officials who sign themselves or family members on as co-owners in exchange for one time or continued payments of "chai" by foreign investors.<sup>3</sup> I will return to these issues later.

An interesting counter balance in investment seems to have developed over the last few years in the form of Middle-Eastern investors and relatedly, through local people who have worked in the Middle-east and have repatriated much of their earnings in their home communities. People I asked about this, including several prominent members of the local Muslim community, the headmaster at an Islamic school and a local municipal councilman, told me that an increasing amount of investment in Muslim schools new mosque construction, and financial assistance through mosques is coming in through interested groups in the Middle-East as an attempt to counter-balance some of the perceived negative influences of Westerners on the Islamic community.

Reportedly, they also represent attempts to counter-balance the declining cultural influence of the local Muslim community as Malindi continues to absorb non-muslim non-coastal Kenyans. For example, the Sabaki Shopping Center, that includes thirty store-fronts and offices (a number of

---

<sup>3</sup>"Chai" is a Swahili word the literal meaning of which is "tea". Through popular usage, the word had also come to mean bribe and the dispensation of chai is a necessary step in getting almost anything involving a government employee accomplished. These days, it is enough to say that a person wants to eat to understand that a bribe is being requested.

which were yet to be occupied when I left Malindi), three eating establishments, and about twenty residential apartments, is co-owned by a local Italian and a local Arab investor. At the rear of the newest part of the shopping center is small mosque built at the insistence of the Arab investor. On the political front, the fledgling Islamic Party of Kenya, which enjoyed a great deal of support among the Swahili community in Malindi, is rumored to have been funded largely through support from Iran.

A third source of investment from abroad comes in the form of local Swahili young men who have found their way to the Middle East to work as foreign laborers. These young men often remit much of their wages to family members at home. Even though the jobs filled by these Kenyans are largely "blue collar", their salaries can amount to considerable investment capital in Kenya given the growing weakness of the Kenyan shilling on the international market.<sup>4</sup>

There are a number of success stories of young Swahili men sending enough money home from Oman or Saudi Arabia to build houses for themselves and their families or starting a small business in Malindi. One of the Swahili tour company

---

<sup>4</sup>Inflation in 1993 was running at about 50%. However, the Kenyan government's acceptance of structural adjustment restrictions by the I.M.F. and World Bank, including the removal of currency protection, has cut the currency value in half in the first half of 1993. Hopefully, this will stabilize the economy in 1994. The renewal of foreign aid and loans are to be restored in 1994 in return for acceptance of SAP policies, which include freeing up of foreign exchange markets (personal communication, Ronald Cohen).

owners I interviewed, in fact, obtained his initial investment this way.

### Tourism and the Future

Population growth, infra-structural growth and improvement through both foreign and domestic investment and a degree of international recognition currently enjoyed by Malindi are all ultimately the result of tourist growth. The period of fastest growth in the tourist industry has also exhibited the most investment in the town's infrastructure. For example, a sample of building permit applications from the Municipal Council's Permit Office revealed that during the peak years (1980s) of tourist growth in Kenya, applications for permanent residential and business structures in Malindi more than doubled from 61 in 1978 to 126 in 1981, reaching a peak in 1989 at 169.<sup>5</sup>

The Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife District Office in Malindi estimated in 1991 the total number of persons employed full-time in the tourist industry in Kilifi District at 5,350. The District Tourist Officer in charge told me that this number is arrived at by tabulating reports on manpower coming from the tourist hotels, restaurants and tour companies registered as officially sanctioned tour agents by the

---

<sup>5</sup>These numbers include extensions to existing buildings and the construction of very small structures such as kiosks, sheds, stalls, etc. The numbers also represent only applications that were approved, even if the application was first made in the previous year. As of the November 1, 1992, 130 applications had been made.

government. As a result, this is undoubtedly a underestimation of those working in an official capacity in the industry, not to mention those working as tour guides without licensure and those who depend on the industry for at least a part of their income and those participating in related "under-ground activities.

The estimate of official participants in the tourist industry is smaller than the actual figure for two reasons. Firstly, medium and small size hotels on the coast are notorious for under-reporting the number of guests they receive each year in order to avoid paying the bed-tax the Kenyan Government imposes on the tourist industry. In under-reporting the number of guests, they also must also under-report the number of staff they employ in servicing the guests.

Secondly, official estimates of people working for tourist companies do not reflect on the hundreds of people working in equally above-board industries whose livelihood depends wholly on the tourist industry. These include farmers and fisherman who sell much of their produce to restaurants and hotels, taxi-drivers whose main customers are tourists, and retailers of African clothes or curios whose main clientele are tourists. The Malindi Curio Dealer's Association alone has approximately 360 members, i.e. those

licensed to own and operate kiosks, and at least an equal number of hawkers actually selling the curios.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to "more or less" legal activities there are hundreds in the district involved in illegal and/or black market activities including prostitution, drug-dealing, money-changing and assorted con-artists. I estimate from daily observation over many months that at least one-quarter of the economically active people living in Malindi are involved in, or seriously depend on the tourist industry for their incomes.

Beyond direct participation, a number of other linked enterprises owe their existence to the tourist industry and the population growth it has provided. Thus, there are several food kiosks and canteens near the curio village that depend almost exclusively on the lunch-time business of curio dealers and the beachboys that "hang around" the curio market waiting for tourists. It is often said jokingly by people living in Malindi, that every other person in town works in some way in the tourist industry. I met very few people in Malindi who did not derive some portion of their income from tourists either through an activity that they themselves

---

<sup>6</sup>The curio market also sells second clothing and other items obtained through trades with tourists to local people who browse the market looking for items after a large number of tourists have arrived, especially on Wednesdays and Saturdays, the days after the biggest selling days at the market. On a number of occasions, I've witnessed people who do not regularly sell curios or who have nothing directly to do with tourists, attempt to share in the trade by selling curios for commission to tourists who happen to be shopping at the same time they are.

engage in or through some contribution to their income by a family member engaged in tourist related activity.

The widespread Kenyan perception of a bounty created by tourism on the Coast has resulted in a great deal of upcountry migration to Coast Province in general and to Malindi specifically. Immigration is motivated by the economic opportunities presented by the growth of the tourist industry and conversely the lack of opportunity elsewhere. Many, if not most of the migrants come to the coast with no firm expectation of finding work, i.e. without any job waiting for them, but with the expectation of "making something" out of the opportunities that are perceived to surround tourism and tourists. These opportunities may include anything from waiting on tables in a bar to prostitution to freelance tour guide operations.

The number of recent economically motivated migrants is almost impossible to gauge for two reasons. One, many of the migrants come seasonally to the coast in order to take advantage of the "high seasons" between December and March and again between August and October. The other reason is that even those who remain throughout the year become involved in the informal economy and are invisible from a standpoint of a census of the labor force.

A sign of the impact of this migration on the physical size of Malindi is apparent in the fact that two of the largest neighborhoods in Malindi, Kisumu mdogo and Ronald

Ngala Estates were not even in existence prior to 1970. Housing shortages and the relatively high rate of rent are also evidence of a growth rate that is beyond that which might have naturally occurred without high levels of tourism. Although no data exists for total economic and population growth for Malindi specifically, inference can be made by way of a comparison between growth in Coast Province and similarly situated provinces elsewhere.

Of course the kinds of growth outlined above have effected the social development of the town. The pluralist ethnic milieu manifested and made more complex almost overnight is the most visible outcome of this rapid expansion. In the next few chapters, we shall explore the details of multi-ethnicity in Malindi. This exploration begins with an outline of the general features of some of the major ethnic groups that are involved in the continuing evolution of the town.

#### CHAPTER 4 THE COASTAL PEOPLES

The next few chapters examine the basic social, economic and cultural characteristics of the major ethnic groups that are of concern here. For each group, I will briefly outline ethnographic material that is illustrative of what I believe are key factors in both the identity of the group and in how the group relates to other named ethnic groups. The areas of interest in the examination of each of these groups include; historical background; current nation-wide residential patterns; kinship and familial relations and structure; economic base; and overall political status in the Kenyan community.

These particular areas of interest were chosen, of course, to fit each description within the context of the overall theme of this work. Many areas of group identity and status are not examined here and in the forthcoming chapters, I believe, however, that the areas chosen are illustrative of particularly relevant characteristics.

As noted, I have not examined all ethnic groups or features of ethnicity in Malindi. Such an attempt would go beyond the temporal, spatial and theoretical limitations of this work. The ethnic groupings described below exercise the most influence and are most influenced by changing patterns of



ethnic relationships in Malindi according to criteria set by myself based on observations derived from field work in the community. Some groups that are neither distinctive ethnic groups in and of themselves by well-known definitions nor, as individuals, part of the usual ethnic landscape of Kenya are also included. I of course refer to tourists and other visitors from outside.

What follows has been organized to reflect the perspective of the coast looking outward. I start out with an examination of the indigenous coastal peoples, the Swahili and the Mijikenda, move to "upcountry" ethnic groups including the Kamba, Kikuyu and Luo, continue with non-indigenous natives including Arabs and Indians; and finally lump all Europeans and other non-Africans together for reasons that will later become evident.

### The Swahili

The Swahili are the original inhabitants of Malindi town and the heirs of a community of descent with over 1000 years of continuous urban settlement. In fact, Swahili culture and civilization is largely marked by this pattern of urban living and by the transcontinental trade patterns that made urban living both necessary and possible. Swahili urban areas developed in response to and in order to take advantage of trade with the Middle-East, India and China (Middleton 1993).

The term "Swahili" itself is, like many of the ethnic identities on the African continent, something of an

historical and, in a sense, artificial construct (see for example Mudimbe 1988). The word Swahili is thought to have derived from the Arabic word for coast "sawahil" and was used for descriptive purposes to refer to the indigenous people by Omani intruders beginning in the 18th century (Middleton 1993). There is no historical evidence that a common named ethnicity existed among coastal people before that time.

The trading towns that historically represented the seats of Swahili civilization were also never part of a collective polity and the individual communities, in fact, were as often than not, bitterly antagonistic rivals (Maxon 1989, Nurse and Spear 1985, Middleton 1993). A common identity, if it ever existed, was based on the similarity of cultural characteristics in reference to others who did not share in those similarities. The most important of these identity-forming characteristics being urbanization, Islam and a genealogy that includes a progenitor who originally came from the Near East. According to oral and written tradition, these progenitors were Persian Shirazi traders who married into the local communities (Chittick 1965, Nurse and Spear 1985).

All of the ancient Swahili communities shared similar myths concerning their Near Eastern origin, and the distinctions between themselves and their neighbors that this contact brought about. Although several different Shirazi myths exist in various Swahili communities, a generalized

version might contain the following elements taken from the chronicle of the island of Kilwa:

- Kilwa was inhabited by a group of people before the Shirazi arrived
- These people hunted on the mainland
- The Shirazi gave gifts and tribute to the hunters
- The Shirazi were traders: they gave trade goods, beads and cloth
- A Shirazi male married the daughter of a local leader
- Citing in law avoidance, he persuaded the local people to leave
- They agreed to leave if paid with a large amount of cloth
- The Shirazi ruled the island, no longer paying tribute
- The hunters tried to return
- The Shirazi invoked Muslim magic and made sacrifices to keep them from returning
- The Shirazi were subsistence farmers and fisherman, they paid no taxes
- Kilwa was a village with no walls
- A son was born of the Shirazi and the hunter's daughter
- The son later sought out his grandfather on the mainland and was given his power to make war against them
- The son returned to Kilwa, his father died, and he succeeded him as the first ruler of the island and the mainland. Those who had come from Shirazi did not rule. (Nurse and Spear 1985:75-76)

Such oral traditions are not offered as evidence of historical fact, they do, however, express statements of ideological importance. In the above example, these ideological comments include: (a) the distinction between land-based and sea-based economies; (b) the merging of the two traditions through marriage; (c) the superiority of Muslim vs. non-Muslim religions (magic), and, perhaps more importantly to future developments; and (d) the distinction between the civilizing power of urban life versus the barbarism of life in

the "bara" or wildness (Curtin et al. 1989:145, Janmohamad 1976:195).

Perhaps above all else, the ideological and mythological example is repeated in numerous Swahili communities. It emphasizes and points out the importance of the link made between Swahili identity and the Shirazi complex. The importance and strength of this link is shown by the fact that Shirazi descendancy carried more in the way of a claim upon "true" Swahili identity as time went on. This was especially true with later migrations of Swahili speakers, such as the Bajunis, began to participate in the growing urban culture (Middleton 1992).

Throughout the course of Swahili history, outsiders to Swahili communities have been able to assume Swahili identity by laying claim to cultural and religious identities and the ambiguity inherent in claims to Shirazi or Arab descent. Over the centuries some members of Coastal Bantu groups, becoming Muslim and urban, have assumed Swahili identity and grafted it on to Swahili communities in regular fashion throughout Swahili history and down to this present day, while others continue to recognize their Bantu origins (Janmohammad 1976:196). Motivations for assuming a Swahili identity include taking advantage of the relatively more complex material culture and access to material goods to conversion to the Islamic faith. Both types of motivations suggest an

increase in prestige and status to be gained by assuming the more cosmopolitan identity.

The coalescence of various local communities into a common identity was to a large extent brought on by an imposition of the common identity by outsiders, firstly and most notably, the Omanis. This process was accelerated by the policy of British colonialism on Kenya to stratify ethnic communities in terms of rights and privileges within the colony (Ogot 1973). Swahili communities alternately accepted and rejected classification as a "native" ethnic group based on their ancient and modern Near Eastern heritage and the political expediency one or the other identity implied (Salim 1976).

#### Contemporary Swahili Residential Patterns

The Swahili of today represent only a small minority of the Kenyan population. Estimates of the total number of Swahili generally fall between 30,000 to 50,000, the majority of whom are Bajunis from the Bajun Islands near Lamu (Central Bureau of Statistics 1991). Notably, this number represents less than one percent of the total Kenyan population.

The vast majority of the Kenyan Swahili live in coastal villages and cities within the range of the "ten-mile strip" extending into the hinterland. These hamlets range in size from small rural villages of a few dozen people or less to Mombasa, a city of over a half a million people. In the larger historic Swahili urban areas, including Mombasa,

Malindi and increasingly Lamu, the Swahili have become or are becoming a minority. In Mombasa especially, rapid influx of migrants from upcountry has left the historic "capital" of Swahili civilization in Kenya a hodgepodge of ethnic groups of which the Swahili are only a small part.

The total number of Swahili in Kenya is difficult to estimate because of the amorphous quality of Swahili identity mentioned earlier. Perhaps to an extent greater than any other Kenyan ethnic group, Swahili ethnicity has historically been open to outsiders who have taken on key aspects of material culture and the Islamic religion. Relatedly, the identity has also represented a catch-all category for those exhibiting generalized, yet key ethnic markers. As a result, some members of the Swahili community, both self-proclaimed and acknowledged by others, have a traceable heritage that originates not on the Swahili Coast but in the Near East in the last century. One of my chief informants was a member of such a family. His family recognized their origin in Oman (his great-grandfather immigrated from Oman to Kenya at the end of the last century) yet had lost all contact with Omani relatives and had become prominent members of the Mombasa community. The patriarch of the family is in fact a well-respected religious leader of the Mombasa Swahili community.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are very clearly members of the community that are no more than one or two generations removed from Mijikenda ethnicity. These people,

having moved to town, taken on Arabic names, the Islamic religion and other material aspects of Swahili culture have, in many cases, "passed" into Swahili ethnicity. On this note, there is a great deal to be said about racial classification among the Swahili, perhaps more than can be explored in this setting. But I think a few generalized points should be made at the onset.

Swahili ethnicity today includes a wide range of "racial types".<sup>1</sup> In the Malindi community and in every Swahili community in Kenya, with perhaps the exception of Old Town Mombasa, people who identify themselves as Swahili range from very dark-skinned "Bantu" types visibly indistinguishable from their non-Swahili neighbors, to very light-skinned, straight-haired "Arab" types similarly indistinguishable from "true" self-identified Arabs and Indians living on the Coast.

There is a wide range of variation in between, of course, and the range of variation can be seen within even one family. I have always considered the situation to be analogous to that of African-Americans in regard to the variation in physical types within the community, although the range on the lighter-skinned side for the Swahili is perhaps greater. In between

---

<sup>1</sup>This is not the place to argue the anthropological or biological significance, or lack thereof, of the concept of race. Race in the terms used here refers to generalized type and the social perceptions they form. For a discussion of the efficacy of racial classification, see Gould 1984, Mead et al 1968, Montagu 1950; etc.

the two extremes are several shades of "brownness" that make up the majority of the Malindi urban community.

In the country-side, darker skinned Swahili are much more prominent. This is perhaps a function of the lack of continued Near-Eastern immigration and the historical flexibility of rural communities to accommodate the inclusion of their non-Swahili neighbors as new members of the community (Middleton 1992). It is also undoubtedly a function of the high degree of internal stratification that has always existed within Swahili society. High status families invariably married within their own ranks with only rare exception (Middleton 1992). This pattern of patrician intermarriage seems to date back to the foundations of Swahili society. In urban areas especially, social prestige and the desire to obtain it were motivating factors in the political and material development of the towns. I hypothesize that skin-color is used as a status marker in the Malindi and Mombasa communities (it may be different in other communities) in one of three ways.

Lighter-skin is associated with closer genetic proximity to Arab (Shirazi, Omani, Baluchi, or Saudi) ancestry and is therefore a mark of prestige in that much of the adopted material culture of Swahili society comes from the Near East and is associated with the religion which sprang up there. At the same time, skin that is too light and a physical appearance that is too Arab-like confers upon the individual



a Near-Eastern ancestry that is likely to be less prestigious because it is not connected, unless it can be proved otherwise, to the ruling noble Omani families that settled in East Africa in the 19th century but to the traders and laborers that followed. Very dark skin and a very Bantu appearance means that the individual comes from a family that converted to Islam relatively recently (passing again), that they come from a rural (and hence less civilized) Swahili community relatively remote from the town, or worse, that they are the descendants of slaves or menial servants to the higher status families. Bajunis, who, while not as dark skinned as the Mijikenda tend to be, are also associated with low status occupations and origins.

The ideal Swahili appearance is therefore somewhere in between, neither very dark nor very light, and there seems to be some degree of color prejudice within the community. There are however, people of prestige within the community who are very dark-skinned. The principle of the largest local Islamic school who officiated at several "karamu" that I attended was among the most "Mijikenda looking" Swahili men that I knew. Islam, of course, holds racism as a sin and promotes the brotherhood of all men. On several occasions while discussing color prejudice with Swahili informants, I was reminded that the first muezzin, Bilial, was a black African. However, many instances of day to day prejudice exist.

For example, a Swahili neighbor of mine had two small daughters aged 3 and 5. The younger of the two was also lighter skinned (though not, in my estimation, by much). The woman shamelessly and publicly favored the lighter child and on several occasions that I personally witnessed, told the older child that she looked like a Giriama when she became angry at her.

I later asked the woman why she thought the lighter skinned child was prettier, she answered only that she preferred lighter skin. Her sister-in-law, who was present at the time told me that she too thought lighter skinned children was prettier and that lighter skin among women and children was preferred although she personally thought darker skinned men were more attractive. Perhaps to further prove to me that she was not prejudiced against dark skinned people, the sister-in-law, a twenty year old, told me that one of her best female friends in school "was very dark skinned but she was a very fine person." These attitudes, of course have implications for the Swahili's relationship with other ethnic groups in Kenya which I shall return to later.

The problem with this flexibility of identity within the community is that membership in the ethnic group is at times relative to whom you are asking. Part of this ambiguity is expressed when Swahili refer to their home town as the most salient identifier. A person is thus an Amu or an mPate or an mtu wa Malindi in a generalized sense.

Swahili in Malindi

The influence of the Near East on the development of Swahili culture, especially material culture, has generally been overstated. While the Swahili have constantly had contact with strangers from the Middle East who have brought their own cultural traditions and norms to the coast, the adoption of some of these aspects of material and otherwise cultural artifacts may have been exaggerated in the past as to their overall effect on the African base of Swahili culture. What cannot be denied however, is the effect of Islam on the continuing development of Swahili society on the coast and the role that it has in guiding people's everyday affairs.

The central reality of Swahili identity in Malindi and elsewhere in Kenya is adherence to the islamic religion and in particular the particular brand of Sunni Islam found in East Africa (see Trimmingham 1964, Pouwels 1987). Middleton in fact tells us that historically, a Swahili town was not considered "founded" until at least one mosque was established (Middleton 1993:62).<sup>2</sup>

The Islamic religion in Swahili societies at the ritual level approximates very closely the functional role of identity reinforcement described by Geertz and others (Geertz 1975). The yearly ritual calendar revolves most importantly

---

<sup>2</sup>It is not clear however, as to whether this had always been the case. There is at least one contemporary example of a Swahili community in Tanzania that is not Muslim and there may have been others in the past (Trimingham 1975). The link between religion and ethnic identity among the Swahili in Kenya however remains strong.

around the major Islamic observances of Ramadan, Id al Fitr and the Maulid (celebrating Mohammed's birthday). Most Muslim owned eating establishments closed during the daylight hours during the month of Ramadan, in observance of the prohibition against eating and serving food and water during that month. Eating establishments also close during the two other holidays.

The Maulidi is celebrated by visiting family and friends in nearby communities. Mombasa, Lamu and Mambrui being the object of many of the travels after the major holidays. Children are brought the most expensive new clothes a family can afford for wearing during these visits. The Maulidi is an especially significant event for the Malindi Swahili community. A huge feast is offered by "rich Arabs" in Mambrui (about thirty miles north of Malindi). Free transportation is provided by the local bus companies and by car owners travelling to Mambrui for the evenings feast which includes entertainment offered by area Muslim schools. I estimate that close to half of the Muslim population of Malindi leaves town for Mambrui during the Maulid.

Ritual observances also play an important part in the everyday affairs of the Swahili community, most notably through the institution of the "karamu". "Karamu" describes any number of small feasts held within a Swahili household in observance of events that are particularly important spiritually or socially, to the household members. If the

family is well off, these feasts can occur rather frequently and the guest list can include dozens of men. Women also attend karamus but they serve and eat separately, after the men are finished and departed.

I have personally attended karamus that mark events such as; the birth of a new child, the construction of a new addition to the household; the anniversary of a patriarch's death; and the engagement of the son of a household. The guests at the more personal karamus include only members of the family and close personal friends or associates. I was told at a karamu that I attended that marked the pending birth of a new addition to the family that only close friends and family had been invited in order to insure against any latent negative feelings or active witchery that could potentially harm the child.

The karamu always begins with a prayer administered by a local khatibu (Muslim preacher) or mwalimu (Islamic teacher) if one is available, or a prominent Islamic scholar. The prayer is conducted in Arabic with the prayer leader reading from the Koran or reciting from memory. The guests, who are seated on the floor on mats against one or several of the walls of the house, repeat/chant common Koranic passages after the initial blessing is read. Incense is lit in sacrifice while the prayer blessing is being said.

After the prayer/blessings conclude, the guests rearrange themselves into small circles of four or five and await food

being served by the youngest male members of the household or the family. The actual feast is served on large serving platters ("sahani") and the guests eat with their right hands from the common plate (hence the proverb "he who eats with you also dies with you").

In addition to these frequent small scale celebrations, a great deal has already been written about the important role of marriage ceremonies in reinforcing cultural identity as well as hierarchical structuring among Swahili communities. These celebrations, often lasting for the better part of three days and in the past as many as seven, have been known to drive families literally into bankruptcy (Mizra and Strobel 1985, Swartz 1991, Middleton 1993).

Besides ritualized feasts, mosque attendance, and particularly attendance at the noon prayers of the Friday Mosque are key elements in the routine of every Swahili male. Note that women in Malindi do not go to mosque (although elsewhere in Kenya and Tanzania, they do). Women are restricted entirely from mosques in Malindi. I asked one informant if absence from the mosque inhibited the religious education and well-being of women. I was told that women, like men, are required to pray and to study the Koran diligently but that the nature of women required that they do so in the home.

The force of religious adherence and its function in identity affirmation extends even to the style of dress

preferred by Swahili males. A respectable Swahili gentleman often dons the Islamic "kofia" head covering and a long cotton shirt known as the kanzu around the home and during daily activities. Many of the younger men wear the kanzu and kofia during the religious holidays or during attendance at the Friday Mosque. A popular saying "he is a Swahili of the kanzu" means that a person has taken on that particularly identifying aspect of Swahili Islamic material culture even if in other areas of his life he does not live up to the ideal of a Muslim or Swahili man.

Swahili women dress on a daily basis in a bui-bui, a long black gown and head dress worn over other clothes in order to observe purdah, the covering of women in public. The extent of the covering depends on the individual, or more importantly, the individual's personal and family status in the community and the family's overall religious conservatism. Many Swahili women wear the bui-bui as a cape covering most of their clothing but with the hem of their dresses exposed or with some partial opening in the front. The extent of covering varies with the destination of the women outside of the home or with the company kept while walking about. The bui-bui is hardly ever worn inside the home.

Most Swahili women will never cover the face and body completely. There are others, however, that observe a very strict definition of purdah, covering completely from head to ankles with all of the face, except of course the eyes,

covered by bui-bui. Women who cover completely are jokingly referred to by Swahili and non-Swahili alike as "maninja" and "mafundamentalists."<sup>3</sup>

The Islamic religion and the sheri'a (Islamic law) reaches beyond mere ritual importance for Swahili communities. Islamic laws of governing marriage and divorce, inheritance and conflict resolution are still widely in effect. This despite the fact that more secular domains of law, such as those regarding crime and punishment, have been replaced as the major judicial authority first by the British colonial and later the independent Kenyan legal systems.

For most Swahili males whose families can afford the tuition, formal education begins within the confines of an Islamic academy. There are five such academies in Malindi which cater to a range of pupils from pre-school children (aged 3 to 5) to secondary education. In the past, formal education in school was limited to male children. Today, however, boys and girls attend public school together and the madarasa (Islamic school) after regular school hours and on the weekend. While a far greater number of Swahili have received formal education than in the past, the need for continued schooling past primary school is not stressed, and, at least in some instances of which I am aware, discouraged.

---

<sup>3</sup>"ma" is a KiSwahili prefix marking a plural noun that is often used in conjunction with a foreign loan word referring to people.



Domestic and Economic Life

The social and economic base of Swahili communities have changed drastically since the advent of British colonialism and the period following independence. The most important changes have perhaps taken place at the level of means of production. Swahili communities grew wealthy due to their ability to act as middlemen in international trade between East Africa and the rest of the world (Middleton 1993). The Omani intruders of the 18th and 19th century capitalized further on already established trade networks by instituting cash crop plantations which required mass labor in the form of slaves. British intervention ended slavery and effectively destroyed the plantation system in East Africa (Chittick 1986).

In addition to the destruction of the profitable plantation system, changes brought about by colonialism included an increased level of immigration by Indians and Arabs to the coast of Kenya during the early part of this century. The Swahili were thereby instantly faced with new competitors with closer ties to the historically important trading partners of the Swahili. As a result, international trade by way of dhow among Swahili communities decreased dramatically. What has resulted has been the continuing impoverishing of these communities and subsequent changes in the social fabric of the community (Parkin 1985).

As a result of the breakdown in traditional subsistence activities, Swahili today find themselves occupying a number of different occupational positions. In Malindi, Swahili often own small shops (maduka) which sell commercially produced food and household products; own small restaurants or local hotels; or are otherwise engaged in some occupation surrounding the tourist industry, such as working as tour bus drivers, tour guides and tourist company owners. In fact, Swahili men are almost exclusively employed by the major hotels and tour companies as bus drivers (I say almost exclusively, however, I was not aware of any exceptions). The Bajuni of the Shela section of town continue in their longstanding occupational identity as fisherman, selling their catch to hotels and at the local fish market which sits along the shore. If an individual does not own his own boat, he must hire himself out to a local captain.

Married Swahili women, as a rule, do not work outside of the house. However, they are able to supplement the household incomes by taking on work as seamstresses, hairdressers and traders (with other women) of jewelry, imported cloth and various household and cosmetic items. I was told by several informants that a woman works for herself and not to support the household and that it would be shameful for the male head of the household to have to rely on his wife to support his family. The income earned by a woman through her business activities is used to buy herself and her children clothes and

jewelry, at least in the ideal situation. It is not hard to imagine some of the money being used to buy household staples, especially among poorer families.

Single Swahili females increasingly find it necessary or desirable to work outside of the home. This is a function both of their increased educational attainment over the last thirty or so years and the increasing economic need for women to work. The jobs they fill however, are usually the stereotypical female jobs of clerk, secretary, teacher and nurse. I did not come across one Swahili woman who owned or ran her own public servicing enterprise in Malindi without her husband or some other male family member being closely involved. This is not to say that women do not own businesses, however, the businesses that they own are "fronted" on the public end by a man.

In general, unemployment in the Swahili community is at least as high as it is nationwide, which is to say very high, and according to local Swahili, higher because of the discrimination in hiring and in educational opportunity they claim to have faced. As a result, there are substantial numbers of Swahili youth involved in illicit activities with tourists or in response to the tourist industry. Black Market money changing, drug peddling and prostitution being among the most serious of these activities, although they of course are not limited to Swahili participation.

The Mijikenda

Although the title of this subsection refers to the Mijikenda ethnic group as its frame of reference, towards the middle of this section, I will concentrate mainly on describing one Mijikenda sub-ethnicity, the Giriama. The Giriama are by far the largest of the Mijikenda tribes and are the majority ethnic population in the area surrounding Malindi. But first, a few words should be said about the origins and current status of the larger ethnic grouping.

The word "Mijikenda" itself means "nine towns" and refers to the historical origins of nine linguistically and culturally related tribes occupying the inland area just behind the seafront from the Sabaki River in the North to Tanzania in the South. The last reliable Kenyan census (1979) estimated the Mijikenda population at close to 750,000 (Census of Kenya 1979). The Giriama represent something on the order of 60% of the entire Mijikenda population.

All Mijikenda communities are based primarily around agriculture. The Mijikenda, for the most part, occupy extremely fertile areas of land just between the coast proper and the more arid plains that mark the beginnings of the "bara" or wilderness. A great variety of tropical fruits and plants are everyday products of Mijikenda agriculture in addition to staples such as maize and cassava (Berg-Schlosser 1984).

Modern Mijikenda populations form small villages known as "mudzi" which snake into the lush landscape from the major roads. The vast majority of Mijikenda live in these small villages growing their own food and selling surplus produce in the markets of larger towns or to traders. In the past, each Mijikenda tribe had a fortified capital hidden away on a densely forested hillside. These capitals were known as "kaya" and represented the political and spiritual seat of the Mijikenda tribes as well as protection in time of danger (Spear 1978). To my knowledge, none of these kayas are currently occupied, although they are used as shrines and allegedly retain the tribal totems hidden there<sup>4</sup>.

The current geographical location of the Mijikenda is the result of several decades of migration that seems to have concluded not more than a century ago. Like the Swahili, the Giriama claim an origin in Singwaya, the legendary starting point of several Bantu coastal groups, thought to have been located in southern Somalia. The Mijikenda began a long process of southern migration as a result of violent intrusion by the Galla and later the Somali sometime in the 16th

---

<sup>4</sup>There recently has been a great deal of consternation expressed by the elders of several Mijikenda tribes over the actual and potential disruption of the kayas by developers and archaeologists. In one famous case last year, Mijikenda elders and the area Member of Parliament successfully petitioned the government to stop the development of tourist facilities on a small island that is the site of a Mijikenda kaya shrine (Daily Nation, September 1, 1992).

century. By the beginning of the 17th century, Mijikenda were reported living around Mombasa (Spear 32: 1978).

The historical relationship between the Mijikenda and their Swahili neighbors seems to have been one of mutual cooperation in matters of trade and mutual influence culturally and linguistically. The Swahili urban centers in the pre-Omani period were especially dependent on produce from Mijikenda agriculturalists and protection for their own trade excursions further inland. In fact, until the 19th century at least, the rulers of Mombasa paid tribute in the form of cloth to the Mijikenda in exchange for continued trading relations and help in defense against mutual enemies and raiding by the Digo themselves (Spear 1978:73).

Omani and British influence during the 19th century changed matters irrevocably for the Mijikenda, however. The greatest of these changes occurred as a result of the establishment of Omani plantation agricultural around the major towns of Mombasa, Malindi and Mamburi during the middle to late 19th century. As already mentioned, the success of such plantations depended heavily on slave labor, which was most readily available in the form of the Mijikenda (Cooper 1981, Morton 1990). Mijikenda slaves were often obtained through the Mijikenda themselves as commodities which could be sold during times of drought or otherwise dramatic decline in economic fortunes (Champion 1967:12, Cooper 1981).

The end of slavery under the British saw a continuation of plantation agriculture under a wage system, but this time with the imposition of hut-taxes that were designed to keep the Mijikenda working on the plantations (Cooper 1981). The refusal by some Mijikenda communities, most notably the Giriama, to fully comply to the imposition of hut taxes and the associated re-settlement of Giriama villages led to a series of uprisings by the Giriama and increasingly brutal suppression by the British during the first decade of this century (Brantley 1981).

#### Contemporary Economic Status

Continued population growth among the Mijikenda coupled with a rather broad based agricultural heritage, as well as increased market demands from the growing urban areas, has led to increasing numbers of individual Mijikenda as well as family or corporate groups becoming squatters on lands claimed by Europeans and Arabs. In addition to land lost by the Mijikenda through colonialism, the growth of tourism on the coast and the desire to develop land for tourist facilities by foreigners and Kenyans has created a demand for limited land resources. A large amount of Mijikenda held land has passed from their control through either short-sighted sales of land by the owner or by appropriation by the government or private interests through the government where no title deed was held.

The result has been the continuing impoveritization of Mijikenda communities throughout the coastal area and the

subjective and objective developmental backwardness of many areas on the coast compared to nation-wide standards. The literacy rate among the coastal districts is the lowest in the country; health care facilities per capita are among the lowest; and, rural electrification and the availability of clean water sources are both problematic despite the proximity of several rivers and lakes. The Mijikenda represent the largest single ethnic grouping in the coastal districts discussed here and certainly account for much of the comparative disparity in developmental indicators.

The perception of Mijikenda/Giriama poverty and backwardness is reinforced by the roles of the group in the urban areas of Mombasa and Malindi. It is a common site on the road between the two towns and in Malindi itself to see Giriama (in the case of Malindi) selling bananas, oranges and other fruits to tourists and other passerbys from baskets or from a piece of cloth laid on the ground. Invariably these sellers are older women who come into town early in the morning and spend the entire day or until their supply is exhausted.

Most of these older women (and some younger women with children) walk to town from the surrounding Mijikenda communities (sometimes for 10 miles or more) barefoot with their fruit baskets on their heads, wearing the traditional "kanga" (two square pieces of brightly colored cloth wrapped around the body in various fashion) and the "mahando"



surrounding their waists<sup>5</sup>. Those traveling for greater distances make use of the constant flow of public buses along Malindi-Mombasa Road to carry their wares to a potential marketplace.

Truck-loads of younger men (without the kanga or mahando of course, but barefoot, bare-chested or otherwise shabbily attired) can be seen every morning heading for day-jobs in construction or the harvesting maize and sisal. While other young men and women enter Malindi every morning, to return to work as domestic workers in the homes of relatively wealthy Swahili, Indians, Arabs, Europeans and Kenyans. Young Giriama are also most frequently found working the most menial jobs in small Arab, Swahili or Indian owned retail stores (maduka), non-tourist restaurants and at construction sites. The overall impression of Giriama economic status in Malindi is that of general poverty and overall malaise.

There are remarkably few Giriama employed in the tourist industry in Malindi above the capacity of custodian or grounds keeper. As a general rule, Giriama women are discouraged from working at all and especially discouraged from getting jobs that involve direct contact with Europeans. This seems to apply mostly to jobs such as housekeeping in hotels and

---

<sup>5</sup>The "mahando" is a lengthy piece of cloth worn under the kanga which, when properly tied in a belt-like fashion around the waist and hips, is used to carry all sorts of items. The "mahando" gives the wearer the appearance of having impossibly large buttocks. I have known quite a few flabbergasted tourists (and even some visiting non-coastal Kenyans) to mistake the mahando for the real thing.

waitressing. There are at least four professional Giriama traditional dance companies that regularly perform in hotels for tourists and all have a mixed cast of males and females with at least two having a mostly female membership.

My own survey of the upper management of twelve important tourist hotels revealed only one Mijikenda in a management position. Of the thirteen tour companies surveyed, only two very small companies were partially owned by Giriama. There are only three Mijikenda curio kiosk owners at the Malindi Curio Market out of over 300 members. The disparity in exploiting the tourist industry by Giriama is a phenomena remarked upon by Giriama and non-Giriama alike. I will return to this issue later.

#### Mijikenda/Giriama Social Status in Malindi

Relatively few Giriama actually live within the confines of large towns. Most live in the numerous small exclusively Giriama villages within 5-10 miles of the towns or in somewhat larger "suburbs" such as Mtangani, and Kibokoni, towns of about 500 persons 3 miles west and 3 miles south of Malindi, respectively. The high cost of living within the town and the Giriama's reluctance to completely forego small scale farming are perhaps the most important causes of these residential patterns.

A more important reason may be the continued strength of Giriama kinship relations and clan affiliation. The Giriama lineages (rika) still play a major role in the day to day

lives of many Giriama. Clan elders (kambi) must be properly honored at all times. If, for instance, one visits a Giriama home, the head of the household, no matter how poor, must prepare large quantities of ugali (a stiff porridge that is the staple of many diets in Kenya) and a generous amount of palm wine (tembo) in his honor. Bridewealth is still commonly paid by Giriama young men to the family of their expectant bride and the money or livestock (usually goats) used in payments often must be raised through the lineage. Funerals are massive affairs in Giriama villages in which the clan honors its deceased member with a huge "party" for all the residents of the village and all the members of the clan. Again large amounts of palm wine are consumed and many goats slaughtered and roasted, all at the expense of the dead person's clan (Champion 1967, Parkin 1972).

On the subject of ritual, a word should be said about the religious character of the Giriama population and the possible effect it might have on some of the other social characteristics mentioned here. The Mijikenda population today is fairly evenly split between Christianity, Islam and traditional beliefs. Islam is, of course, particularly dominant where the Mijikenda have had close contact with the Swahili, near the coastal town. Perhaps as many as 40 percent of Mijikenda are Muslims. Muslim Mijikenda especially dominate on the south coast (Parkin 1985).

Acceptance of the Islamic religion also brought with it acceptance of material culture associated with the Swahili in terms of style of dress, and household inventory in addition to changes in residential patterns and social norms. As mentioned earlier, there has been and continues to be a permanence of ethnic boundaries because of the value of these characteristics in identity determination (Donley 1989).

Christianity, while still a minority religion, has become a major force in Giriama and other Northern Mijikenda groups as the result of aggressive missionary activity in the area starting with one of the first British missionary settlements in Kenya (1888) near the Sabaki River (Spear 1978:139, Morton 1990)<sup>6</sup>. The Evangelical Lutheran Church is especially important in the Malindi area although Catholicism and increasingly Protestant fundamentalist evangelists are gaining ground.

There are large numbers of Mijikenda who retain traditional religious beliefs despite the influence of Christianity and Islam. Traditional believers make up probably close to thirty percent of the entire population, mostly residing in the older smaller Mijikenda peasant villages. This number is misleading if consideration is to be

---

<sup>6</sup>The mission was founded in the late 1880s by the British Christian Missionary Society in Rabai (a northern Mijikenda tribe) territory and was intended to save the souls as well as the bodies of runaway or newly manumitted slaves. Fittingly and characteristically enough, the Rabai who formed the first community of the newly converted became known as "WaMisheni", literally "the mission people" (Morton 1990:110).

made concerning the belief system of the Mijikenda. The Mijikenda, Christian and Muslim alike, are known country-wide for their acceptance and respect for the supernatural and traditional beliefs.

Especially important are ancestor cults and the perceived continuous need to appease the spirits of one's forbearers. As is the case with many cultures with strong systems of ancestor respect, the spirits of the dead are thought to be very active in the daily lives of the living (Kopytoff 1971, Brain 1979, Lewis 1988). Spirit possession, conjuring and witchcraft are important aspects of Mijikenda traditional religion and, in numerous ways, carry over to the world religions observed by the Mijikenda in syncretic form (Parkin 1989).

The huge feasts mentioned earlier (Swa. *maziko*) in honor of a deceased relative is one way of appeasing the spirit-world, but, in case something goes wrong or you have an enemy working against you, there are numerous specialists available in Mijikenda communities to help ward off harmful effects. In fact the Mijikenda are known nation-wide as among the most powerful practitioners of magic, comparable to the Kamba and the Luo in their propensity to use it and its effectiveness.

The overall the impression of the Mijikenda by other ethnic groups is one of a proud people vainly holding on to cultural and social roots despite the massive changes occurring around them. Both the pride in cultural

institutions and values and the continued observance of cultural values by the Mijikenda is seen by others as both positive and negative aspects of Mijikenda identity.

Certainly the Mijikenda have suffered in terms of developmental investment due, in part, to the general lack of interest shown by the national government towards the coast area. Unlike other groups however, scarcely a whisper has been heard from the Mijikenda towards their regions lack of development despite their representing the fourth largest ethnic grouping in Kenya. The best and, to this point at least, the only example of Mijikenda political mobilization on a national scale occurred during the 1960s under the leadership of Ronald Ngala, a founder of the opposition Kenya African Democratic Union (Maxon 1989:235). The growing dominance of foreigners and Kenyans from upcountry ethnic groups in the exploitation of the economic potential of the Coast may cause this ambivalence to change in the coming years.

## CHAPTER 5 WATU WA BARA

The next important category of ethnic in Malindi includes several non-coastal ethnic groups. The Swahili collective term for people not indigenous to the coast is "wa-bara" or "watu wa bara," literally, "people of the wildness." A discussion of some implications for this categorization will be returned to later.

This chapter briefly outlines some of the ethnographic detail available for each group. The goal is not to be exhaustive in ethnographic detail. Selective features are examined for each group. These features include historical and ethnographic data that are important in understanding the relative role and status of each group in Malindi and nationally.

### The Kikuyu

The Kikuyu are the largest single ethnic group in Kenya. The last census numbered the Kikuyu population at 3 million or roughly 30% of the entire population of Kenya (Central Bureau of Statistics 1992). While not a majority, their status as the single largest ethnic group and their continued numerical superiority in the capital city, Nairobi, have enabled the Kikuyu population to dominate public affairs at the center of government and politics in Kenya for decades.

Linguistically and culturally, the Kikuyu are related to several ethnic groups currently occupying the centrally located districts in Kenya including (in order of closeness) the Meru, the Embu, the Kamba, and the Maasai (Berg-Schlosser 1984). Historically, the Kikuyu are an amalgam of several older Bantu speaking ethnic groups of the Thagicu family that settled in their current location in Kenya sometime in the 18th century (Ogot, 1973, Mariuki 1976).

For years after Independence they were the most politically and economically dominant group in Kenya. A large factor in the political success of the Kikuyu following the dismantling of British colonialism had to do with their central role in armed colonial resistance (Mau Mau) and the political organization and savvy developed by Kikuyu leadership during the decades of constant political pressure for increased rights under the colonial system. Kikuyu still recall their role in Mau Mau with pride. Many use this identification to support their claim that they, among all other Kenyan ethnic groups, have earned the right to political leadership (Nottingham and Rosberg 1966).

The first president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, himself a Kikuyu, saw to it that his group was rewarded for their efforts. Publicly anti-tribalist, tales of Kenyatta's ethnic nepotism abound. On the other hand, and in defense of the late president, it must be said that the Kikuyu were also well prepared for independence having previously taken advantage of



educational and economic opportunities under colonialism to an extent far greater than other Kenyan ethnic groups (Tignor 1976). Kikuyu were therefore among the best educated and most skilled indigenous populations in Kenya at the time of independence. This was soon reflected in recruitment to jobs in civil service, government and industry that created a lopsided formal sector, especially at the center.

The traditional Kikuyu home areas are located in what is now the Central Province of Kenya in the districts of Kiambu, Murang'a and Nyeri. The mythic and emotional center of the Kikuyu community is Mount Kenya, located in Murang'a District. It is from the snow capped peaks of Mount Kenya that God created the first man, Gikuyu, and his wife Mumbi and set them out to populate the world. To the children of Gikuyu and Mumbi, God gave all the land visible on either side from the summit of Mount Kenya (Kenyatta 1969, Muriuki 1987).

The Kikuyu over the last one-hundred years or so seem to have taken this gift quite literally. No other ethnic group in Kenya has a larger percentage of its people living outside of its traditional home area and no group is as ubiquitously settled in every part of the country. "The Kikuyu are like mosquitos," one non-Kikuyu informant told me, "they are everywhere."

The dispersion of the Kikuyu community is matched in equal measure by the diversity of economic niches inhabited by Kikuyu entrepreneurs. The Kikuyu remain the most successful

and wealthy (and therefore internally stratified) indigenous ethnic community in the country despite recent gains by individual members of the Kalenjin and Luo ethnic groups.

Kikuyu small businessmen are to be found everywhere throughout the country. Most often as owners of small produce, household utensil or second-hand clothes kiosks, but also as owners of restaurants and bars, petrol stations, hotels and almost every other kind of business to be found in Kenya.

The Kikuyu as entrepreneur is, in fact, a cliché in Kenya both among Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu alike. The general attitude is that a Kikuyu not engaged in some sort of business is not really a Kikuyu. It can be said that the Kikuyu work ethic (or more directly and stereotypically, the Kikuyu love of money and profit) is a defining characteristic among the Kikuyu and among their Kenyan neighbors and a motivating factor for much of Kikuyu behavior.

Traditionally, the Kikuyu are among the most successful agriculturalists in Kenya. The very rich, hilly landscape around Mt. Kenya provided good soil in which to grow a variety of crops and support many villages. The Kikuyu also raised livestock on a small scale.

Kikuyu society was based on a system of land-owning lineages (mbari) and male and female age-sets (mariika) that were responsible for the determination of land-tenure rights and social control and sanctions, respectively (Mariuki 1976).

Like many ethnic groups in Kenya (and in Africa as a whole for that matter) the Kikuyu were engaged in an ongoing pattern of migration and territorial expansion when British colonialism locked in the territorial boundaries between ethnic groups that exists today. Changing demographic patterns probably also meant that changes were and had been occurring at the level of ethnic identity that were interrupted by the new order (Mariuki 1987).

#### The Kikuyu in Malindi

The notorious Kikuyu appetite for entrepreneurship has not overlooked the potential for economic gain present on the Coast. In fact, trading relationships, while not entirely amicable, have existed between the Kikuyu and Swahili dating back at least to the 19th century (Muriuki 1976:136).

The "pass laws" of the 1940s and 1950s made it difficult for Kikuyu to get in on the ground floor of Coastal development and exploitation of the tourist industry. Kikuyu were not allowed to leave their home areas without permission at all during the height of the crisis (Kenyatta 1969). Eventually, however, the desire to take part in coastal development brought scores of Kikuyu to the coast.

A story is told among Kikuyu in Malindi about Kenyatta's desire to see his fellow Kikuyu take advantage of the opportunities present on the coast. Kenyatta allegedly was addressing a multi-ethnic crowd at the soccer field in Malindi. At one point during the speech, he ceased using

KiSwahili and addressed the crowd directly in Kikuyu saying that they should grab all the land they could on the coast and if they did not, they should not blame him when others did. Later, he allegedly called a Kikuyu policewoman on to the stage and asked the crowd, in Swahili, which was more suited to building the nation, the Kikuyu woman or one of the bui-bui<sup>1</sup> clad Swahili women present. The Swahili present were quite upset by the display.

The Kikuyu are presently the second largest non-coastal ethnic group living in the Malindi area, surpassed in number only by the Kamba. The majority of Kikuyu in Malindi, by their own accounting, come from Kiambu, the district closest to the coast and to Ukambani. It is also one of the most densely populated Kikuyu districts in the country.

As is often the pattern in agricultural areas facing overpopulation due to high population growth, it is the younger members of Kikuyu society that strike out on their own in order to find their fortune. Unlike the other ethnic groups migrating to Malindi and the coast area, many Kikuyu see their move away from the traditional homeland as a permanent one. In my survey, Kikuyu, as a group, were several times more likely to say they did not wish to return to the home areas to carve out a living when compared with any of the other non-coastal groups.

---

<sup>1</sup>A long black outer garment and its attendant scarf, used by Swahili women to cover themselves in observance of purdah.

For younger Kikuyu men, making a living in Malindi means selling something, usually curios or small quantities of drugs, to tourists, or second-hand "matumbo" items to local people in Malindi<sup>2</sup>. For younger Kikuyu women, the way to make it in Malindi is often through prostitution. Most of the prostitutes frequenting bars and discos in Malindi are Kikuyu or Kamba with the Kikuyu prostitutes outnumbering the Kamba by something of the order of two to one. I know of several cases in which Kikuyu prostitutes have invested their savings from income gained at these activities, into small businesses and as a result, no longer "work."

There are, of course, other more respectable ways for Kikuyu to make a living in Malindi. Kikuyu have also carved a niche for themselves in Malindi as produce retailers buying merchandise from Mijikenda farmers around Malindi and Mombasa and from daily convoys of trucks that arrive in Mombasa from upcountry every morning. There are any number of Kikuyu owned kiosks as well as "mom and pop" stores along every street in Malindi.

The comparative advantage the Kikuyu have enjoyed in educational attainment continues to a large degree. Because

---

<sup>2</sup>It is a common complaint among young Kikuyu men in Malindi that Swahili, Arabs and Indians refuse to hire them even at menial jobs in the retail shops and restaurants that they own, preferring instead to hire the less qualified, more docile Giriama. The Kikuyu say Coastal people discriminate against them because they think that if they became involved in such businesses, they will stealthily steal from them or eventually take them over. "They fear us because they know we are more clever than they." one Kikuyu informant told me.

of this and because young Kikuyu men and women often spend find employment in Nairobi before going elsewhere in search of work, many of the skilled office jobs, such as bookkeeping, hotel reservations, and other clerical duties in hotels and tour companies are filled by Kikuyu. Almost all Kenyan managers of tourist hotels that I was aware of in Malindi and Watamu were Kikuyu (out of a total of 17, only three were from other Kenyan tribes, two Luos and one Mijikenda)<sup>3</sup>.

#### The Kamba

The Kamba are the fourth largest ethnic group in Kenya. As many as 80% of the two million or so Kamba live rurally in their home areas in Eastern Kenya. The main Kamba urban area is Machackos, a town of roughly 100,000 people. More recently, increasing numbers of Kamba also live in Nairobi and Mombasa.

The Kamba are said to have occupied the area in the eastern part of Kenya for at least the last 700 years (Middleton 1953). There is a great deal of physical variation in Ukambani ranging from the very hilly, fertile lands on the western edge of Kamba territory to the very dry, arid regions on the eastern extreme near Kitui.

---

<sup>3</sup>A number of management level Kikuyu hotel workers in Malindi and Watamu (and elsewhere in the country for that matter) are graduates of Utali (Swa. tourism) College in Nairobi, a post-secondary two year vocational college that supplies much of the skilled Kenyan labor to the tourist industry.

Traditional Kamba subsistence strategies have included maize, millet and sorghum production in the west, shifting to a much higher dependence on cattle and livestock in the marginal soils of the east. The Kamba also have a long tradition as hunters in both areas. There remains a great deal of emphasis placed on land-owning and farming by Kamba.

Most of the Kamba I knew in Malindi claimed to have some land in Ukambani and expressed the desire to go back to work it someday. Because of the geographic proximity of Ukambani, the Kamba are also very prone to return home for short visits or to conduct some small business.

The Kamba are often thought of as the poorer "country cousins" of the Kikuyu. The two groups share a common boarder through much of Central Province with the heartland of Ukambani<sup>4</sup> extended south and east while Ukikuyuni extends northwards and west. Besides the geographic proximity between the two groups, Kamba and Kikuyu also share a great deal of cultural characteristics. Kamba origin myths recognize the Kikuyu as descendants of one of the four "brothers" (Kamba, Gikuyu and Maasai and Athi) that originally populated this part of the world. Both groups are strongly patrilineal (although not necessarily patriarchal) and recognize the strength of clan affiliation.

---

<sup>4</sup>Ukambani means literally the place of the Kamba. In KiSwahili any proper name of an ethnic group can be made into a word denoting the groups homeland by adding a "u" as a prefix and the locative "ni", as a suffix (Ashton 1945).

The two groups remain linguistically very similar. Kikamba and Kikuyu are to some degree mutual intelligible depending on the dialect of Kikuyu spoken (Kikamba has less variation in regional dialect). Many Kikuyu from Kiambu speak Kikamba as a second language and even more understand spoken Kikamba without speaking it themselves.

Traditional Kamba and Kikuyu communities consisted of numerous, spread-out individual homestead that were self-contained and generally autonomous. Again like the Kikuyu, social organization outside the homestead revolved largely around a series of clans (mbai) and sub-clans (muvia) that ordered behavior internally and externally. Political, judicial and ceremonial authority was held within each clan and sub-clan segment by male elders (atumia) (Berg-Schlosser 1984:75).

Most Kamba today profess some Christian denomination as their religion (the Swahili were quick to point out during the I.P.K. controversy that there are some Kamba in Ukambani who are Muslim)<sup>5</sup>. However, as might be expected given the continued strength of clan ties, ancestor respect still plays an important part in even the Christian Kamba cosmology indicating the continued eminence and authority of the

---

<sup>5</sup>In the Kamba town of Kitui there is, in fact, a section inhabited by people who call themselves Swahili. These people are descendants of Swahili caravan traders and upcountry Kenyan women. They have maintained the Islamic faith and many speak KiSwahili as a co-mother tongue along with Kikamba (Ministry of Planning and Development, 1986).



departed, especially the recently departed lineage and clan elders. Indeed, part of the closeness of the spirit world that accompanies ancestor cults is a belief in the daily interaction between humans and supernatural beings, including ancestral ghosts.

Other beliefs among the Kamba concern magic and sorcery, expressed in a strong belief in the beneficent and malicious use of magic. The Kamba are famous throughout Kenya as the most artful practitioners of magic among Kenyans. "Kamuti kimaya" is an especially popular form of supernatural manipulation allegedly known to most Kamba. "Kamuti" can be used in a variety of situations "to make things go your way" as I was told by one informant. "Kamuti" includes the use of a variety of charms and specific "ways of saying what you want" that are said to be quite potent. For men, a woman who knows how to use Kamuti-class love potions is especially dangerous.

#### The Kamba in Malindi

The Kamba are the largest upcountry ethnic group in Malindi and one of the first groups whose members permanently migrated and sometimes settled there. There seems, in fact, to have been a small Kamba presence in the community from as early as the 1920s (Martin 1973). Like other upcountry ethnic groups, however, the overall scarceness of housing means there is no one Kamba neighborhood, the Kamba are spread out throughout Malindi neighborhoods.

Historically, the Kamba are well known for being the middlemen for upcountry trade with the Swahili. The Kamba traded ivory, gold and other exotic products for export aboard with the Swahili who brought them cloth and a variety of other items. The Kamba both received Swahili caravans as guests in Ukambani and travelled to the coast themselves to trade directly in the coastal towns (Middleton 1992, Cooper 1981). In some ways, this pattern of contact through trade between the Coast and Ukambani has never been broken.

A large percentage of the Kamba population currently resident in Malindi are involved in one way or another with trade in the carved wooden curio business. I estimate that at least five hundred Kamba men in Malindi are directly involved in the production and sale of wooden curios alone. This is based on the fact that the Kamba Wood Carving Cooperative, which operates the largest curio production facility in Malindi, has over 350 members, almost all whom are Akamba. The Malindi Curio Dealers Village, the largest single market for curios in Malindi, has over 250 Kamba owners of curio kiosks (some of these are multiple kiosk owners) and at least an equal number of more or less permanent hawkers. A few Kamba carvers own curio kiosks, however, the expense involved in constructing and supplying a kiosk, and the time investment needed to make it successful, are prohibitive for most carvers.

Besides curio sales, the Kamba also make up a large percentage of the service staff in hotels and bars. Kamba men seem to be particularly favored as waiters, barmen and desk-clerks in hotels, Kamba women as maids. Besides networking and/or outright ethnic nepotism, other reasons for this occupational specialization may include some degree of discrimination expressed by hotels toward the other possible choices for hiring local help.

Discrimination toward the Giriama in filling these posts is probably due both to entrenched stereotypes regarding the Giriama's competency, intelligence and motivation in handling these positions held by either the foreign owners of hotels or the upcountry managers. Discrimination toward Kikuyu is based largely on stereotypes about the dishonesty of Kikuyu staff in directly handling money. The other large group of potential local the employees, the Swahili, will not do this kind of work.

Kamba also occupy a range of other occupational niches in Malindi including jobs in teaching and other civil services, as well as entrepreneurial enterprises such as food or clothing kiosks and bars. On this latter point, it is not unusual for an entire Kamba family, including newly arriving relatives from Ukambani, to become involved in the operation of one of these businesses. On the whole, however, Kamba enterprises in Malindi smaller in scale, and therefore less profitable, than Kikuyu interests.

As mentioned previously, Kamba women share with Kikuyu the dubious distinction of being the most populous group of prostitutes in Malindi. These women are often very young, without much formal education and many newly arrived from Ukambani or Nairobi. Many claim to have been driven out of traditional homes after giving birth out of wedlock to a child in their parents' home. Whatever the reason, women often amass capital in this way. There are several examples of Kamba women in Malindi who have developed successful legitimate businesses by investing resources earned as a prostitute or mistress.<sup>6</sup>

The Kamba community in Malindi maintains very close ties within the Malindi community and with home communities relative to other upcountry groups on the coast and especially relative to their Kikuyu cousins. There are several "self-help" organizations that provide assistance to new Kamba coming into town and that provide relief to family members back home.

In the curio village, for example, there are two Kamba organizations one representing Kamba from Kitui and one Kamba from Machakos. Each organization has monthly meetings in which members discuss projects in Malindi and at home and vote

---

<sup>6</sup>Prostitution in Malindi has several different levels of behavior and motivation that a single individual may pass through during her (or his) involvement. In many ways, prostitution in Malindi is unlike prostitution anywhere else in the country in terms of behavior and expectations. A more in-depth analysis of this industry in Malindi appears later.

as to how monthly dues are spent. These meetings are mandatory (as long as they do not interfere with business that is immediately at hand). Failure to attend meetings or to pay membership dues (three times) results in expulsion.

In a capital poor environment, a main function of these organizations is to provide emergency funds to sick relatives or to provide burial costs and transportation for deceased members and their families. For example, there was a drought in the Kitui area in 1992. Agricultural earnings and food crops in the area suffered as a result. One of the major initiatives undertaken by both mutual aid groups was to remit relief supplies of rice and maize meal to needy families in the home areas. That same year, the Kitui organization also decided to undertake a fund raising project to buy a mini-van to transport association members back home on a regular basis.

#### The Luo

The Luo are the third largest ethnic group in Kenya, surpassed only by the Kikuyu. The 1979 census placed the number of Luo at approximately two million (Central Bureau of Statistics 1992). They are also the largest non-Bantu ethnic group. This creates create social distance for Luo in relation to other groups and has implications for their political and cultural integration with the Kenyan nation.

The Luo speak a Nilotic language usually associated with pastoral ethnic groups further north in East Africa, such as the Dinka and the Nuer. The ancestors of the Luo were

probably also pastoralists, who moved southward toward their present home from the plains of Sudan. According to some scholarship, the Luo probably migrated from Southern Sudan to Kenya sometime around the 16th century (Ogot 1967). The Luo apparently abandoned pastoralism soon after their migration to Kenya. This was probably due to very limited grazing lands in target areas, plus many tropical pest-borne diseases associated with the area around Lake Victoria (Ogot 1967:47).

Eventually, Luo populations turned from pastoralism to primary reliance on agriculture, although many Luo still rise and place importance on the ownership of large numbers of livestock today. The Luo also took advantage of their position near the Lake and became very skilled fisherman. Observers note that these subsistence strategies still characterize the great majority of the contemporary Luo population (Odhiambo 1986).

Like many other "stateless" agriculturally based East African societies mentioned here, Luo societies were horizontally integrated on the basis of segmented unilineal descent including minimal (libembini) and maximal lineages (dhoudi) (Berg-Scholessr 1984:124). Each lineage was headed by elders (jodong) who were responsible for maintaining order within their own, often extended homesteads and even across communities.

Also like other groups discussed here, Luo culture placed a great deal of emphasis on the integration of ancestors into

the community and the need to placate the same. As a result, Luo funeral services remain to this day extravagant affairs that can result in bankruptcy for the family of the deceased.

The Luo depart from similarity with all other Kenyan ethnic groups in their lack of circumcision for males or females. By contrast, the Luo broke out the lower incisors of an individual coming of age. However, this practice is now rarely seen. The continued lack of circumcision among the Luo has been the cause of much ridicule by their fellow nationals, several of whom, including the Kikuyu, Kamba, Maasai and Luyha, have very important, identity defining ceremonies to mark this rite of passage (Mariuki 1976).

The contemporary homeland of the Luo is in the far west of Kenya in the plains and sloping hills on Lake Victoria's eastern shores. There are also Luo populations on the Western side of the lake in what is now Uganda. Luo dominated districts constitute three of the four districts of Kenya's Nyanza Province. The provincial capital of Nyanza, Kisumu, is synonymous with Luo national political identity.

Nyanza Province itself has remained one of the "most underdeveloped" provinces in Kenya since independence. One of the major factors in the continued underdevelopment of the area is that Luo farmers are primarily subsistence farmers and therefore ignore the potential profitability and technical innovation that results from the production of cash crops. Another developmental concern is that the declining importance

of the Port of Kisumu, resulting from the establishment of the Kenya-Uganda Railway in the 1950s, has contributed to Nyanza's less prosperous position.

Less observable but perhaps just as important among Nyanza's troubles has been the political marginalization of the Luo since the 1960s. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, a modern Luo leader, became the first Vice-President of Kenya at independence in 1963. However, it soon became apparent, however, that there were deep-seated disagreements and even distrust between Odinga and President Kenyatta. Odinga even went as far as to accuse the President of corruption and other misuses of authority.

In 1966, Odinga resigned the Vice-Presidency to form his own party, the Luo dominated KPU (Kenya Peoples Union). The KPU was forcibly disbanded by Kenyatta in 1969 and its leader and several prominent members arrested following the assassination of Tom Mboya (the most powerful Luo KANU member of government). Riots in Kisumu during a visit by President Kenyatta were interpreted as ethnic antagonism against government discrimination against Luo leadership (Maxon 1989:266).

Many Luo today (including the still very politically active Odinga) believe that this series of incidents lead to Kenyatta's punishment of Luo-land through the purposeful withholding of governmental developmental resources and political representation. Daniel arap Moi, during the



presidential campaign of 1992, constantly reminded Luo audiences of the marginalization they suffered under Kenyatta and of the steps he (Moi) had (allegedly) taken to correct this prejudice. He often concluded such statements by warning that, although not a tribalist himself, he was not above engaging in the same type of marginalization if the Luo insisted on opposing him.

Because the economic troubles endemic to the Luo homeland, the Luo are among the Kenyan ethnic groups most likely to leave the home areas and settle far away from home (Berg-Schollosser 1984:123).<sup>7</sup> Once in the target areas, and especially Nairobi, many face problems of lack of housing, overcrowding, unemployment and alienation faced by other migrants to the big city.

Despite this, the Luo have developed a solid reputation for being among the best educated and most scholarly ethnic groups in all of Kenya, many having been awarded advanced degrees from prestigious universities abroad, particularly from universities in England and America. This educational ethic apparently extends throughout much of Luo society in the homeland and especially abroad in other parts of Kenya.

---

<sup>7</sup>The Kikuyu and the Kamba are the Kenyan groups most likely to migrate, however, their destinations are mainly Mombasa and Nairobi, urban centers relatively close to each groups' home area. Visits home (given sufficient funds) are relatively easy to make and not uncommon. The Luo, on the other hand, must migrate across the breadth of Kenya to reach as far as Mombasa and many may only visit home once or twice a year if at all.

Luo scholars are disproportionally represented on the faculty of all five Kenyan universities and many of the smaller technical colleges. Kenyan scholars of international repute are also significantly weighted in being Luo (e.g. B.A. Ogot, Okoth Ogendo, W.R. Ochieng', etc.). Luo are also highly represented in the professional fields. The success of the Luo in stressing educational success has meant that Luo have obtained positions of power and prestige in government and the business community that they otherwise may not have been able to obtain, given their geographic distance from the seats of power in Nairobi and the relatively backward quality of their home districts.

The emphasis on education among the Luo provides an interesting contrast in strategies for attaining power in relation the other, more politically powerful ethnic group, the Kikuyu. Kikuyu values emphasize above all else the need and the desire to obtain some property and to turn that property into a profitable enterprise. Success comes when a profit is being made from an investment or a venture enterprise.

For the Luo, education and scholarly pursuit are both highly respected and highly desirable. Granted, educational attainment often leads to financial success (at least in theory), but for the Luo, the prestige of being a school headmaster, or a university lecturer carries its own rewards. By contrast, among the Kikuyu, the uneducated successful

entrepreneur is probably to be admired more and to be the object of emulation than the struggling university professor.

### The Luo in Malindi

The Luo were among the first upcountry groups to settle in Malindi in large numbers. In fact, Kisumu Mdogo (little Kisumu), now the largest ethnically mixed neighborhood in the town, located on the southern fringe of Malindi, is named so, I am told, precisely because it was the initial residence of large numbers of Luo immigrants in the late 1960s. These migrants filled many of the clerical and service jobs in hotels and other tourist facilities well before the later arrival of large numbers of Kikuyu and Kamba.

In the 1970s and 1980s. these other upcountry groups have come to greatly outnumber the Luo in the Malindi area. Furthermore, the Luo are very much dispersed through out the town in more or less a haphazard fashion. Although such settlement patterns are common among many migrant populations it is observably more so among the Luo. As with all migrants, the sex and age ratio is heavily skewed in favor of young men, many of who have probably recently left home to seek their fortune (Southall 1969).

Luo also tend to predominate in a limited number of occupational niches. The scarcity of general civil service jobs in Malindi means that a traditional Luo occupational niche, given their educational values, is not available.

Alternatively, they have been able to find positions in clerical and accounting positions in private tourist firms and as secondary school teachers. Interestingly enough, Luo make up almost all the bookkeeping and clerical staff of the Malindi Casino (about 12 employees) and most of the security guards (20 men)<sup>8</sup>. A sign of ethnic nepotism no doubt but perhaps also related as well to the fact that Luo men, on the average, tend to be physically larger than other Kenyans, and are recognized as such. The two African lawyers in Malindi (one of whom is allegedly among the wealthiest upcountry people in town) and two doctors are Luo again reflecting the use of education in creating advantageous positions.

#### The Maasai

The Maasai are part of the "Maa-speaking," Eastern Nilote peoples of East Africa, whose members include the Samburu in Kenya and the Arusha in Tanzania. The Maasai are generally known within in East Africa for being fierce and brave warriors, rugged individualists, and particularly proud of their ethnic heritage and identity (Spear and Waller 1993).

The long sloping plains and escarpments of the Rift Valley in Kenya and Tanzania are their homelands. The Maasai are one of the few ethnic groups in Kenya whose membership stretches across national borders, the Luo and the Swahili

---

<sup>8</sup>On the point about the guards, this is in marked contrast to the general trend among hotels and other tourist businesses in Malindi which customarily use Maasai as guards. Discussed in the next section.

being other notable examples. About 80% of Maasai live in Kenya with the remainder resident in Tanzania. In Kenya, the neighbors of the Maasai include the Kisii and Kalenjin on the West, the Turkana to the North and the Kikuyu and Kamba to the East.

The traditional lifestyle of the Maasai revolved around pastoralism and the semi-nomadic lifestyle it implies. Maasai cosmology, in fact, insists that God (Ngai) gave to the Maasai ownership of all the cattle on the Earth. Their notorious penchant for raiding and stealing the cattle of non-Maasai herders is therefore the logical reclaiming of what is rightfully theirs.

Unlike some other noted East African pastoralists, such as the Nuer, Maasai cattle herds are mainly utilitarian, i.e., they provided no symbolic or ritual function within the community and could be slaughtered or sold at the individual owner's leisure. Cattle were property and wealth and other livestock, such as sheep and goats, are also kept.

Instead, cattle-keeping to the exclusion of other subsistence strategies, seems to have functioned only in providing the Maasai with a unique ethnic identity. The Maasai were purely pastoralists, in contrast to some of their Maa-speaking cousins. In fact, the pastoralism defined to a large extent Maasai identity, and Maa speakers employing other subsistence strategies were generally despised.

Like many other East African ethnic groups, political leadership among the Maasai was tied very closely to social organization and integration. Maasai society consisted nominally in a series of age-sets for men, each of which held duties and responsibilities appropriate for the age. Ceremonies marking each of the three major stages in a man's life (junior warrior, senior warrior, elder) are "closed," i.e., they occur only when the leadership decides that a significant portion of the age set has reached the proper stage, and that time and resources are propitious.

The lowest ranked age-set, consisting of newly circumcised young men, formed the "junior warrior" class (il murren or moran) in Maasai society. Traditionally, these young, unmarried men lived apart from the rest of the community in something of a military training-camp called a manyata. After completing a time of service in the manyata, the men were eligible for marriage and promotion to senior warriors. Throughout the course of a lifetime, members of each set progressively moved through stages of increased responsibility and respect ending with the position of senior elders and retired elders (enganyit-oleng) (Spencer 1993). In addition to generalized identities within each age-set, there were also specialized roles of age-set spokesmen, ritual leader and cultural expert, each to be filled by individuals qualified or elected to the post.

On a smaller scale, Maasai communities revolved around the family homestead consisting of a father and up to several wives. These homesteads consist of small mud and dung huts that could be easily uprooted and moved to a new location as the herds moved in search of water and grazing. An encampment of such homesteads (enkang) surrounded by thornbushes for protection and centered around a corral, consisted of several families of brothers or age-set fellows, wives and children. Between ten and fourteen enkang, together with enough surrounding land to graze all of the cattle, formed an "enkutoto." Further integration of these units eventually formed the largest geographically defined effective social unit for the Maasai, the "oloho" (Berg-Schlosser 1984:160).

The Maasai are probably the most internationally known of the Kenyan ethnic groups not because of their numbers or political importance but because of their "colorful," i.e., exotic, traditional culture that is closely associated with the Western romanticism about East Africa. To outsiders, the Maasai represents the quintessential "noble savage" whose way of life harkens back to images of a bygone era of man against nature. The Maasai have therefore proven to be an instant and important marketing tool for the Kenyan tourism industry.

The "noble savage" stereotype of the Maasai is reinforced by their historical reluctance and outright refusal to give up the traditional lifestyles and adopt Western practices even when other groups around them seemingly benefitted from

modernization and Westernization. For example, the Maasai continue to tenaciously cling to pastoralism as the acceptable "Maasai way of life" despite the fact that Maasai-land is among the most potentially fertile areas for agricultural production in Kenya (Berg-Schlosser 1984:170). Maasai children are the least school-educated and among the least likely to seek education among all Kenyan ethnic groups. Also, Maasai representation on the national political level is limited to the representatives of the towns of Narok, Ngong and Kajiado.

Changing patterns of land use in Kenya and the increasing presence and influence of outsiders in their territory have resulted in some Maasai abandoning exclusive pastoralism in favor of agricultural or trade in urban areas. Many of the cultural patterns typically identified with Maasai have also lessened in value, including the age-sets and polygamy. However, it is significant that urban-dwelling, "Westernized" Maasai still represent only about 15% (Kituyi 1990).

As a result, in direct economic competition with other groups, the Maasai have not fared well. The Kikuyu especially have been able to take advantage of the Maasai's traditionalism by cultivating the fertile soils of the Rift Valley's escarpments. In Maasai towns such as Narok and Ngong, Kikuyu traders dominate leaving little room for the Maasai.



Despite their recognition and reputation enjoyed abroad, the Maasai are a small minority (2%) of the total Kenyan population. Something on the order of 95% of all Maasai live in the traditional Maasai homelands, making them the Kenyans least likely to migrate (Central Bureau of Statistics 1992).

#### The Maasai in Malindi

As stated earlier, there are relatively few Maasai who live outside of their homeland. This is due largely to the Maasai's reluctance to give up traditional values and relatedly, to the Maasai's lack of exposure to outsiders. There are of course individual Maasai who have done quite well for themselves in business and politics (V.P. Saitoti, formerly a mathematics professor, is a notable example).

On the whole, however, the Maasai in Malindi and elsewhere on the coast fill a very narrow range of occupational roles centered around the tourist industry. Most of the Maasai living outside of Maasai-land are younger men who travel abroad to earn money. These morans are often property-less younger sons either without inheritance or even inheritance prospects and who seek cash labor elsewhere. Therefore, without other options for making a living at home, morans leave in search of "temporary" work abroad. This trend will no doubt continue as Maasai lose more and more of their grazing territory to increased agricultural production in the Rift Valley and as economic development among the Maasai

themselves grows slowly and provides more choices for young people.

Several Maasai moran in Malindi live in rented housing in close proximity to other residents. There also is a small manyata about three miles outside of town that houses the majority of the morans and all the Maasai women. There are only a handful of Maasai women (perhaps less than 20) living in Malindi. These women are kept carefully apart and their role in the wider community is virtually nonexistent.

As stated earlier, the Maasai are probably the best known Kenyan tribe among the thousands of tourists that visit the country each year. Their distinctive appearance and dress make them stand out among other ethnic groups as the "culturally correct" ideal for exploitation by the tourism industry.<sup>9</sup>

Because of the popularity of the Maasai among tourists, a significant number of Samburu have begun "passing" as Maasai. The Samburu are the nonpastoralist cousins of the Maasai mentioned earlier and share a great number of social cultural and physical characteristics with them. The Samburu are not, however, regarded as particularly brave or fierce warriors, or as particularly jealous of their ethnic heritage,

---

<sup>9</sup>Postcards featuring Maasai dominate every tourist shop and hotel in Kenya. There is no other group in Kenya, so represented as part of the landscape and as tourist attraction in and of themselves. It is very common to see Maasai postcards or carvings of Maasai warriors displayed in the same spaces and in the same manner that postcards and carvings featuring wildlife are displayed.

and are, to a large extent, despised by the Maasai because of their "foreign" economy.

The stereotypical Maasai man is tall and lean, wearing a red tunic (shuka) and sandals along with a large assortment of multi-colored necklaces, bracelets and armbands, red okra in his long braided hair, and heavy earrings that pull downward the incised flesh of his earlobes. His fierceness in battle and rugged individualism are marked by the scars on his arms earned in battle with a lion (allegedly) as part of his warrior initiation and his ever present "fimbo" or war club.

Maasai morans are employed in Malindi exclusively as watchmen (Swa. askari) (and mostly as night watchmen at that!) for tourist hotels, restaurants and shops and for local Asian and Indian owned businesses. The morans often change jobs several times in the course of a few months depending on how well they adhere to their responsibilities. I know of several Maasai in Malindi who lost jobs for being late or drunk or not showing up at all for work. This sort of behavior was almost expected of Maasai from the tourist hotel and shop managers and employees. Those I spoke to made these points repeatedly. Indeed, it is apparently not uncommon for a moran to have been hired and fired several times from the same establishment.

Maasai who work as watchmen come to work attired in their traditional dress with fimbo bared. In doing so, they not only give warning to potential burglars that there are Maasai guarding the position and it is therefore, off limits, but

also provide something in the way of local color for the tourists.

Maasai morans also earn money performing traditional dances in hotels. Often the dancers are the same individuals who work as askari and a few of their friends.<sup>10</sup> The same morans will perform as many dances in a night or a week as are requested by the entertainment managers at the hotel. In the case of really large scheduled performances, Maasai women also join the dance and afterward sell beaded jewelry to the audience.

There is a widely held consensus among other Kenyans in Malindi that the Maasai are grossly taken advantage of by the tourist industry. They are paid little for their performances, sometimes they are paid nothing at all and are simply allowed sell jewelry on the hotel's grounds to keep what they earn of their sales. Their pay as askari is equivalent to what other askari in Kenya make (about 800 KS per month). This is extremely small given the fact that part

---

<sup>10</sup>Maasai dances are very formalized performances in which the men form semi-circles and sing slowly and rhythmically in very high pitched voices. The singing is accompanied by head and neck movements to the time of the music. During the performance, each of the individuals leaves the semi-circle and leads the singing. While the leader sings, another individual leaves the semi-circle and "challenges" the leader. Both individuals (and sometimes a third) leap straight up into the air as high as possible and continue leaping until sufficient height as been reached. Women also dance but with more exaggerated head movements and without the leaping.

of their job also includes hobnobbing or taken pictures with interested tourists.<sup>11</sup>

The romanticism and exoticism associated with the image of the Maasai have made morans the object of a considerable amount of fantasy fulfillment among European women visiting the coast. Young morans can often be seen in the company of young and older (mostly German) women. The morans receive free meals, plenty of beer and gifts of clothes and watches in return for their company.

There were three cases in 1992 alone of morans marrying German women and leaving (temporarily) Kenya.<sup>12</sup> Polygamy is common among Maasai, however, so I am not sure how seriously the morans took these unions. I was told by one moran whose friend had gone to Germany to live with his German girlfriend that he would return to Kenya as soon as he tired of her.

#### The Kalenjin

Kalenjin is a term first used as an ethnic identity only a few years after World War II to refer to a conglomerate of

---

<sup>11</sup>On this point, Maasai in Malindi absolutely refuse to have their pictures taken without being paid something for it. One tourist last year had his camera taken away and destroyed by an angry moran after his picture was snapped while he passed the tourist on the street.

<sup>12</sup>One of the biggest social events in Malindi in 1992 was the marriage of a 40 something year old German woman, whose family owned Lawford's Hotel, to a twenty-year old Maasai moran. A huge wedding was held at the hotel attended by every Maasai in Malindi and a large number of European guests. The bride wore a traditional white wedding dress and the groom was attired in his crimson red shuka. A limousine(!) paraded the couple around town with horns blaring after the ceremony.

eight closely related ethnic groups in western Kenya. The name Kalenjin is actually a term from the language of one of the groups, the Nandi, that literally means "I'll tell you," and was the name of a student's magazine and a series of radio reports, some with directed political intent, that were aimed at the eight "Nandi speaking" Nilotic groups of Western Kenya (Sutton 1976:22).

The Kalenjin are therefore one of the rare examples in Africa of an ethnicity being imposed from the inside. Kalenjin leaders recognized that the eight relatively small, isolated tribes could not compete with the larger, consolidated tribes in an independent Kenya.

The tribes that make up the Kalenjin include the Nandi, the Kipigis, the Tugen, the Keyo, the Pokot, the Marakwet, the Saboat and the Terik, today form the third largest "ethnic group" in Kenya. Much of the contemporary influence of the Kalenjin does not result from their numbers, however, but from the fact that the most powerful Kalenjin, Daniel arap Moi, a Tugen, is also the father of the nation. The continued acceptance of the "Kalenjin" label by the eight sub-tribes is, to no small extent, due to the influence of Moi and other Kalenjin national leaders who have successfully politicized the ethnicity.

It is difficult to discuss the notion of a traditional cultural and social pattern that might have existed for the "pre-Kalenjin" Kalenjin tribes because of the lack of an

integrating identity before the latter half of this century. However, there are social, cultural and linguistic characteristics common among the Kalenjin tribes that probably helped distinguish the Kalenjin from their close neighbors, the Kisii, Luo and Maasai.

Chief among these similarities was the strength of age-sets in political organization. All of the Kalenjin tribes had councils of elders that oversaw much of the social and political organization of the de facto maximal political unit, the "pororiet," or location. Membership in the council of elders brought with it a level of political participation that was among the most democratized of any ethnic groups in Kenya.

Membership was, however, limited to those who had been initiated into specific stages in the life cycle, with each stage having its own set of rights and responsibilities (Sutton 1976). These initiations were among the most harsh in Kenya, and at inclusion in the "junior warrior" grade included a very brutal circumcision ritual that still makes headlines today.

The named age-sets were based on cycles of between fifteen to twenty years and were held in common across all the sub-tribes. An individual initiated as a "junior warrior" was submissive to the will of the elder age-grade members until he himself, and all his age-mates, achieved that status (Sutton 1976:27).

The Kalenjin occupy a wide range of ecological and topographical zones in Western Kenya yet, as stated above, share among them a great deal of cultural and social characteristics and languages that are, to varying degrees, mutually intelligible. Most Kalenjin were traditionally agriculturalists with a great deal of pastoralism practiced by some sub-groups, notably the Nandi and the Pokot. The pastoral subsistence strategy employed by the Kalenjin has, in the past, put them in direct competition leading to occasional hostility with the Maasai.

Contemporary Kalenjin populations have gradually moved away from dependence on pastoralism due to population pressure on the available potential grazing areas. Agricultural initiatives have replaced much of the pastoralism and indeed, the areas occupied by the Kalenjin are said to be among the fastest developing in Kenya (Finance 1992).

Individual Kalenjin have also fared quite well under the Moi presidency. Some of the wealthiest and most powerful Kenyans in the country are Kalenjin politicians such as Energy Minister Nicholas Biwott, also the owner of Total Oil East Africa. There are also untold multitudes of Kalenjin with appointments in Kenya's overblown civil service. The number of Kalenjin secondary and university students has also dramatically increased (Finance 1992). Still, Kalenjin are among the least likely Kenyan ethnic groups to migrate to other areas of the country (Berg-Schlosser 1987).



The often blatant ethnic nepotism that has led to Kalenjin over-representation in the civil service has been the cause of a great deal of resentment, especially on the part of the Kikuyu, not only because of the somewhat expected and accepted nepotism, but also because many of the appointees have literally moved from the farmhouse to the statehouse. It is not, for example, uncommon for new Kalenjin employees in a civil service office to move quickly ahead of more experienced and qualified peers into positions of authority. The implications for efficiency within the civil service are obvious, but there are also far reaching implications for inter-ethnic relations.

#### The Kalenjin in Malindi

Kalenjin represent only a small proportion (probably less than one percent) of the population of Malindi. Like other Kalenjin scattered throughout the country, most Kalenjin find themselves in Malindi due to some appointment to a governmental post. At least half of the police force in the Malindi area are Kalenjin, for example. There are also several Kalenjin staff members in the Post Office, Telecommunications Office, and the Kenya Power and Lighting Office. I (and, for that matter, the Kalenjin informants that I talked to) am not aware of any Kalenjin-owned small business or even of a single Kalenjin in Malindi not employed in one of the governmental offices.

As might be expected, the Kalenjin in Malindi are mostly young men and a smaller number of young women, and are fairly spread out throughout the town in terms of residences. Malindi has a police barracks that accommodates some of the twenty or so officers assigned there. The police barracks are probably the single largest concentration of Kalenjin in Kilifi District.

Given their small numbers in Malindi and the distance of the town from their home areas, the Kalenjin are among the most isolated ethnics groups in Malindi. All of the Kalenjin that I knew and talked to had no desire to remain in Malindi beyond their current appointments and found it very difficult to enjoy their current tenure there. Their isolation was further brought home to me during the "ethnic clashes" mentioned earlier. Several Kalenjin simply disappeared from social gathering places around town, and did not come out of "hiding" until tensions had greatly decreased.

## CHAPTER 6 WAGENI

The last category of actors in the ethnic milieu so unique to Malindi are the most diversified of the "ethnic" groups discussed so far. I am referring to the several subcategories of Europeans and other non-Kenyans who contribute significantly in creating the unique composition of the town.

The KiSwahili word for guest or stranger is "wageni," and is used colloquially in Malindi to refer to both tourists and less transient visitors from their countries. I will therefore refer to the Western, mostly caucasian (although an increasing but still small number of Asians are also wageni), subjects of this chapter as "wageni" rather than Europeans or Westerners, for as we shall see, some of them cannot be accurately included in either category.

In this chapter, I have divided the "wageni" into three main categories based largely on the extent of permanent settlement in the community; motivations for coming to Malindi; and level of interest in continued or transitory residency there. On this basis, wageni can roughly be divided into three subgroups within which further distinctions can be made. They are; the Tourists; the Expatriates; and the Settlers. None of these groups are necessarily exclusive and,

as we shall see, it is quite possible and even normal for an individual to change categories during the course of his/her Malindi experience. I believe, however, that ethnographic insight is enhanced by studying the wageni using these culturally defined categories, even if there are individuals who may fit several of them serially, or even ambiguously, because of changes affecting their statuses.

#### Watali

I have already noted (Chapter 2) some of the attractions that draw so many visitors to Malindi. The relatively small size of the town, its oceanside vistas, and an already established infrastructure being some of the keys. The Tourist Information Office in Malindi estimates that there were 84,000 tourist arrivals in Kilifi District in 1991. The lion's share of these arrivals probably at least visited Malindi.<sup>1</sup>

As is the case in other parts of the world, tourists in Malindi are not a homogeneous group, neither in terms of national origin nor in regard to motivation and expectation of the tourist experience. The spectrum of experience and motivation among tourists has been summed up by dividing the general category of "tourists" into two more defined groups, travellers and tourists.

---

<sup>1</sup>I would estimate tourist revenues in the district as somewhere around 25 million U.S. dollars (84,000 x \$300.00 estimated total individual expenditure). This is based on the fact that most of the 84,000 reported tourists stay in the district only a few days before moving on to somewhere else.

Tourists of the latter type especially, are desirous of a tourist "bubble" from which they can experience the exotic without uncomfortably close contact to the real world of the host country. Great expense is incurred by the tourist industry to provide all the comforts of home for tourists seeking an exotic yet sheltered experiences. In Kenya, for instance, first class hotels are built in the middle of savannahs to provide tourists up close, but not too up close, views of wildlife and the feel of safari.

At the other end of the spectrum are tourists who seek the most authentic experience possible. This class of tourist is often composed of relatively young people in search of new experiences and authentic exposure to the host culture. These young people are often students who travel in a "drifter" fashion, avoiding, as much as possible, the "packaged" experiences of their fellow countrymen. In between are a large range of individuals seeking various levels of contact with the host culture. Such individuals may or may not see themselves as tourists. Often, they attempt to avoid areas frequented by tourists and the behaviors commonly associated with tourists. The attitudes and behavior of these kinds of tourists reflect sincere concern with gaining the respect and acceptance of the host communities (Vogt 1978).

In Malindi, the differences between the two groups are recognized and linguistically codified into two terms. The "tourists proper" (Swahili 'watalii') and the travellers

(Swahilized as 'matravella').<sup>2</sup> I turn now to a more detailed examination of the matravella phenomena in Malindi.

### Matravella

Matravella season in Malindi begins in earnest late April to early May and continues throughout the summer months until the beginning of September. This is in contrast to the normal "high tourist" season that begins in late December lasting through February and into early March (just before the long rains begin) and again during September and October.

There are two and possibly three reasons for the contrast in visiting seasons between travellers and other tourists. Firstly, a large percentage, though not nearly as large a percentage as has been reported elsewhere, are university students (Graburn 1989). The Summer months for most of the countries producing travellers are breaks in the school year providing time off for overseas travel for student travellers. Secondly, airline rates to Kenya are reduced because of the reduction in the number of tourists travelling to the country during the rainy season. Thirdly, travellers world over are known for being quite contemptuous of "regular tourists". Off season travel is one way to avoid the crush of tourist crowds.

---

<sup>2</sup>I first became aware that this distinction was important enough to have undergone 'Swahili-ization' when a friend who was a curio kiosk owner said to me during one of the off-season months "now we will have to rely on these 'matravella' to make a living and they never have any money." I had not previously used the term when speaking to anyone in Malindi. "Matravella" was apparently already a well established concept and I heard it used independently by several other people during "matravella" season.

Travellers are fairly easy to spot in Malindi. Almost all arrive in Malindi from Mombasa or Nairobi by way of one of the popular bus lines that constantly crowd the central market area of town. They almost always carry with them large camping backpacks strapped around their shoulders often with a sleeping roll or sleeping bag dangling from it. They often dress in bluejeans, shorts or kikoy (a square piece of colored cloth usually with wide stripes worn tied around the waist), and tee-shirts.

The majority of travellers in Malindi originate, mostly from the United Kingdom, The United States, Australia and New Zealand, or one of the Scandinavian countries, in that order. German travellers also visit in smaller numbers. Italian travellers, in my experience and in the experience of people that I talked to, are virtually nonexistent. Interestingly, these proportions are almost exactly inverse to more usual patterns of foreign tourist visitations to Malindi. Italians, and until very recently Germans, by far make up the largest 'watalii' nationalities. The marketing of Kenyan tourism in Europe is, to a large extent, behind this reversal and will be returned to later.

Accommodations for travellers in Malindi are plentiful. In addition to a half-dozen or so "wananchi"<sup>3</sup> hotels, there

---

<sup>3</sup>"Wananchi" literally means 'citizen' in KiSwahili (wana=a person having, nchi=a nation). Wananchi establishments, including hotels, bars and eating establishments, are distinctly beneath establishments meant to attract tourists in terms of size, quality of service and/or

are an equal number of lodges throughout the town specifically intended to accommodate travellers. These lodges contain between ten to thirty beds, sometimes with several beds in one room, and shared guest toilets and showers. In fact, one of the most popular of these lodges offers a bed and mosquito net placed in a common open area under the peaked, thatched roof of the building. A bed can be had at one of the latter types of establishments for under ten U.S. dollars per night (1992 prices). For three dollars per night, travellers can find accommodations at the Silver Sands beachside camp site without use of one of the small tented bungalows owned by the campsite or under six dollars for use of the campsite's shelter facilities.<sup>4</sup>

True to the general characterization of travellers mentioned earlier, travellers in Malindi differentiate, and to some degree segregate, themselves from other tourists on the basis of their experiences and previous expectations. Travellers eat and drink at local establishments unaccompanied by local "tour-guides," they are notably respectful of general norms of dress and propriety, and they appear very interested

---

accommodation.s

<sup>4</sup>A sign of the times. I recently received word from Malindi that the Silver Sands Campsite has been sold to an Italian developer by its Arab/Swahili owners. The Italian has begun construction of a tourist hotel on the site. The campsite, which was popular among travellers and among local Swahili families during holidays and weekends, is no more.



in finding out more about the people and the places they visit.

Young women travellers, for example, often return from Lamu with henna painted by Swahili women in Lamu decorating their hands and feet, or with hair braided by local hair-dressers.<sup>5</sup> Male travellers are quite fond of the aforementioned kikoy and will spend a great deal of time (much more so than the local Swahili) wearing it about on the street. Given their desire to participate, travellers also often pick up the habit of chewing 'miraa' in Malindi and the social sharing of the stalks and conversation that goes with it. In addition to these more superficial interests in local customs and practices, I met and spent time with several travellers who had even picked up a few words of KiSwahili and expressed a real desire to learn more.

Travellers also spend a great deal more time in Malindi and in the other places they visit than do regular tourists. This feature alone makes them different in their relations with other tourists and with their guests. Several of them even reported travelling throughout most of East Africa, and even all of Africa, often on trips lasting more than three

---

<sup>5</sup>Henna application has become something of a cottage industry among Swahili women in Lamu. The women charge a small fee or will even not directly ask for anything but will accept a gift for hours of careful work applying the henna. Notably, this industry has not taken root among Swahili women in Malindi, probably because the larger size of the town makes it harder for foreigners to meet locals and because Swahili women in Malindi are more jealously guarded against contact with tourists.

months. In my survey of fifty-five travellers, conducted in 1992, the average length of time spent travelling was over eleven weeks. Often, travellers had visited other exotic places in Third World countries such as India and Thailand. Some were even passing through Malindi as part of a travel itinerary that included countries in Asia and other parts of Africa.

Part of their ability to participate in relatively long travelling adventures has to do, of course, with the larger amount of leisure time available to student travellers as opposed to vacationing tourists and to the fact that travellers spent much less on food and accommodations and arrange their visits and timetables themselves. Tourists on the other hand, are parts of larger groups whose timetable and budget are "packaged" by the travel agents in their home country. More to the point, however, is the sense of adventure as a motivating factor in travellers' visits compared with the carefully programmed vacations built into packages organized by tourist companies and officials.

Travellers in Malindi also use the town as a stop-over point for journeying to Lamu Island. The journey to Lamu by bus from Malindi takes over five hours over very rough, dry terrain. The bus and the passengers arrive at the Lamu ferry covered with yellow dust from the dirt roads that constitute

most of the trip<sup>6</sup>. In 1992, there were several cases of reported Somali bandit activities along the route to Lamu. Several buses were even fired upon by bandits resulting in injury and at least one death.

Despite the danger and discomfort of the trip, Lamu has become something of a Mecca for the young travellers because of the exoticism it represents in contrast to other, more tourist dominated parts of Kenya. The pristine beaches of what are really small sandbars surrounding the island, the ancient narrow streets and absence of cars on the island and, its reputation for high quality and easily available marijuana make it especially popular. Many travellers, in fact, spend more time in Lamu and report enjoying their stay there better than their stay in Malindi. During the 1992 Matravella Season, 70% (n=38) of the travellers in my survey had either visited Lamu or had planned to visit before leaving Malindi.

Because most travellers are "on a budget" they are also less likely to be pursued by beach-boys and other hopeful members of the informal tourist economy. They have less and spend less money than tourists and their consumption is not nearly as conspicuous. Travellers therefore tend to get better prices at curio kiosks, and better prices for black market currency exchange. However, because they travel without the supervision of tourist companies, they are more

---

<sup>6</sup>A new paved road linking Lamu to Garissa (about 70 kilometers south) was being constructed in 1992.

vulnerable when involved in serious con-games involving hundreds or thousands of dollars.

For example, one British couple told me of a scam that had been involved with in Mombasa. Upon arriving in Mombasa, they meant a local tour guide who offered to show them around town. The tour guide did as expected and showed them all around Mombasa. At the end of the day, as they were returning to their hotel, the tour guide asked them if they could hold on to his bag until they next day because he was afraid of thieves attacking him for it as travelled home alone at night. The couple agreed.

A few minutes after entering their hotel room, there was a knock on the door. The couple entered the door and three men claiming to be police came in and demanded to search their luggage. When they came across the bag that the tour guide had left, they "discovered" that it contained several ounces of marijuana. The alleged police threatened to take the couple to jail immediately for possession of the drug. The only way to avoid jail, the couple was told, was to pay the police a bribe of 50,000 Ks (at the time, about \$1500.00 U.S.). The couple at first refused but, after being driven to the front of a police station and given one more chance to accept the offer, they complied.

Other types of contact between Kenyans seeking to exploit the tourist industry and travellers are commonplace. Beachboys make a good percentage of their income through the

sale of marijuana and miraa to travellers. The usual pattern is for beachboys to charge the matravella several times the price charged by the local supplier and to keep the profit. "We charge them what they think is a cheap price in their own countries but is an expensive price here." I was told by one beachboy. Sexual relations between female "ma-travella" and beach-boys are fairly common, although these contacts are not as exploitative as those between Kenyans and more formal, packaged tourists, as we shall see.

### The Tourists

As previously noted, more than anything else, Malindi owes to the development of the tourist industry. The economic foundation for the industry is the thousands of "tourists proper", watalii in Swahili, as opposed to the low-spending, somewhat self-contained, travellers discussed above.

Watalii are also indirectly responsible for many of the social changes taking place in town. Their sheer number has led to a perception among the town's Kenyans that they are in the midst of an economic boom offering a harvest of jobs and many other ways to make a relatively good living from the fertile soil of Kenyan tourism. In a nation suffering chronic under and unemployment and a falling currency, watalii represent a huge reservoir of untapped resources.

In general terms, there are two classifications of tourists in Malindi, or more to the point, two methods of arrival in Malindi and two motivations for visiting; watalii

who have come specifically to see Malindi, what I will refer to as the "sun and fun" tourists, and those conducting a more extensive tour of the country with the coast as one of the interesting stopovers. The vast majority of watalii in Malindi are visiting the town as part of larger tour. Malindi is part of a travelling itinerary that includes other places in Kenya. For these tourists, the town often represents an oceanside respite from days or weeks of travelling that may have included Nairobi, Mombasa and the western game parks.

"Grand tour" tourists usually arrive on the coast at Mombasa via airplane from Nairobi and hence to Malindi via tour bus. Most of the larger hotels in Malindi have their own tour buses or contracts with local tour companies who supply bus service. A concierge, or a group of staff members from the hotel or from the tour company, meets the group of tourists at their hotel in Mombasa or at the airport, if a stay in Mombasa is not on the itinerary. Once safely in Malindi, the tourist is free to make whatever arrangements are desired for safaris or tours of local attractions with local tour companies.

"Grand tourists" often book stays in Malindi hotels themselves through tour companies in Nairobi and are given rates, departure times, and advice on what to do once they get to Malindi through these agencies. Nation-wide and international tourist agencies, such as Pollman's Tours, United Tourism Company, Abercrombie and Kent and Francorossa,

arrange more complex excursions from offices in all major towns, Malindi is a well-established destination on almost all of these tours.

International tour companies in Europe include Malindi in their schedules so that tourists can plan to visit the town even months ahead of time. Malindi is therefore a well-planned, well-established, albeit budding, tourist center with almost guaranteed revenues given the present conditions and preferences of tourists.

"Sun and fun" tourists differ from grand tourists. For them, Malindi is the main destination. The vast majority of their time in Kenya is spent within a few hours travel by road from the town. The means of arrival in Malindi includes travel by road from Mombasa after only an airport stay there or flight from Nairobi directly into Malindi. For those arriving from Mombasa, an increasing percentage seems to have come directly to Mombasa from Europe, bypassing upcountry points altogether.

The motivation for coming to Kenya also differs somewhat from the grand tourists. Grand Tourist are interested in getting all he\she can out of the adventure of visiting Africa. Often, visits to several game parks, the slopes of Mount Kenya and Lake Naivasha or Victoria will be on the itinerary along with a visit to the coast. All of course within the confines of the "tourist bubble," in contrast to the experiences of travellers (E. Cohen 1972, 1979).

Sun and Fun tourists, on the other hand are drawn to Malindi by the tropical exoticism of its palm lined beaches and the laid back lifestyle on the coast. Swimming, tanning and partying are more important to the S&F tourist than viewing exotic animals or learning about exotic African cultures. In classic four "S" style (sun, sea, sport, and sex) these tourists value the luxurious hedonism of the experience along with the freedom of anonymity over its educational or enriching value (Matthews 1978:67).

Germans in Malindi are a classic example of the "sun and fun" tourist. Tourists from Germany comprise the largest portion of European tourists on the coast. As shown in Table 6:1, in 1990, German tourists occupied close to 40% of all beds on the coast. The statistics for Coast Province include the South Coast-Diani chain of tourist hotels, whose customers are also largely German and British.

These figures are particularly interesting when contrasted to the overall pattern of German tourism in Kenya. While the 1990 figures reveal Germans as the single most populous group among foreign visitors (at 26.9%). German hotel patrons in Nairobi make up only 4.8%, for other parts of the country only 8.7%. It seems clear that Germans prefer the coast and therefore make up a large percentage of what I have classified as sun and fun tourists. This reputation is reflected in common stereotypes (and by my own observations) about Germans among local people. It is rare, for example to



Table 6:1

Percentage of Hotel Beds Occupied By Country of Origin.

---

	COAST	NAIROBI	OTHER*
Germany	39.8%	4.8%	8.7%
United Kingdom	15.2%	12.7%	12.6%
Switzerland	11.2%	1.9%	4.8%
Italy	5.7%	2.6%	2.4%
France	4.9%	3.9%	6.6%
Other Europe	6.4%	4.5%	5.3%
U.S.A.	1.6%	15.0%	17.8%
Kenya	9.1%	18.0%	30.6%

---

\*Includes people staying in lodges, game reserves and national parks.

---

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.

find German heterosexual couples travelling together. The pattern instead is for small groups of two to four German men, or similar groupings of German women visiting Malindi. The pattern is especially pronounced among Germans over age forty.

To the observer, foreign and local, the possibly stereotyped impression left by this pattern is that Germans come to Malindi for "sex safaris." Female prostitution thrives around the three or four still mostly German bars and restaurants on the tourist strip. Often, prostitutes will move several times during the course of one evening between one or another of these bars looking for clients. At any time of the day, it is not unusual to see a male German tourist

drinking beer in one of these bars with one or several prostitutes.

Prostitution by men also targets Germans, for the most part females but occasionally males as well. Male prostitution is conducted in a somewhat more haphazard fashion and is less blatant in terms of directly requesting payment for services. Male "gigolos" often meet their clients on the beach or in a bar and stick with them using the pretence of serving as a tour guide.

The bad reputation given to "beach-boys" are partly the result of these activities, although by no means are all beach-boys gigolos. Often a young local man will be seen in the company of a German woman during her entire stay and will accompany her on tours, on the beach and in the hotels and bars. Several Maasai have been drawn into this lifestyle, and, as already mentioned, some end up married to or establishing a long-term relationship with their German lovers.

Germans are also notoriously oblivious to local standards of dress and propriety. They have developed a stereotyped reputation for being perhaps fond of beer drinking and of being generally rambunctious in bars and other public places. German tourists can even be seen walking through even the most Islamic areas of the town in the middle of the day wearing nothing but bathing suits (and rather skimpy ones at that!). All of the above is in line with the favoritism enjoyed by the

laid-back Coast among Germans and characteristic of S&F. tourists (Mathieson and Wall 1982, Matthews 1978, Turner and Ash 1976).

Italian tourists in Malindi also sometimes display many of the characteristics of s&f tourists. The "Italian side" of town is replete with sun worshippers and beachcombers. On the other hand, Italian tourists segregate themselves physically, restricting much of their activities within the hotels. Accordingly, Italian hotels go out of their way to provide a wide range of popular activities within the hotels and weekly the discos. Even curio shopping is carried out en masse. A bus from the hotels brings dozens of tourists at a time to the various shopping venues around town. It has even been rumored, but not independently corroborated, that some of the Italian hotels make Italian prostitutes available to guests.

The sex safari stereotype is not as strong amongst Italians, however. Indeed, many Italians come as couples, as opposed to the German pattern of groups of same sex singles. They also stay close to Malindi for their entire trip. Italian tourist in Malindi also tend to be much younger than their German counterparts and professionals, or at least fairly well off, as opposed to the scores of working class Germans who invade the town.

British tourists represent the opposite end of the spectrum and are the best example of grand tour tourists. Referring again to Table 6:1, the British make up a major

proportion of the guest nights spent throughout the country, including Malindi.

The "low season" (March-August) is an especially favored time among the British to visit Malindi. Extremely low fares are a large part of the reason. In 1992, for example, Pollman's Tours for example, offers a six day stay at Lawford's Hotel with round trip airfare from Manchester for 600 pounds.

There are three locational clusters of hotels in Malindi differentiated and servicing guests who differ by the national origin. The largest cluster is composed of the three large hotels on Lamu Road on what is the "tourist strip" of the town. The hotels, Lawford's, Blue Marlin, and Eden Roc, are the largest in Malindi with an average bed capacity of about 320. All are German owned and managed. The clientele of these hotels is almost exclusively German during the high tourist season. During the low season, Blue Marlin is half-German, half-British.

A cluster of eight "Italian" hotels are located about five miles southward along the coastline. The largest of these hotels, African Dream, Tropical Village, and Jambo Club, average about 120 beds. All of the hotels in this cluster are Italian owned and operated, with a notable exception being the British owned Driftwood and White Elephant "clubs." The clientele in these hotels is, as might be expected, almost

entirely Italian, even to a greater extent than the German hotels cater to German guests.

Along with the large hotels on this side of town, there are a half-dozen or so Italian, independently owned "guest cottages". These cottages usually house under 20 people in total in small bungalows or a large guest house. These establishments are notorious in Malindi for the evasion of bed taxes and other governmental levies on the tourist trade. The owners avoid taxes by officially retaining the lodges as private residences and reporting the guests as personal friends, if and when necessary.

The spatial segregation outlined above is due largely to the marketing of packaged tours in Europe, and especially in Italy. The common pattern is for guests to pay in Italy for all of their expenses in Malindi, room, board, excursions, and to have all of their needs catered to by the hotel. As a result, hardly any money is circulated into the local economy by tourists staying at these lodges. Italian hotel owners maintain daily fax contact with tour agencies in Italy. They often have their own offices in Italy that are in constant contact with the hotel updating the guest list and informing the hotel about arrangements made and prices paid.

Europeans also practice ethnic segregation. Germans and Italians are especially known for going out of their way to avoid each other. This fact was pointed out to me several times by local tour operators who noted the acrimony that

seemed to exist between members of the two groups experiencing a tour together. One informant told me that he has even been asked by German clients if any Italians were going along on the tour before they agreed to sign up.

One Kenyan manager of a German hotel expressed to me his fear that as Malindi becomes more dominated by Italian tourists and developers, the Germans will increasingly drift away to other parts of the coast, such as Kilifi and Watamu. There may in fact be some cause for concern. The most popular disco in Malindi, Stardust, was owned and operated by a German in 1990 when I last visited Malindi. At that time, the European clientele was almost exclusively German. In 1992, the German owner leased the disco to an Italian. Literally overnight, the clientele changed from almost completely German to exclusively Italian. British and Americans continued to frequent it under both regimes.

Neither of the two groups of tourists mentioned above is completely homogeneous in terms of experience or composition, of course. There are tourists in both groups who at varying times behave in ways that go from one end of the spectrum to the other and even off of this scale and into the realm of the *ma-travella*. Individuals are not completely constrained by their travel itinerary even if they have arranged and paid up front for it in their home countries. Alternate scheduling and activities can be arranged while in Malindi from any

number of local sources without penalty from the tour company or hotel.

When activities are not in progress, whether within the hotel or through some tour company, visitors are free to roam about town in relative safety. They can and do eat and drink in local tourist bars and restaurants, and generally explore the town and the seaside on their own. In addition, there are literally dozens of beachboys and streetboys who actively and competitively seek out tourists interested in walking tours of the town.

At the other extreme, as already noted, tourists can come to Malindi and never have any contact with the local community or even guidance from hotel or tour company staff. All of the major hotels schedule daily activities including ocean sports, discos and performances by traditional dancers or local bands that can take up an entire holiday period.

More so than grand tourists, s&f tourists book their entire itinerary in Europe. It is not uncommon to have literally every detail of their stay mapped out and paid for before entering Kenya. Safaris, visits to the Marine Park or to the Gedi Ruins are all made in advance through one of the international tour companies mentioned above. They also contract with local companies, however, in arranging the

obligatory safari in nearby Tsavo National Park, "bush tours" of nearby Giriama villages,<sup>7</sup> and deep sea fishing adventures.

### The Expatriates

In addition to the masses of tourists that make up the majority of the outsider presence in Malindi, there are also local, permanently resident Westerners. Some of these "Expatriates" are Westerners who have recently settled in Kenya but who regularly return to their home countries. Others are more accurately referred to here as "Settlers" and include much smaller group of British citizens and their offspring, many of whom have lived in Malindi since the early days of British colonialism. This latter group is, in fact, sometimes referred to among the Kenyan community as "wakoloni", the colonists.

While perhaps not as influential in terms of physical presence and contribution to the overall economy and lifestyle of the town as the thousands of tourists that pass through each year, these groups certainly add to the overall presence and perception of Westerners. Their contact with other members of the community, through employer-employee relationships, romantic relationships, or as investors in the infrastructure of the community, and their often colorful lifestyles, makes them important players.

---

<sup>7</sup>One of only two Giriama owned tour companies in Malindi (who happened to cater mostly to German and British tourists) advertises bush tours of "topless Giriama villages".



I use the term "expatriate" to refer specifically to a group of Western foreigners who are resident in Malindi for at least part of the year and who own permanent dwellings in and around the town. Some expatriates are also involved in commercial activities. Most maintain close ties with the home country. Many spend only the Winter months in Malindi or visit for only a few days or weeks at a time several times during the year. Others are permanent residents and rarely if ever leave Kenya for their homelands.

Expatriates seem to have been drawn to Malindi for the same reasons as those that draw tourists. Older expatriates especially seem enamored with the relative serenity and idyllic beauty of the town and the surroundings. Those involved in smaller business ventures (there are a number of small restaurants, boutiques and tour companies owned by expatriates) probably have interest in the town that goes beyond financial gain. There are other places in Kenya and certainly in Europe that could return more on the investment without the added expense and trouble of equipment shipment, taxes plus the extra cost of repairs and spare parts.

In addition to the attraction of Malindi's tropical beauty, stories and rumors abound among the local Kenyan community as to the secret, more nefarious, reasons some members of the expatriate community have chosen to settle there. For example, one of the wealthiest Italian expatriates is said to have been banished to Malindi from Italy by the

Mafia, and told never to return. A well known German entrepreneur is said to have earned his wealth by embezzling from his company in Germany. I was also told by a reliable informant, who claimed that he was directly contacted by Interpol agents,<sup>8</sup> that the agency tracked down another German, who had recently set up a business in Malindi, on similar charges of embezzlement.

It is difficult to judge the exact number of expatriates in Malindi because of the habit of many of the wealthier expatriates of traveling several times during the course of one year between East Africa and Europe. In addition, expatriates tend to self-segregate. There are many sub-community associations and activities which form an "invisible" population and subculture within the community.

My own impression, based on observation but not an actual census, is that there are less than one hundred expatriates in Malindi town, with a few more scattered in the surrounding small towns. This is based on the number of expatriate families known to exist in Malindi, and the number of European businesses whose owners spend at least some of their time directly overseeing them. The British settler population number less than fifty.

---

<sup>8</sup>This particular informant worked for the local telecommunications office and said that he was asked by the agents whether a German fitting a given description had set up a telephone account recently.

Like other segments of the Malindi community, the expatriate community is segmented and segregated into several largely exclusive networks. Differences in wealth and status among expatriates and ethno-national identity form the basis for the segregation present. Within the two largest groups of expatriates, the Germans and the Italians, there are elite cliques that form their own sub-communities and who have little or no contact with much less wealthy expatriate countrymen.

Although a great deal of day to day interaction takes place between the wageni (expatriates and tourists) and local Kenyans, many of these activities are perhaps best described as mercenary in nature. Kenyans seek to exploit the financial and socioeconomic status of wageni through marriage and other social contracts. Expatriate wageni often seek to establish relationships with influential members of the Kenyan community in order to profit from the Kenyan's political influence and/or access to resources. Tourists seek the fulfillment of expectations of service in providing a comfortable, yet exotic experience.

As an example related to the former point, a local health inspector in Malindi was very popular among Italian investors because of his willingness to turn his head away from health standard violations (especially those regarding worker conditions). This very useful trait was reflected in the number of close friendships held between the man and the

Italians. The Kenyan played a key role in a number of social engagements featuring Italians and Kenyans (two of which I actually attended). In another example, the Malindi postal worker in charge of assigning post boxes (which are in short supply) is greeted daily by smiling, waving Europeans acquiring after his health and the health of his family.

The Germans are perhaps the most diversified group of expatriates in Malindi. Within the German expatriate community there are the owners and executive directors of the largest hotels in Malindi, and the owner of Stardust complex, one of the most valuable pieces of real estate on the tourist strip.<sup>9</sup>

Most of the German investment in Malindi and the subsequent migration of permanent German residents to the coast occurred in the early to mid-seventies during a particularly vigorous spurt of growth in the tourist industry led by Germans (Martin 1973). Lawford's, Blue Marlin and Eden Roc hotel were taken over and greatly expanded upon by German investors at this time. The longest, permanent German member of the Malindi community that I was aware of, had lived there since 1967.

The homes of these wealthier Germans tend to be congregated towards the Western side of town, two or three

---

<sup>9</sup>The owner of the Stardust complex can occasionally be seen driving around town in a huge, yellow, convertible, left-hand driven Buick from the early seventies. Such a car is not available in Kenya and was undoubtedly brought from Germany or the U.S. at the owners expense.

miles from the beach. Several homes are on the outskirts of the old colonial neighborhoods, the older ones taken over from former British owners. Regardless of the ethnicity of the owner, the higher-priced homes stand on small estates of land with high fences and askari separating the occupants from the outside world.

There are also quite a few pensioners and working class German men and women who live more modest lifestyles. There are a number of German pensioners and their families living in Mtangani, a small community three miles west from Malindi. These men own modest homes, similar to the homes available to mid-level civil servants in Malindi town, with indoor plumbing, electricity, and several bedrooms, and apparently live off what they receive as pension from Germany. I say apparently because I am not aware of any income generating activity by this particular group of five pensioners.

There are several younger German men and women in Malindi who have seemingly "retired" there. I am aware of several who rent rooms or houses from Kenyan landlords and who reside in Malindi for most of the year. Two of these people own a small fishing boat that they use to take tourists on deep sea fishing expeditions. For the most part, and unlike the Italian example, there are few Germans owning smaller self-operated businesses.

As with German tourists, some of the less elite resident Germans have gotten (or earned) the reputation of being drawn

to Malindi for s&f purposes only. One particular group of three German men in their mid thirties who had come to Malindi only a year or two before, quickly earned a very bad reputation of being "washenzi", or barbarians. These men frequented daily all of the more seedy bars in town and were often seen in the company of very young, teenage Giriama girls.

The permanent Italian residents of Malindi are less well known for s&f activities. They most often follow the general pattern of Italians in Malindi. This means staying, for most purposes, within their own ethnic networks. The Italian community are notorious for forming cliques based on place of origin in Italy,<sup>10</sup> wealth and relative social standing.

As alluded to earlier, Italians in Malindi (and indeed throughout Kenya) have managed to develop a widespread reputation for being, or at least behaving as, "mafioso". These perceptions are reinforced by numerous examples of bribery of public officials, pressures exerted by Italian hoteliers and entrepreneurs.<sup>11</sup> Part of the closedness of

---

<sup>10</sup> On the subject of home area in Italy, interestingly enough, most of the Italian hoteliers in Malindi are from Rome or from southern Italy and Sicily, most of the Italian tourists that crowd their hotels every year are from Milan and Northern Italy. Separate regions with a great deal of historical animosity and prejudice between them (see, for example, Belmonte 1989).

<sup>11</sup>A Kenyan archeologist working for the National Museums of Kenya, reported that in 1992 he was told by one Italian hotelier that he could be made to "disappear" if he insisted on preventing the hotelier from developing on an historic site.

their community may be due to the involvement of some members of the community in illegitimate activities at home and abroad, or at least to the desire to maintain this somewhat exaggerated reputation.

The presence of so many allegedly "connected" people in town, combined with the growth of investment opportunities, the increasing Italian tourist presence, and the increasing number of people seeking to exploit these opportunities, had led to a desire to maintain the appearance of success and potency must be great within the Italian community. The intrigue that constantly surrounds the community (if the local grapevine has any validity whatsoever) is, I believe, partly due to the shuffling for position that has characterized the community in recent years.

One African wife of an Italian hotel owner told me that she had given up on socializing within the Italian community because of the backbiting and gossiping that goes on within these cliches. She described the social scene within the Italian community as consisting of an endless stream of small gatherings at the homes of various members of the community in which both male and female guests engaged in endless speculation about the affairs and concerns of others.

She also maintained that a great deal of "social climbing" went on in the community and that members would often go out of their way ( and above their means) in attempts to impress their guests with generosity and hospitality. I

attended one such social function, ostensibly the birthday of a child of an Italian-Swahili marriage, held at one of the Italian hotels. Despite the fact that it was the child's fourth birthday, the party was held at night and lasted late into the evening. The child's proud father, a middle aged man of about fifty, apparently spared no expense in providing food and drinks for more than thirty adult guests (at least a third of whom were Kenyan). A Maasai troop performed and even allowed the young boy to dance with them at the end of the evening.

The child's father owns a small retail store that sells hand-made Italian styled leather shoes and other items (mostly to other Italians) and lives with his wife and son in a rented apartment. I was told by the friend who invited me to the party, and who knew the family well, that the man was grossly overstepping the boundaries of what he could afford.

#### Expatriate Families

On the subject of wageni and their African families, one further common pattern of long-term, sometimes transient residency in Malindi among Germans and Italians, although definitely not limited to Germans and Italians, exists. This pattern is often centered around a long standing romantic relationship with Kenyans, usually involving male Europeans and their African mistresses or wives. A somewhat different pattern exists among women involved with African males.



The male Expatriate will buy or rent on behalf of his partner, a small house or apartment in town and send money for its upkeep and the expenses of the lover from Europe. When the visitor arrives in Malindi from Europe, room and board are of course already awaiting. The Kenyan may also visit Europe at various times during the year.

This pattern of long term romantic involvement and even marriage occurs frequently enough that many prostitutes express seemingly sincere expectations of eventually finding a "husband" who will provide for them in this way. Although relatively few actually fulfill this expectation. A long standing joke exists among Malaya that Malindi is the "ticket to Europe", the preferred outcome expressed to me by several women was to have a home and a business in Kenya and to visit Europe perhaps occasionally. I knew of at least a dozen women involved in such "commuter marriages", some of which were previously involved in prostitution before they met their European lovers.<sup>12</sup>

Although I knew of several expatriate females who had male lovers in Malindi and made trips to the town several times during my stay there, I did not know of any who had gone

---

<sup>12</sup>There are several distinct categories of prostitution in Malindi ranging from what might be considered in our society, a milder form of "street hustling" to a much more aggressive form of "gold-digging". I henceforth refer to the range of women involved in some form of sexually exploitative financial arrangements with men by the Swahili term "malaya". Chapter 7 discusses several issues surrounding "malaya-ism" in Malindi in more detail.

as far as providing a permanent home for their partners. This may have more to do with the negative attitude toward women providing for men among all Kenyan customs than it does with the ability or desire of female expatriates to pay for their male lovers.

One of the by products of these unions has been an increase in the number of interracial children being born and raised in Malindi. Some of whom have become something of expatriates themselves. This is often an especially desired outcome among malaya because of the permanent tie believed to have been established at the birth of a child.

This trend is only as recent as the increased presence of Expatriates in the town and so represents a new phenomena (the oldest children born from one of these relationships, that I am aware of, are now twenty), the implications for which on the overall cultural and social milieu of the town remain to be seen. In the future, the children of these unions may possibly come to represent a new category of individuals unique to the Malindi community.

There is also apparent desire for having children among older members of the expatriate community who marry or make mistresses of Kenyan women in Malindi, judging from the number of older men with small children that can be seen every day in Malindi. I once witnessed a gathering of three German "pensioners" at a bar in Mtangani, each of which had several small racially mixed children in tow.

Children of these unions are often derogatorily referred to by other members of Malindi's African community as "nusu-nusu" (literally 'half and half' in Swahili), a term that refers not only to their physical appearance, but also to their mixed cultural and linguistic heritage. Notably, none of the Kenyans that I came across would think of referring to the Swahili as half and half, even though some of them are even less phenotypically "African" than the Nusu-nusu.

The cultural "half-ness" of these children is often determined by the fact that they are raised in homes that reflect, to some degree, the traditions and norms of two cultures. In terms of language use, the trend among the families in which they are raised is for the mother to learn and to communicate in her mate's European language. The child therefore grows up in a household speaking a European language and speaks Swahili or, more likely, his mother's mother-tongue haltingly if at all. Or, the child spends at least part of the year with his father or both parents in Europe and is again exposed to European languages and lifestyles.

Also important to their "half-ness" is the general trend toward patrimonial kinship ties among all Kenyan ethnic groups. That children "belong to the tribe of his father" is a common determination of identity among Kenyan ethnic groups in which a great deal of intermarriage has occurred historically. The Swahili "Shirazi complex" discussed earlier is a classic example of the strength of this association.

Whether the children of the specific types of relationships common in Malindi fall within these rules of identification is a question that remains to be answered. However, one specific example from my fieldwork of the conflict inherent in "half-ness" almost anywhere in the world is perhaps illustrative of the problems of identification faced by these children and those around them.

I visited the home of a woman who had recently returned from Germany with her eight year old son by a German father, with a friend who was a close acquaintance of the woman. My friend had been very close to the woman, but had not seen her or her child in more than a year. The conversation was held in Swahili with the child participating fully. I was also told that the child spoke German fluently.

My friend teased the child mercilessly by calling him "nusu-nusu" (literally half and half) and "mzungu" (white). He went on to ask the child in the presence of his mother whether he was a Kamba (his mother's tribe) to which he shyly replied no. My friend asked him if he was a Kenyan to which he again replied no. He asked him who he (the child) was and the child did not answer. After the child had left the room, my friend asked his mother why she had not taught him (the child) any KiKamba. The mother said that she tried but that the child was in school in Germany and had no opportunity to learn KiKamba. She seemed remorseful that the child had not been exposed to more things Kenyan.

The overall influence of all three types of foreign residency in Malindi operates at several levels, culturally, economically, socially and politically. However, all three categories of foreigners form largely insular communities. Membership in them is limited by place of origin, economic status and, nominally, marriage. It is not clear to me, despite several examples of which I have knowledge, if even the children of unions between expatriates and Kenyans fit into the category of wageni.

What is clear is that all three patterns of foreign residency in Malindi serve to make the differences between Kenyans and non-Kenyans even more clear and more immediately relevant than they may be elsewhere in the country. The economic and social exploitation of the local community that is part of Third World tourism almost everywhere further distinguishes Westerners from other residents, particularly non-coastal Kenyans. Several members of the Malindi community have expressed to me that tourism is, in fact, a new form of "ukoloni" (colonialism). Ethnic, national, and cultural differences can only serve to heighten the awareness of the dichotomy that exists between Kenyans and non-Kenyans within the local community.

## CHAPTER 7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In the preceding chapters, I have provided a descriptive outline of the patterns of ethnic diversity and identity in Malindi along with some of the modes of behavior that have resulted from the ethnic diversity that has developed because of tourism. In this chapter, I discuss the research methodologies used in answering the questions posed at the beginning of this dissertation. This discussion includes a description of data gathered during the field experience and why these types of data were important in answering research questions.

To reiterate, the goal of this study is to examine the particulars of ethnic diversity in Malindi and the phenomena of continued multi-ethnic contact, within a tourist setting. Research activities were designed to determine whether multi-ethnicity, in this particular set of social, economic and political circumstances, leads to an increase in feelings of national identity among members of the host community. The study is also concerned with the possible effect of increased contact and the resulting conflict, competition and cooperation associated with expanding the inclusiveness of ethnic categories.

The types of behavior and attitudes thought to represent either or both of the above trends, includes the recognition among members of recognized ethnic groups that individuals outside of ego's group are part of a community, social or political, that endows individual members with similar rights, responsibilities and common interest. Further, that a disposition to act in ways that manifest this attitude is evident among those recognizing and accepting this communal identity. It also includes the recognition that commonalities inherent in being a member of an overall society carries more significance for the individual than does the sum of individuated differences between constituent ethnic groups.

In the present field setting, I have hypothesized that this lessening of ethnic distance and a concomitant increase in feelings of inclusiveness at the individual and the group level results in the formation and maintenance of a unifying national identity among members of various indigenous ethnic groups. This results, ultimately, in a sense of common citizenship and "Kenyaness," which, for reasons that have been earlier annunciated, is important, and indeed vital, for the continued effective maintenance and future strengthening of the Kenyan state.

A further, closely related hypothesis is that "social distance" is lessened as the above two types of attitudes become prevalent. This lessening of social distance takes place between groups as members come to recognize the value of

the ties that bind them to other, all be it, ethnically differentiated members. In addition, members recognize the relative commonalities inherent among members of the recognizable ethnic universe as compared to the foreignness of strangers.

Malindi represents a prime area to conduct research into these areas. However, its almost bewildering diversity and its dualistic character as both a resort town and an expanding East African city also presented a practical and methodological challenge to obtaining the kinds of information needed to at least partially answer some of the questions raised above.

Expectations of results derived from the particular methodological strategies used in gathering data, included obtaining information at several levels of analysis, which, when related to information from other sources, could provide evidence of the expected trends (or lack thereof). In addition to trends in attitudinal measures and responses, I was also interested in gaining some insight into the "texture" of ethnic relationships in Malindi and the etic-based norms of interaction, preference and value that determine everyday relationships and the direction of future change.

In fact, the lion's share of time spent in the field was devoted to gathering the latter type of data and in exploring previously observed nuances of the texture of ethnic relationships. This data, though contextually rich, by itself



was not sufficient to describe factors important in determining the direction of changes in attitude or the strength of these changes. The research therefore included less subjective measures of the phenomena observed.

Therefore, from a methodological standpoint, this research was divided into three stages in order to accomplish these data collection goals; the ethnography of the multiethnic experience in Malindi; the measurement of social distance; and, the measurement of increasing national identity relative to individual and ethnic interests. All three areas are presented as sub-factors in order to give an overall sense of the direction of ethnic change in relation to national identity.

I will now briefly outline the activities undertaken and research methods used in each of these areas, describe the types of data that were gathered, and explain how they fit into the overall picture presented here. Later in this chapter, I will present an outline of the major research survey instrument used and brief discuss the ethnographical justifications for the types of questions used and the responses they permitted.

#### Ethnographic Method

Ethnographic data was gathered in Malindi through both participant observation and directed ethnographic questioning of key informants. As is often the case with anthropological research, both approaches were combined to gather data. I

would witness an event or be involved in a particularly interesting conversation and would later engage in conversation or ask key participants or other people I thought knowledgeable about a particular event, practice or circumstance, further questions about what was going on (the cases presented in Chapter 9 are good illustrators of this process at work on a day to day basis).

As stated previously, I was particularly interested throughout the ethnographic experience in gathering data about the "etic" rules of interaction between ethnic groups and the possible "emic" substrata that governed these rules. I have used some of this data to discuss the ways in which people categorize ethnic groups in Malindi and the "axis of identification" (see Chapter 9) formed by this process of determination of ethnic identity and subsequent categorization.

I also collected data on popular stereotypes, jokes and perceptions about different ethnic groups in order to supplement the ethnographic information obtained from the above activities. I was especially interested in the context in which ethnic stereotypes were invoked. Often, the invocation of a stereotype represents an honest (however misinformed) attempt to understand the motivation of the object of the stereotype in relation to a larger group to which the person is thought to belong (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986, Lakoff 1987).

The final subset of ethnographic tasks were intended to provide descriptive data regarding the impact of the tourist industry on the local community particularly with regards to the local economy and the moral and behavioral influence of the resort atmosphere. This latter subset was particularly important, I believe, in anticipating and interpreting reactions by members of the local community. I hypothesize that attitudes toward that ubiquitous class of outsiders, the tourists, and to other members of the European community in Malindi, act as a catalyst for the expression of nationalism among Kenyans.

Some of the key informants interviewed for this later set of ethnographic data included members of the community directly involved in the formal tourist industry, such as hotel managers, tour company operators and curio sales people, to people involved in the decidedly informal economy, including money-changers, beachboys and prostitutes. Interviews also involved local political and religious leaders as well as everyday residents of Malindi.

#### Social Distance Scale

The major goals of the social distance scale were to provide a measure of relative distance between ethnic groups based on individual judgements in a number of different areas of social interaction, while providing these same measures for individuals. The social distance scale was also designed to test assumptions about ethnic categorizations derived from

some of the more conventional ethnographic activities described above and to determine the strength of stereotypes in determining expressed preferences and predispositions in behavior toward other ethnic groups.

In addition to these measures, the scale was designed to give an overall picture of where the ethnic groups involved stood in relation to each other, i.e.; at what points did groups start to cluster in their preferences for interaction with the other groups? The basic question was this; which ethnic groups are considered more or less desirable as a partner in social interaction (and thereby more or less "distant"), relative to others?

Distance between groups followed predictable lines reinforcing the ethnographically derived assumptions about ethnic categorizations put forth in the chapters that follow. The social distance scale also was designed to verify on a wider scale, the strength of ethnic stereotypes.

A final type of data deriving from the use of the ethnic distance scale had to do with the degree of ethno-centrism expressed by members of various ethnic groups. Groups which expressed a great deal of self-selection on the scale, especially with regards to the questions dealing with close personal ties, were described as ethno-centric, groups with less self-selection were described as less ethno-centric. When examined at the level of the individual, differences in the level of ethno-centrism offered another measure of

lessening ethnic as opposed to national identity that was later compared to the data derived from the "Kenyaness" scale.

#### The "Kenyaness" Scale

The final important research tool used in this study was a scale measuring the individual's identification with the political and social concept of the Kenyan citizenship. Kenyan citizenship, or "Kenyaness", was operationalized to be represented by a relative value on the absolute scale constructed. Details of the scale's components are discussed later in this chapter.

The data derived from this measure, like the data from the other activities discussed above, served multiple purposes while producing the relative measure of Kenyaness desired. For example, there were several questions on the scale that, although related to the individual's conceptualization of Kenyan citizenship, also provided information on the ways in which tourists and other outsiders are viewed relative to other Kenyans.

The total set of responses to the scale was used in determining the relative degree of "Kenyaness" present for each of the respondents. Individual answers to the questions on the scale were designed to provide an indication of some of the key influences of ethnic loyalties and affiliations on the continuing process of citizenship and statehood among members of the Malindi community. When "correct" responses were totalled for each individual, a normal distribution resulted.

While this is not by itself evidence of the validity of the scale, it does suggest a range of values held by the respondents which points to commonly held values.

Summary observations derived from the survey instrument are presented later in this chapter. Further discussion and analysis continue in Chapter 8. I will now turn to a detailed discussion of the survey instrument in order to identify what I believe are key ethnographic influences on the design and the subsequent responses.

### The Survey Instrument

#### Demographic Data

The survey discussed in the last section was conducted in Malindi over a three month period during the Spring and Summer of 1992. A total of 288 respondents of various ethnic groups participated in the survey during this period. An attempt was made to conduct the survey with roughly equal numbers (initially 60 members of each group) of the four largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu, Kamba, Giriama, and Swahili/Bajuni, and nonrepresentative samples from the other groups.

The actual footwork of surveying was conducted by myself and three research assistants. The research assistants included a Kamba female and a Giriama and Swahili males. The Kamba woman was instructed to survey only Kamba and Kikuyu respondents. Likewise, the Giriama and Swahili research assistants were instructed to survey within their own respective communities. I conducted surveys with members of

all ethnic groups represented in survey including those represented by the research assistants.

The sometimes sensitive content of the survey necessitated proceeding along these lines. Answering the survey with fellow ethnics allowed the participants to respond freely to questions regarding preference, or lack thereof, towards other ethnic groups. I believe that my own ambiguous identity, because of both my status and in my expressed action and attitude in the community, allowed me a similar neutrality.

Throughout the course of this discussion, I direct the reader's attention to the survey instrument reproduced in Appendix A. The survey consisted of four related sections, each designed to obtain specific types of information. The first section consists of a series of questions designed to produce the demographic characteristics of the population under examination (Table 7:1).

The first few questions of the first section deal with the individual's personal identity and characteristics, i.e., sex, age, marital status and ethnic group. The marital status question also required the respondent to name the ethnic group of his\her spouse if different from their own.

The respondents were also asked about the neighborhood of residence in Malindi and the length of residence there. These questions were particularly important for later analysis of the possible factors affecting within and between group

TABLE 7:1  
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SURVEY POPULATION

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std.Dev.</u>
Age	27.4	8.2
Length of Residency in Malindi (in months).	130.1	126.8
Total Number of Years of Schooling	10.0	3.4
	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	160	60
Female	128	40
<b>Tribe</b>		
Kikuyu	49	17
Kamba	54	19
Giriama	86	30
Swahili	67	23
All Others	32	11
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Married	116	40.3
Not-Married	172	59.7
<b>Religion</b>		
Christian (Protestant)	144	50.0
Christian (Catholic)	62	21.5
Muslim	78	27.1
All Others	4	1.4
<b>Occupation</b>		
Formal Tourist Industry	97	33.7
Informal Tourist Industry	83	28.8
Non-Tourist Related	74	25.7
Civil Service	13	4.5
<b>Malindi Neighborhood</b>		
Kisumu Mdogo	50	17.4
Shela	42	14.6
Barani	42	14.6
Central	22	7.6
All Others	133	43.8



differentiation in the later examination of citizenship. The question about the home area of origin was also important in this regard. It was hypothesized that there may be differences in response between individuals originating from an already diverse home area and those originating from a relatively ethnically homogeneous one.

Length of residence in Malindi was thought to be particularly important because of the contact effects hypothesized to have been brought about through exposure to the multiethnic community. Similar effects were thought to be induced by residence in an ethnically diverse neighborhood. Possible exposure effects are also sought after in the questions dealing with number of languages spoken, travel outside Kenya, exposure to the news media, and the frequency of organized as well as informal associational contact.

Several studies involving Western populations have shown trends in the direction of decreased animosity toward "other" ethnic groups as length and amount of exposure have increased (Bogardus 1962, Kuper 1971). However, all such studies have been somewhat confounded by the sheer complexity of the forces surrounding changes in attitude between ethnic groups. In fact, a similar body of work exists that points to the exact opposite trend; increased tension as exposure increases (Glazer and Moynihan 1975, Isaacs 1975, A. Cohen 1974, Horowitz 1985, Banton 1985).

In East Africa, the research based evidence for the direction of change related to increased contact is sparse. However, Edari's (1974) study in Mombasa also presented similar evidence of lessening animosity as exposure increased. In addition, unlike the Western populations studied, the effects of "racial" differences, media enhanced stereotypes, class competition and national origin were lessened because of the similarities within group characteristics in the Kenyan case.

#### The Social Distance Scale

The social distance scale used in the research was an adaptation of the Bogardus Scale of Social Distance popular in sociological research. The Bogardus Scale is used "to estimate the amount of potential and real conflict existing between any cultural groups, anywhere in the industrial, political, racial, religious, and other phases of life." (Miller 1977:262). It therefore provides a good measure of attitudes held by members of one ethnic group toward others.

Commonly, the scale is designed so that several ethnic groups are represented at once and the respondent ranks all represented groups from first to last in response to questions of social acceptance ranging from "would accept this person as a neighbor" to "would accept this person as a marriage partner."

I constructed an adaptation of the scale for use in Malindi in order to present a measure of relative ethnic

distance that could be compared with other data. The scale consists of twenty questions to which the respondent gives two answers. The twenty questions are actually ten domains of interactions with a negative and a positive response for each domain.

For each response, the respondent gave his opinion as to which of the eight named ethnic group represented the best answer. The respondents were told to state a preference in choosing the ethnic groups by selecting the group they most thought fit the answer first (or by circling it) and the group that next best fit the answer second (by marking with an underline).

The survey was limited to these particular eight ethnic groups for two reasons. An even number of ethnic groups was desired in order to produce scores that could be evenly divided by ten out to one decimal place, trials had revealed that the use of eight named groups was sufficient in allowing the interviewee to seriously consider each choice without become frustrated at the number of choices available and the length of the survey task.

The eight groups chosen were chosen because of their numerical and social importance to the Malindi community and/or because of their importance nationally. No European or non-Kenyan group was used because trial surveys had revealed that they were often chosen on negative answers over a Kenyan group even when the Kenyan group was widely reputed to hold

the negative characteristic. In my opinion, using the non-Kenyan groups created an "out" that could be exploited in order to avoid a socially uncomfortable choice (appearing to the interviewer of harboring disdain for a fellow Kenyan). Limiting the choice to Kenyans made this choice necessary and unavoidable.

Respondents were told before starting the survey that they could choose any ethnic group as often as they wished (including their own) and that they could base their decision on whatever criteria they desired. The answers were scored by assigning a "1" to the first answer to each positive question and a "2" to the second. The negative answers received a "5" and a "4" for the first and second responses respectively.

The responses to all twenty questions were totalled for each ethnic group by adding together the "1's", "2's", "3's" and "4's" obtained for each named ethnic groups. Groups that were not selected in any particular response (there were, of course always at least four groups not selected for each response) received a "3." All of the scores were added together and the total was divided by ten, the number of each paired question with the questionnaire.

The resulting number represented a quotient that could be compared to other scores and among the named groups. For example, if all the scores on one survey for "Kikuyu" equaled 25, dividing by ten would give a quotient for "Kikuyu" of 2.5, a relative score to other responses. Therefore, the highest

TABLE 7:2  
RANKED SCORES OF ETHNIC DISTANCE BETWEEN GROUPS

	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
KIKUYU	3.13	.88	1.00	5.00
KAMBA	2.74	.59	1.00	5.00
GIRIAMA	2.30	.83	1.00	4.80
SWAHILI	2.69	.82	1.00	4.20
KALENJIN	3.45	.60	1.80	5.00
LUO	3.47	.64	1.40	5.00
MAASAI	3.33	.51	1.60	5.00
KISII	2.87	.52	1.00	5.00

n = 288

TABLE 7:3  
ETHNIC DISTANCE MATRIX

Correlations:	KIKUYU	KAMBA	GIRIAMA	SWAHILI
KIKUYU	1.0000	.1811*	-.4508**	-.4641**
KAMBA	.1811*	1.0000	-.3308**	-.4283**
GIRIAMA	-.4508**	-.3308**	1.0000	.2640**
SWAHILI	-.4641**	-.4283**	.2640**	1.0000
KALENJIN	-.2841**	-.1135	-.2101**	.0895
LUO	.0606	.0831	-.2016**	-.3871**
MAASAI	-.1612*	-.0973	-.0534	-.0179
KISII	.0281	-.0686	-.2172**	-.2823**
	KALENJIN	LUO	MAASAI	KISII
KIKUYU	-.2841**	.0606	-.1612*	.0281
KAMBA	-.1135	.0831	-.0973	-.0686
GIRIAMA	-.2101**	-.2016**	-.0534	-.2172**
SWAHILI	.0895	-.3871**	-.0179	-.2823**
KALENJIN	1.0000	-.2183**	.0501	-.0414
LUO	-.2183**	1.0000	-.2318**	-.0083
MAASAI	.0501	-.2318**	1.0000	-.1802*
KISII	-.0414	.0083	-.1802*	1.0000

N of cases: 288

\* =  $p < .01$  \*\* =  $p < .001$

possible score any group could obtain was 1.0, which would occur if the respondent had chosen that group every time for each of the positive questions and never for the negative questions. Conversely a 5.0 would be obtained for a group that was always chosen as a negative response and never as a positive response.

All eight named groups were thereby ranked for each respondent from low to high based on the quotient obtained (Table 7:2). The lower the score, the less distance between ethnic groups. Taken together, these individual ranks could be compared on an ethnic group by ethnic group basis to give a coefficient of distance between all ethnic groups (Table 7:3).

In addition, the relative distances that resulted were used as a measure of individual and group "ethnocentrism", as defined earlier. Groups and individuals with consistently low quotients of self-selection were deemed to be more ethnocentric than those with higher quotients.

#### The "Kenyaness" Scale

The next section of the survey dealt with the central question of Kenyan nationalism and its acceptance in Malindi. The scale used in examining this possible trend consisted of thirteen questions/statements to which a "true" or "false" response was given by interviewees. The respondents were also encouraged to comment on any or all of the statements as they saw fit.

The statements touched on a variety of closely related conditions and reactions and were designed to elicit answers in one direction or the other without compromise on the part of the respondent. "Don't know" answers were not accepted (the respondent was told to choose either way). If the respondent had no opinion on the statement, the item was left blank and counted against the informant in tabulating the total score.

A key was used in scoring "right" and "wrong" responses for each question based on my own pre-determined criteria and operationalization of the variable "Kenyaness". The range of possible scores went from a perfect thirteen right out of thirteen, to zero right out of thirteen, with the higher score, of course, representing an increased trend toward "Kenyaness" within the individual.

As with the other measures used in this survey, the "Kenyaness" scale served double duty both as a relative measure of aggregate differences in the importance placed on key attributes of Kenyan citizenship and national identity, and, as a "public opinion" poll, individually responding to each of the sometimes controversial statements concerning the political and social of the national community.

There are two areas of inquiry addressed by the thirteen questions; (a) who is to be regarded as Kenyan; and, (b) are the common interests held among Kenyans more or less important than the interests connected to other, potentially competing

identities? Kenyaness is denoted by the more liberal application of these rights and identities. Individuals who are both open to accepting other ethnic groups as part of the political and social community and who understand that membership in the community includes an extension of rights and responsibilities, are regarded as expressing an increased awareness of and appreciation for, Kenyan citizenship.

The statements themselves were derived directly from ethnographic data obtained during fieldwork and from the lively contemporary nation-wide political events<sup>1</sup> to which most people had at least some awareness. For example, question nine was based on the fact that the issue of tribal security had been debated seriously in Parliament during the ethnic clashes. Likewise, question five was especially relevant because of the impact of the I.P.K. and the debate among Muslims about the future direction of Coast Province.

Questions dealing with what types of persons sharing in a common Kenyan identity and the associated rights that derive from it (questions 1, 4, 7, 8, and 11), were worded so that the individual respondent could judge independently whether or not these identity based rights obtained to the individual. They also attempted to uncover any hidden animosity toward certain classes of people, both indigenous Kenyans or

---

<sup>1</sup>I refer here, of course, to the 1992 Presidential and Parliamentary Campaign and subsequent elections and to the ethnic clashes and political intrigue that was the daily subject of conversation in the media and in the homes of everyday people preceding those events.



TABLE 7:4  
RESULTS OF KENYANESS SCALE

---

<u>N</u>	<u>Tribe</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Dev.</u>
288		8.2	1.72
49	Kikuyu	8.8	1.7
54	Kamba	8.0	1.6
86	Giriama	7.9	1.8
67	Swahili	7.9	1.6
18	Kisii	9.2	1.6

---

TABLE 7:5  
GROUP COMPARISONS

---

	Kikuyu	Kamba	Giriama	Swahili	Kisii
Kikuyu		t=2.74* p < .007	t=2.74* p < .007	t=2.95* p < .004	t=-.83 p < .411
Kamba			t=.45 p < .650	t=.71 p < .482	t=-2.53* p < .017
Giriama				t=.27 p < .784	t=-2.92* p < .007
Swahili					t=-3.08* p < .005

---

TABLE 7:6  
CORRELATIONAL PARTIAL MATRIX FOR SELECTED INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES.

---

	INDEX SCORE
SEX	-.1581*
AGE	-.0652
TRIBE	.0278
OCCUPATION	-.1381*
INCOME	-.0013
EDUCATION	.1754*
RELIGION	-.0745
TRAVEL	-.0202

Number of cases = 288

\* =  $p < .01$

---

otherwise, that may have colored the opinion of whether the rights and responsibilities in question should be extended or withheld from those people.

Most of the remaining questions presented situations in which the welfare of individual ethnic groups was compared to the overall interests of the entire national community. These questions called on the individual respondent to choose in each case what the preferred course of action would be in the situation presented, using whatever criteria deemed necessary in making the judgement. The entire list of questions was presented in randomized order to prevent a pattern of related questions or positive and negative responses from appearing.

The total scores from this scale were analyzed for each individual respondent and for group aggregates (Tables 7:4 and 7:5). The mean scores were then used as dependent variables to be compared with demographic data and other independent variables obtained earlier in the survey. The analysis also tested levels of significance between the mean score obtained for individuals and groups and the possible effect of select independent variables (Table 7:6).

#### Tourism Survey

The last section of the survey consists of five questions dealing with people's perception and knowledge of tourism in Malindi. A series of open-ended questions were used to allow for the expression of a variety of opinions regarding the positive and negative effects of tourism. The section

concludes with a multiple choice question concerning people's overall perception of the effects of tourists and tourism.

The former section was included in order to examine negative attitudes towards tourists among the Kenyan respondents, in comparison to the perceived positive benefits of tourism. The results of this section of the survey for the four largest ethnic groups in the sample, and for the total sample population, appear in tables 7:7 and 7:8 below.

The responses to the questions themselves were recorded on the survey exactly as stated by the respondent. The benefits and drawbacks of tourism were then classified into the broader categories below. The frequencies in the tables represent the percentage of respondents who choose the respective benefit/drawback as the most important feature of the class. Some of the implications of these results are discussed in the concluding chapter.

218  
TABLE 7:7  
NEGATIVE FEATURES OF TOURISM

---

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Kikuyu</u>	<u>Kamba</u>	<u>Giriama</u>	<u>Swahili</u>
Prostitution/ Sexual Exploitation	49.3	42.9	59.3	41.9	49.3
Crime/Drugs	11.8	8.2	5.6	12.8	23.9
School Drop-outs	6.9	10.2	11.1	7.0	4.5
Loss of land	7.3	14.3	13.0	5.8	1.5

---

TABLE 7:8  
POSITIVE FEATURES OF TOURISM

---

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Kikuyu</u>	<u>Kamba</u>	<u>Giriama</u>	<u>Swahili</u>
Foreign Exchange/ Income	37.5	51.0	64.8	16.3	29.9
Employment	37.5	26.5	14.8	68.6	26.9
Development	11.8	18.4	14.8	4.7	13.4
Exposure to Westerners	3.5	2.0	5.6	3.5	4.5

---

## CHAPTER 8 RESULTS AND ANALYSES

As outlined in the previous chapter, the key evidence of increasing sense of Kenyaness, as a result of multi-ethnic contact, was derived from two measures. Lower social distance scores as measured by the social distance scale and increased sense of national identity reflected in the "Kenyaness" scale previously discussed. This chapter will further discuss the results of both measures and attempt to put into perspective the variation in response and the importance of these findings to the study as a whole.

The survey tools were constructed to test the hypothesis that respondents who exhibit less social distance, as measured by the social distance scale, and who score at the higher end of the response curve on the "Kenyaness" scale, would share in common a set of attitudinal and experiential characteristics. These characteristics, when taken together, would be reflective of the types of individual factors most representative of a developing Kenyan national identity.

Among the most important of these factors, it was hypothesized, is exposure to both foreign and indigenous multi-ethnicity as a result of voluntary and involuntary contact. These characteristics were represented in the survey instrument by a series of questions dealing with the degree of

out-group contact as reported by the individual respondents. Questions 13-17 of Section 1 (see Appendix A) specifically address the issue the degree of inter-ethnic contact reportedly experienced by the respondent.

The "Kenyaness" scale served as a dependent measure in relation to these independent variables. The determinants of "Kenyaness" on the scale were reflected in higher total scores derived from the battery of questions. Concurrently, lower scores were seen to be reflective of a lessening overall sense of Kenyan identity.

The Social Distance Scale and the "Kenyaness" Scale were analyzed separately and then compared to each other in order to test for the predicted relationship. I will first present an analysis of the Social Distance Scale and then that of the "Kenyaness" Scale. This chapter concludes with an analysis of the relationship between the two measures.

#### The Social Distance Scale

As described in the previous chapter, the ethnic distance scale consisted of a series of questions dealing with the individual's preference, or lack of preference, for interaction with members of eight named Kenyan ethnic groups. The responses were then tabulated in order to arrive at a relative social distance for each group as determined by each respondent (see Chapter 7).

The entire set of responses was then examined by way of a correlational matrix. The scores for each named group

across the entire sample were correlated with each other in order to produce a measure of association between and among the groups. This matrix is fully reproduced in the previous chapter (Table 7:3).

The results of the correlational matrix and the direction of correlation were interpreted in this way. The higher the correlation between any two groups appearing in the matrix, the greater the affinity perceived by respondents between those two groups. Conversely, the greater the negative association between any two groups, the greater the enmity perceived by the respondents.

Thus, the highest negative association present in the correlational matrix (Kikuyu-Swahili at  $-.4641$  at the  $.001$  confidence level) suggests a great deal of social distance between members of the two groups. The highest positive correlation (Swahili-Giriama at  $.2640$  at the  $.001$  level) suggests social closeness between the two groups.

I use the word "enmity" very cautiously and conditionally, since several of the questions about association with various ethnic groups deal not with social interaction but with economic or political interaction. Antagonism is not, therefore, necessarily implied by a negative correlation. An individual can, for example, be unwilling to interact socially with members of a particular ethnic group while at the same time preferring to be involved with them in a business setting.



This was, in fact, the case with Kikuyu respondents considering Giriama as possible employees. Although the Giriama were least preferred by Kikuyu in several of the other categories, they were preferred when it came down to employment, even more so than fellow Kikuyu.

An examination of the frequency data from the social distance scale revealed, in fact, that the Giriama were preferred as potential employees by all of the four major ethnic groups. This is contrary to the predicted trend toward self-selection among ethnic groups on questions which suggest social intimacy.

The reversal of the trend towards self-selection in this particular type of social interaction appears to be evidence of the efficacy of the widely held stereotype of Giriama submissiveness and docility. The fact that the Giriama were often described to me as docile, complacent and non-aggressive in a number of other social settings is further evidence of the strength of this particular stereotype (see Chapter 4). Among the Kikuyu and Kamba, the reluctance to choose their own ethnics as potential employees is possible evidence of the strength of the opposite stereotype existing within the stereotyped groups themselves.

The frequency data revealed some other interesting trends in group self-selection among the survey population. For example, national political leadership, as expressed in preference for president, seems to have been conceded to the

Kikuyu by the other groups, either in recognition of the Kikuyu's ability in this arena, or as a realistic appraisal of the group's own weaknesses or chances at holding that office. I will return to some of these trends and the issues they raise in the next chapter. A table showing the percentage of respondents who expressed first preference for members of their own ethnic group in a number of categories is reproduced below (Table 8:1).

TABLE 8:1

Percentage of respondents choosing their own ethnic group as first preference in each of the below categories.

	Kikuyu	Kamba	Swahili	Giriama
Who would you most like to..				
Have as a Neighbor	67%	57%	63%	74%
Employ	31%(37)	20%(57)	36%(47)	69%
Work With	55%	37%	60%	63%
Work For	61%	35%	60%	65%
Vote for President	92%	39%[50]	66%	51%[19]
Vote for Councilor	41%(47)	30%(43)	75%	86%
Marry	94%	80%	70%	76%

Note: Number in parentheses represents the percentage who chose Giriama as the first choice. Number in brackets the percentage who chose Kikuyu as first choice.

The correlational matrix derived from the raw data was compared to the total scores of each group as a test of internal logical consistency. The means for each of the four

largest ethnic groups are compared on an ethnic group by ethnic group basis in Table 8:2 below.

TABLE 8:2  
Comparative Scores by Ethnicity.

Means					
	<u>Total</u> (288)	<u>Kikuyu</u>	<u>Kamba</u>	<u>Giriama</u>	<u>Swahili</u>
Kikuyu (49)	3.13	2.19	2.88	3.45	3.56
Kamba (54)	2.74	2.51	2.22	2.95	2.92
Giriama (86)	2.30	2.80	2.80	1.55	2.41
Swahili (67)	2.69	3.39	3.33	2.50	1.70
Standard Deviations					
Kikuyu		.59	.44	.69	.35
Kamba		.55	.50	.63	.47
Giriama		.93	.63	.73	.50
Swahili		.71	.43	.60	.59

Consistent with the findings of the correlational matrix, the highest measures of distance occur between the Swahili and the Kikuyu. These scores are, in fact, among the highest raw scores observed. Only the Luo received a higher score among the Swahili (3.85) and only the Kalenjin among the Kikuyu (3.65).

In order to further determine possible factors involved in the determination of ethnic distance, the results of the social distance scale were compared to several independent variables. This procedure was accomplished by creating a new

dependent variable "distance" and correlating its variance with the independent variables.

The "distance" variable was computed for each of the 288 survey participants by summing the individual mean distance scores of each of the eight ethnic groups listed on the survey and dividing by eight. This produced mean distances based on the sum of the previously derived ethnic group means for each individual in the survey. Lower individual means (i.e. lower "distance" score ) were interpreted as reflecting a lowered sense of ethnic distance.

The new "distance" variable was correlated with several key independent variables. The results are presented in Table 8:3 below. The only significant correlations observable from this procedure were derived from the relationship of distance to the ethnic group of the respondent and to the occupation (as described in the previous chapter). The relationship between the ethnic identity of the respondent and mean ethnic distance is, I think, both expected and obvious. Ethnic groups in this sample seem to cluster in terms of the ethnic distance relationship, according to any one of a number of criteria that will be further addressed in the next chapter.

TABLE 8:3

Correlations of Independent Variables and Ethnic Distance.

---

	<u>Distance</u>
Sex	-.0526
Age	.0562
Ethnic Group	.1497*
Occupation	-.1777*
Education	.0067
Length of Residence in Malindi	-.1369
Level of Inter-ethnic Contact	-.0300
Membership in Multi-ethnic Organization	-.0928
Interviewer Effect	-.0415

---

\* = significant at the .01 level  
n = 288

---

The somewhat higher significance observed for "occupation" is important, in terms of the current thesis. I interpret this result as suggesting that individuals participating in the tourist industry, perceive less ethnic distance among fellow Kenyan ethnics. Thus, when considered as a measure of the level of inter-ethnic contact, "occupation" supports the thesis at this level of analysis.

It does not, however, establish a direct causal link between "occupation" and other "exposure" variables. It may be the case that individuals participating in the industry may already hold certain values that select for their participation and the attitudes expressed on the social distance scale.

It may also be the case that such a person is more aware of the types of behaviors engaged in by other Kenyans and therefore more knowledgeable when it comes to making determinations of preference. Again, this is in support of the thesis which holds that increased knowledge and contact lessens distance in the particular circumstances present in Malindi. I will return to this issue in the next chapter.

Perhaps what is most interesting about the above results are the independent variables that were not significantly correlated to distance. It is especially interesting that neither age nor sex appear to significantly effect the mean score for ethnic distance. This suggests that distance, as it was defined in the survey, cuts across gender and generational lines. That is, that the attitudes and stereotypes that are reflected in the social distance scale are held across these two very important social boundaries.

As a further attempt to analyze the importance of ethnic distance to the overall thesis, the "distance" variable was correlated to the "Kenyaness" scale's total score for all participants. This procedure produced a correlation

coefficient of .0695 at the .01 confidence level, and was therefore not considered a significant relationship.

The lack of significant correlation between these two variables suggests that the two are measuring separable and independent phenomena. The measures themselves may be biased towards gathering data at different cognitive levels or may, in fact, lack interpretive significance because they are measuring the same thing. In either case, the low degree of correlation observed suggests independent analysis.

#### The "Kenyaness Scale"

The overall results of the Kenyaness scale indicate a fairly normal distribution of response (see Table 8:4) with a slight skewness towards the higher values. Approximately 70% of the total sample was within one standard deviation of the mean.

TABLE 8:4  
Distribution of scores on the Kenyan Index.

---

<u>Score</u>	<u>n = 288</u>
2	1
3	2
4	2
5	10
6	30
7	48
8	69
9	63
10	38
11	19
12	6

---

mean = 8.20      std. = 1.71

---

The mean score across the entire set of respondents (n=288) on the Kenyaness Scale was 8.2014 out of a possible score of 13. The range of scale totals was 10 from a minimum of 2 (n=1) to a maximum of 12 (n=6). Standard deviation for this measure across the entire sample was 1.712 (see Table 9-2). The entire frequency distribution for the individual items on the scale appears in Appendix B.

The total index score for each respondent was analyzed along with a selected number of independent variables derived from Section 1 of the survey instrument. The independent variables utilized in this procedure were those believed to have had the greatest effect on possible differences in feelings of Kenyaness. A measure of correlation (Pearson's  $r$ ) was used in order to determine the relatedness of the independent variables to each other and to the index score. A correlational matrix displaying the relatedness of each of the several variables used was produced as a result of this procedure (Table 8:5). Significance in this step was not tested below the 99% level in order to insure a degree of robustness in initially determining which factors were most closely associated with the index.

The independent variables most closely associated with the total index score were "Group," "Contact," "Sex," "Education," and "Occupation." The negative signs on the "Group," "Contact," "Sex" and "Education" scores reflect the method of coding survey data. For example, "Sex" was coded as



"1" for male and "2" for female. Likewise, "Occupation" included six categories reflecting involvement in the tourist industry ranging from "1" for an occupation closely associated with the tourist industry to "6" for not employed at all. The negative sign therefore reflects association of higher scores on the index with the respective lower score in both cases.

TABLE 8:5

Correlational Matrix of Selected Independent Variables.

---

	Total	Tribe	Age	Education	Group	Contact
Total	1.000					
Tribe	.028	1.000				
Age	-.065	.092	1.000			
Education	.175*	-.011	<u>-.380</u>	1.000		
Job	-.138*	.015	.044	-.161*	1.000	
Group	<u>-.192</u>	.073	-.002	-.154*	<u>.233</u>	1.000
Contact	<u>-.211</u>	.074	.119	<u>-.253</u>	<u>.278</u>	<u>.224</u>

---

N of Cases: 288

Significance at .01 = \*; at .001 = underline

---

The strongest correlations observed as a result of this procedure were between the "Group" and "Contact" variables and the Kenyan Index score. The "Group" variable refers to question 16 on the survey instrument; "Do you belong to any

organization or groups that consist of people from several different tribes?", and was recorded as a nominal variable, "yes" or "no". The "Contact" variable corresponds to Question 17 and is concerned with the frequency of inter-ethnic contact as reported by the respondent. The lower numbered responses again representing more frequent occasions of inter-ethnic contact.

The strong correlation with higher scores on the Kenyan index demonstrated by these two variables, suggests that frequency of inter-ethnic contact is associated with the presence of the kinds of perceptions and attitudes being tapped by the index. The direction of the correlation appears, from this data, to be associated with increasing Kenyan identity, as operationalized in the index.

This observation is further supported by the significant correlation between the "Occupation" variable and the total score. As was the case in the social distance scale, the fact that "occupation", and, most pertinently, participation in the tourist industry, is related significantly to the total score, has several implications to the research hypothesis. The occupational categories were designed to reflect differing degrees of daily participation and contact with tourists, other non-Kenyans and Kenyans of other ethnic groups.

The analysis described above suggests that these different types of contact are all reflected by differences in attitudes towards outsiders and other Kenyans as measured by

the index. This supports the central thesis that Kenyan national identity is strengthened by multi-ethnic contact with other Kenyan ethnic groups and by increased contact with others who do not share the Kenyan identity. A more detailed discussion of these trends and possible implications for the current thesis follows in Chapter 9.

Again, neither the ethnic group of the respondent nor his/her age proved to have significant effect on the total index score at this level of analysis. This is somewhat surprising given the influence attributed to these two characteristics in shaping opinion and attitude in the literature on multi-ethnicity and nationalism. Their lack of discernable influence at this admittedly stringent level of significance is good evidence that other socially based factors less connected to individual identity may be at work in determining response to the index. Again, this point will be further addressed in the next chapter.

In order to further examine the role of these factors in explaining the variance present in the Kenyan index, several multiple regression equations were performed. A Step-Wise regression model using several of the key independent variables that either were significant or approached significance was designed in order to provide further evidence as to the degree and direction of association.

The first model tested used "Group," "Contact," "Sex," "Education," "Tribe" and "Occupation" as independent variables

with "Total" (the total score of the Kenyan Index) as the dependent. A multiple correlation coefficient (Multiple R) of .33951 was derived from this procedure with Signif. F at .0091. Thus, 12% ( $r\text{-squared} = .11527$ ) of the variance in response to the Kenyan Index was accounted for by these six independent variables. Adding thirteen more variables to the regression equation accounting for an increase of less than a 4% in the total variance accounted for (Multiple R .36888,  $r\text{-squared} .13608$ ,  $p < .0111$ ).

By contrast, the above model using only "Tribe", "Occupation" and "Sex" accounted for only 3% ( $r\text{-square} = .03478$ ,  $p < .0180$ ) of the variance. This is perhaps best explained by the relatively weak influence of "Tribe" as a factor in the model. When "Tribe" and "Occupation" were removed from the equation, "Group", "Contact", and "Sex" alone accounted for nearly 8% of the variation ( $p < .0001$ ). When "Education" was added to these three variables as the second step in the regression equation, over 8.5% of the variance was accounted for ( $p < .0000$ ). Therefore, "Tribe" and "Occupation" together, in the more inclusive model, accounted for less than a 1% increase in the variance explained.

It would seem from these initial results that "Group", "Contact", "Sex" and "Education" are by far the most influential determinants of "Kenyaness" as operationalized in this research design. This despite the fact that "Occupation" was also significantly correlated to "Total" at the .01 level

in the correlational matrix. The weaker effect of "Occupation" in the multiple-regression model is perhaps best explained by its already high correlation to "Sex" in the respondent sample.

The correlation coefficient for "Sex" and "Occupation" combined was .2952 and was significant at the .001 level. This measure was among the highest levels of association produced by the correlation matrix. Somewhat surprisingly, the corresponding measure for "Sex" and "Education" was not significant even at the .01 level.

The step-wise regression model produced using "Sex" and "Education" in the same model probably therefore artificially eliminated, due to redundancy, some of the explanatory power of the second analyzed variable, "Occupation". When subjected to the multiple regression procedure by itself, the "Occupation" variable produced a Multiple R of .13809 ( $p < .0191$ ). "Sex" by itself produced a Multiple R value of .15807 ( $p < .0072$ ). However, when the two variables were used in the regression equation together, the two variables produced a Multiple R of only .23 ( $p < .0063$ ). This suggests that a significant portion of their individual explanatory value is concealed by their close association.

A relatively low percentage of the total variance in index scores was accounted for in all of the equations. This suggests that variation of response, within this particular dependent variable, is affected by several factors not

measured in this survey. Further research into the multivocal nature of national identity is needed to determine what some of these factors may be.

Qualitative, ethnographic data may hold some of the answers to understanding the types of factors involved at this level of identity formation. For example, data on the rules of ethnic interaction within the national community may provide the basis for the continuous expansion of ethnic categories to the national level. The next chapter presents just such data and explores its implications to the research hypothesis.

## CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have briefly outlined some of the research tools used during the course of fieldwork, the methodological and ethnographical justifications for including them, and the results of exploratory statistical analysis. This chapter seeks to expand upon the overall results presented in Chapter 7 as well as to provide an analysis of the instrument and its implications for the research question. In so doing, it builds upon the broader ethnographic descriptions established in Chapters 4 and 5 and develops a framework for understanding and analyzing the ethnic distance data presented in the last chapter.

One of the keys to understanding the deeply embedded personal and community phenomena of identity reformation, especially in a community as diverse as Malindi, lies in understanding the axes of identification around which judgements about the strength and social, economic, and political benefits of ethnic affiliation form. The ethnic equation ("x is an x or x is not a non-x") is produced as a bye-product of another set of determinations resulting from innumerable individual determinations of individual and group identity and affects individual and group interaction at every level of community life.

I maintain that in Malindi, there are several, very distinctive foci around which these axes are formed. Among the important of these axes are those identified by Geertz (1975) and others as the primordial basis of ethnicity. These include, religion, language and custom, regional origin. I also would include a set of characteristics referred to here as "relative integration" into the national community.

Determinations of ethnic distances are derived from a constant referencing of identity based on these markers. In many instances, especially among groups with a long history of interaction, such as the Swahili and the Giriama in the Kenyan example, the presence of at least some of these markers in various combination is enough to determine the identification despite the absence of others.

I conceptualize several key clusters of identity formation in developing the analysis throughout this chapter. At the same time, it is recognized that there are a limitless number of determinations that could be made in creating and maintaining the boundaries of ethnicity. However, the clusters used here are also especially fine illustrators of the contrasts inherent to the community.

For example, in Chapter 7 (Table 7:3), we saw that Swahili and Giriama respondents routinely expressed more ethnic distance between themselves and the Kikuyu, as measured by the scale, than any other ethnic groups. Conversely, Kikuyu and Kamba routinely exhibited greater distance between



themselves and the Swahili and Giriama. This suggests a natural clustering within each of the two sets of ethnic groups based on perceptions of the others group's characteristics. In this particular case, I interpret this cluster as centering around economic and political competition between the coastal and upcountry groups. Stereotypical characteristics assigned to individuals in both groups are also major factors in the degree of distance expressed.

In the pages that follow, I establish some of these kinds of salient features of group identity that were manifested in responses to the survey instrument as social distance between Kenyan ethnic groups in Malindi, as illustrated by the above example. Throughout the course of this chapter, ethnic stereotypes and specific examples of interethnic behavior between ethnic groups are used to illustrate the potency of the particular ethnic marker in reinforcing ethnic categories.

The second part of this chapter examines some of the modes of interaction among the various ethnic groups that illustrate the ways in which relative determinations of distance are expressed in real world situations. Three case studies illustrating various degrees of interaction and ethnic distance in the context of inter-ethnic conflict and cooperation will be presented and analyzed.

The chapter's final section presents what I believe to be major trends in the determination of ethnic distance in Malindi and establishes a framework for extending these trends

to the development of national identity throughout the country. The discussion of the cases and the concluding section contain extensive ethnographic detail in order to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative data. The ethnographic data is presented in a manner that illustrates the relativity of ethnic identity. The ethnography also serves to establish those patterns of interethnic behavioral response which are relevant to feelings of national identity.

#### Axes of Identification

The first step is to understand the points at which separation occurs along ethnic lines. I have conceptualized these lines as a series of axes, along which in-group and out-group status are determined by way of the ethnic equation discussed earlier.

Throughout this section I identify the major contrasts present within the African community of Malindi and give a sense of the importance of cultural elements in defining these contrasts. The goal here is to give the reader both a sense of why certain elements seem to be important in making determinations of ethnic distance, and of the ways in which these axes maintain, and therefore, perpetuate ethnic boundaries.

Very often, individual cultural elements serve to trigger in the minds of individuals the rationale for contrast in a way that is subjective in interpretation and relative in degree. The various axes along which identification occurs

are therefore, broad criteria and not necessarily equally weighted in the ethnic equation.

For example, the degree of contrast that exists in the minds of Muslim Swahili between non-Muslim Kikuyu and non-Muslim Italians, is believed to be greater for the Italian than the Kikuyu, even though the important dichotomy of religious difference is the same. Conversely, important cultural elements that are not shared between two or more Kenyan ethnic groups, may be ignored when considering their relationship with still another group. For example, lack of circumcision and the non-Bantu tongue of the Luo does not preclude them from ranking closer to the Kikuyu in the ethnic distance correlation matrix than the circumcised, Bantu speaking Giriama.

#### Religion and Custom

Two of the most salient axes of identification among the population of Malindi, in terms of ethnic markers, are religion, and custom. Both create clearly defined criteria for inclusion or exclusion in the category while, paradoxically, allowing for a great deal of individual interpretation and differing levels of adherence to the ideal within the category.

The majority of the residents of Malindi are nominally either Christian or Muslim. The Muslim population consists exclusively of all the members of the Swahili ethnic group, "Arabs", some Indians and some Giriama. Christian residents

of Malindi come from every other ethnic group, including, the remaining Giriama, and most of the permanent and transient Westerners.

The degree to which the religious affiliation (in the broadest sense of the word) affects the behavior of those not sharing that affiliation undoubtedly differs at both the group and individual level. Here, I wish to purposefully generalize these effects in an effort to derive key characteristics important in considering daily interaction. I discuss these characteristics from the perspective of the Muslim Swahili as a means of illustrating the contrast between Muslims and non-Muslims in Malindi.

Islam has been associated with specific ethnic groups and cultural traditions from the beginnings of its appearance in East Africa (Trimingham 1974, Pouwels 1987). Material, ritual, and other aspects of Middle-Eastern culture have in fact gone hand in hand with the spread of Islam throughout the world since time of the Prophet (Payne 1987). Preferred modes of dress, etiquette and even cuisine (beyond dietary restrictions) have defined what it means to be a Muslim on a cultural as well as spiritual level.

Because of its strong association to geography and culture, Islam in Malindi represents a much more defining "ethnic marker" for the Swahili and other Muslim groups than does Christianity for non-Muslims (It can be argued that this is true in many other places throughout the world that have

been heavily influenced by Islam). Islam tends to be much less subject to the interpretation and adaptation at the local level than Christianity has proved to be historically. Despite the diversity of experiences and interpretations present in the Muslim world, Islam has promoted an overall flavor of Middle-Eastern based cultural conservatism in the societies associated with it.

Theoretically, believers, regardless of ethnic origin, constitute a world-wide Islamic society (umma). The umma is a society not only in terms of religious conduct and beliefs but also in terms of social responsibility, cultural integrity, and personal identity. Non-believers are outside of the umma even if they are of the same ethnic group as believers. Conversely, believers are part of the world-wide society despite ethnic or national origins. The Christian edict "render under to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's" is alien to the Muslim concept of umma and the broader application of Koranic principles to everyday political, legal and social behavior.

There are several major areas of everyday life in Malindi that sharply divide and contrast members of the two main religious clusters (Muslims and Christians) and illustrate the identity-maintaining influence of Islam. These areas include; dress codes and standards of decorum and propriety for men and women; restrictions on the consumption

of food and drink; and involvement with religious institutions.

In all three of the above areas, the Muslim community tends to be more conservative. There are, of course, individual exceptions. There are members of Christian sects in Malindi that express conservative values and standards equal to those held by most Muslims. There are also Muslims whose behavior might shame even the worse infidel. However, religion has the final say when contrasts in behavior are not readily identifiable. The line is drawn first and finally at whether an individual is a believer or not.

The relatively small size of the overall Malindi community makes for even sharper contrasts in lifestyle than those present in, for example, the just as diverse but much larger city of Mombasa. For Muslims, the small size of the town and the general trend within their community toward endogamy makes the contrast between themselves and others even more important. The impact of the both factors on the historical development (see Chapter 4) and the perpetuation of the Swahili community (Section 2, Case 2, below) cannot be over-emphasized.

Sanctions on behavior within the Muslim community in Malindi, are largely expressed in terms of shame or reproach on the individual or on his/her family. Enough shame can even lead to ostracism, especially among the more socially elite families (see for example Swartz 1991). Even appearing too

frequently on the community "grapevine" can engender a fear of social sanctioning of misbehavior, especially among the more well known and respected Swahili families of Malindi.

I witnessed one extraordinary and extreme example of the power of the threat of social sanctioning within the community. An notorious Bajuni alcoholic of about fifty years was approached on the street by a member of his family right before Ramadan. The alcoholic was known around town for his crude behavior when drunk. He would often sing (rather obscenely) aloud in public, call out to people passing by and generally make a public nuisance of himself. Young Swahili children would tease and make fun of him (something they would never think of doing to a respectful man of his age) and laugh at his staggering presence.

One day, the man was approached by a young member of his family (I was told he was a nephew). The young man told him that unless he straightened up during the Holy Month, his family would disown him forever and he would die alone without anyone to bury him or to care about him. "You will end up in the street like a dog" the young man told him. This last statement brought the man to tears.

I saw the drunk on several occasions during Ramadan and he appeared to have taken heed to the warning and sobered up. I even saw him refuse a teasing with an offer of beer from a non-Swahili at the bar he often frequented. When Ramadan

ended, however, the man was soon enough back to his old ways and again intoxicated every time I saw him.

Muslims, for the most part, are easily identifiable on the streets of Malindi. Muslim men often wear the kanzu or at least a kofia during religious holidays and many do so as a part of everyday dress. Male standards of traditional dress are neither binding nor particularly useful as a guide to the piousness of the individual. Western clothes are preferred by younger but as a man grows older, marries and starts a family, and gains respect in the community, the kanzu and kofia become the more customary form of dress.

Muslim women observe "purdah" and cover themselves in bui-bui when walking outside in accordance with Koranic doctrine. The basic ideas of purdah, extreme female modesty and covered head and body, are strictly observed by all Muslim women in Malindi regardless of ethnic origin. There are variations in the extent to which women cover their bodies (see Chapter 4). Among women, the trend in observing norms of dress throughout the life-cycle is reversed from that of men. It is the younger Muslim women, particularly unmarried girls, who are expected to be most vigilant in observing purdah, and become more lax in covering as they marry and become older, reflecting the widespread Islamic compulsion of modesty for women during their most nubile and attractive age grades.

Non-Muslim women, of course, do not observe anything like purdah. However, many dress conservatively (by American



standards) in deference to traditional beliefs of female modesty or in adherence to a more conservative Christian denomination, such as the Seventh Day Adventists. Older Kikuyu and Kamba women, for example, are almost never seen outside without their hair covered with a scarf and a kanga tied around their clothes at the waist.<sup>1</sup>

At the other end of the spectrum are older Giriama women, who often walk about bare-breasted in Malindi (younger Giriama women usually do not walk about bare-chested in town but are not at all shy about breast feeding children in public places).<sup>2</sup> Europeans (especially Italians) and also Malaya also can be added to this more extreme category in terms of dress codes.

There are also important contrasts between the two communities in the observance of dietary restrictions. The most obvious perhaps being the Islamic prohibition against taking alcoholic beverages. Again the gulf separating Muslims from non-Muslims is wide in both belief and practice.

Local bars abound in Malindi and are one of the few sources of entertainment and recreation affordable and available to Kenyans. The consumption of large amounts of

---

<sup>1</sup>Young Kikuyu and Kamba women returning to rural home areas also observe these dress codes no matter how "modern" they are away from home.

<sup>2</sup>A young Kamba friend told me that he was absolutely shocked by the nakedness of Giriama women when he first arrived in Malindi. He said that his friends back home didn't believe him when he told them about it during a visit.

beer and roasted meat, often lasting hours, is a normal weekend event, for those who can afford it. Men and women crowd the most popular of these establishments during the weekend with drinking and revelry lasting well into the night. In Giriama villages, palm wine has a central place in funeral and wedding ceremonies, as well as being a form of hospitable gifts for elders and guests.

Muslims, on the other hand refrain from such activities and the use of alcohol in general, again citing religious doctrine. "A muslim should not even touch a glass containing it" I was told by one pious Muslim. He went on to cite the Koran and the prohibition against Muslims even having anything to do with the provision or procurement of alcohol.<sup>3</sup>

This prohibition is taken quite seriously. An "Arab" developer who, with his Italian partner, constructed the left wing of the Sabaki Shopping Center in Malindi, insisted that no restaurant serving alcohol should be allowed to rent there (although there is a restaurant serving alcohol in the older wing of the plaza). This condition was apparently non-negotiable. As a further attempt to lessen the possible evil influence of the plaza on the town, the Arab owner also

---

<sup>3</sup>I was told by a veteran Kikuyu hotel manager that the main reason few Swahili were working in the hotel service industry as waiters, busboys, etc., was that the Swahili refused to work in any job that would require them to handle or serve alcohol. "The other reason" he said, "is that they are too proud to serve tables or to wait on people."

insisted that a small mosque be constructed at the rear of the complex.

There are several categories of ritualized behavior related to religion regarding cleanliness that separate Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims ritually avoid the consumption of pork and of any food cooked in the fat of pork. With the exception of the Maasai, no other indigenous Kenyan group has restrictions on the consumption of any pig flesh, among the most abhorrent of Islamic dietary prescriptions, nor is there any regulated period of fasting, as there is during Ramadan.

Muslims also insist on strictly using the right hand for eating and the left for bathroom functions. Cleansing after defecation is accomplished using the left hand and a large jerry-can of water present in every Swahili household, never with toilet paper or with the right hand. To offer anything to a Muslim with the left hand is the height of offence.

Taken together, these cultural-religious practices result in an "unclean" characterization of the dietary and hygienic patterns of non-Muslims in general. This characterization rightly suits the perception, by Muslims, of a general lack of enlightenment and "ustaarabu" (high culture) on the part of these same non-Muslims. "We used to say that the Giriama walk around with feces in their pants" I was told by one Swahili informant while discussing perceptions of cleanliness.

The effect of religious distance is clearly illustrated by the highly significant distance between Muslims and non-Muslims on the social distance scale. The data is somewhat confounded by the close association between religion and ethnicity among the Swahili. Islam is one of the most important defining characteristic of the Malindi Swahili community and is therefore inseparable from their ethnic identity.

There is at least one important social custom shared by the Swahili Muslims of Malindi with most of the other Kenyan ethnic groups, the ritual of male circumcision. The social significance of circumcision among many of the ethnic groups in Kenya cannot be under-estimated.

For the Swahili, circumcision is a religious rite closely connected with their identity as Muslims and their historical link with Islam. Male infants are circumcised on or after the eighth day in the home, in accordance with Abrahamic tradition. A traditional practitioner is called in to perform the operation and a religious specialist (possibly the same man) performs the actual operation. A karamu (feast) is held to bless and celebrate the event, if the family can afford it. So important is this religiously based ritual to the social life of a Swahili male that "an uncircumcised man cannot even go into a mosque."

For other Kenyan groups, circumcision is more closely tied to rites of passage marking an individual's initiation

into the class of adult males. As outlined in Chapter 5, almost all groups discussed have a warrior class consisting of young males who have gone through the circumcision ritual and who have newly begun their roles as adult members of the community.

With the exception of the Swahili (and the Luo, who do not circumcise at all) each of the previously discussed groups have very powerful traditional circumcision ceremonies involving the seclusion of the initiates, the passing on during seclusion of male ceremonial secrets and other skills required by a young warrior, and a public reemergence of the initiates. The actual age of circumcision varies among each group. The Kikuyu and Kamba are among the earliest circumcised, between ages 9 to 13; the Maasai and Kalenjin the latest, sometimes not circumcising until age 17, depending on the availability and readiness of age-sets. There were several cases in the national newspapers of adult men who were discovered not to have been circumcised and were literally bound hand and foot by mobs of their fellow ethnics and forcibly taken to a hospital or clinic to have the procedure performed.

Ritual observances surrounding circumcision are always carried out in the traditional home areas of these groups. I was told by a Kisii man that "You should be circumcised where your father was circumcised." Even urban dwelling families send their children to relatives in the home areas when the

time for circumcision comes. An increasing trend among urban dwellers is toward having circumcisions performed in hospitals if travel to the home area for circumcision is difficult for economic reasons or if ties with the home areas have been lost. The educated and economic elite of Nairobi are also turning toward circumcision of infants in the hospital in greater numbers because of their increasing isolation from the rural homelands and growing awareness of the importance of sanitary considerations.

The Luo are the only major ethnic group not practicing circumcision. And they pay for it socially. The lack of circumcision among the Luo was often described to me as the key difference separating Luo from other ethnic groups, even more important than the fact that the Luo are Nilotic and not Bantu speakers. Because of the close association between circumcision and ascendance to manhood among the other ethnic groups, the Luo's lack of circumcision has led to the insistence, by some, that the Luo are not men.

This accusation was made especially prominent during the splintering of the major opposition party, Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), along ethnic lines during the pre-election period of 1992. A common response among Kikuyu to the strife created when the Luo FORD party leader, octogenarian Oginga Odinga, was challenged by a Kikuyu contender, Ken Matiba, was to insist that they (Kikuyus) would never allow themselves to be led by a "boy."

When I asked why Odinga had gone previously unchallenged on the matter of his lack of circumcision by the same Kikuyu that were now objecting to his status as leader of the Party, I was told candidly by several Kikuyu that when Odinga was the only credible challenge to Moi the Kikuyu had to support him, but now that the formerly exiled Matiba had returned, they could look to real leadership. It seems clear to me that, in this instance, the Luo's lack of circumcision was used as a political rationalization of an otherwise ethnically based power play. However, this particular ethnic trait does have very potent everyday effects on ethnic relationships that cannot be as easily dismissed.

A group of several Kikuyu women that I spoke to, insisted, for example, that they could never marry a Luo as long as he was uncircumcised because they realized they "could not bring a boy home to their family." I reminded several of the women that I talked to about the case of Okello, a prominent Luo Nairobi businessman, whose death and subsequent wrangling over his burial site between his Kikuyu wife and Luo family made national headlines. They claimed that either the man had been circumcised at a hospital, or, that the Kikuyu woman only agreed to marry him for his money.

#### Language

Given the diversity of ethnic identities present in Malindi, language differences abound. Linguistic diversity is, in fact, one of the hallmarks of the Malindi community.

There are, however, distinctions made on the basis of the degree of linguistic differentiation. Language, in this sense, is more than a form of communication, it is an ethnic marker.

The most generalized of these linguistic differences is the distinction made between Bantu speakers and non-Bantu speakers. Most ethnic populations in Kenya are Bantu-speaking. Many of the non-Bantu populations are represented by small geographically isolated populations such as the Turkana and the Boran. Bantu speaking ethnic groups among those discussed in this work include; the Kikuyu, Kamba, Kisii, Mijikenda and Swahili. Non-Bantu speaking Nilotic groups include the Kalenjin, Maasai and the Luo.

Members of the Bantu speaking community claim to possess varying degrees of mutual intelligibility, depending on the cultural or spatial proximity of their Bantu neighbor. Kikuyu and Kamba for instance, often claim to be able to "hear each other" despite being unable to speak the other's language effectively. I have witnessed a number of conversations between Kikuyu and Kamba in which each speaks his own language while clearly understanding one another. Similarly, some Swahili can generally understand portions of Giriama conversation without being able to speak Giriama themselves (I once even found myself responding to a question posed in Giriama between two Giriama without realizing that what I heard and understood was Giriama and not Swahili).



Non-Bantu speakers do not have the same degree of mutual intelligibility as do the several Bantu groups, due primarily to the home-based geographic isolation of these groups from each other, compared with the residence patterns of the Bantu groups. I have never heard of any member of the largest Nilotic groups, the Kalenjin, Luo and Maasai (in that order), claim to have a natural ear for understanding another Nilotic language. It is not unusual, however, to find Kikuyu who understand Maasai and Kisii who understand Luo. One Kisii man told me that his mother's generation all knew how to speak Luo (he also claimed that the Gusii of his mother's generation is barely understood by his own). In every case I was told that their language knowledge came from close proximity to the Nilotic neighbor rather than any natural similarities.

Knowledge of the differences between language groups is perpetuated by the national early primary school curriculum. Children in school are taught about the major language groups in Kenya as part of the curriculum discussion of cultural diversity in the country (I witnessed one of these classes being taught in the primary school near my residence in Malindi). Interviews with a number of people revealed that school work produced an impression of differences between the language rather than similarities. One of the major differences noted in discussions with Kikuyu concerning differences between themselves and the Luo for instance, was

that "We are Bantu; they are Nilotic" (or more commonly "and they are not").

This is not to say that Western imposed models of broadly drawn linguistic communities are responsible for the recognition of differences between the two groups or of any animosity that may result. The linguistic, archaeological and historical evidence for these categorizations are probably lost on the majority of Kenyan people, as it would be to the majority of Americans. Rather, these categories (much like Western imposed tribal categories discussed earlier), although based in Western intellectualism, further support indigenously recognized differences and lend the legitimacy of Western scholarship to daily observable differences in language and culture.

A further basis for linguistic differentiation on the Coast is the degree to which Swahili is "correctly" used by non-indigenous groups. The antagonism is expressed in both directions. A kind of "linguistic snobbery" is especially evident among some members of the Swahili community toward outsiders who use the Swahili language. This attitude reflects the overall feeling of resentment toward the newcomers.

The criticism centers largely around the tendency for upcountry people to mix elements of Swahili with English or their native language as a course of conversation. "These upcountry people are ruining our language" I was told by one

respondent. "They say things like 'ameanguka ndani ya pit' instead of 'ameanguka shimoni' (he fell in the pit) because they don't really know Swahili" he concluded. In addition to possibly being deficient in Swahili vocabulary, some upcountry people actually prefer to mix the two languages as a matter of style. In Nairobi, an extreme of this sometimes quite creative linguistic phenomena has been creolized as a language of the street, known as "Sheng". Indeed, I have even observed its occasional voguish use in even the more respectable circles of Nairobi society.

Upcountry people often respond to the criticism of Swahili by contending that the Swahili themselves really don't speak "proper", i.e., grammatically correct Swahili. "We learn Swahili correctly in school" one informant told me, "these Swahili speak badly because they only know the Swahili of the street." The Swahili's pride in the possession of the proper form of their language was used as an example by several upcountry people as evidence of cultural arrogance.

Further evidence of linguistic chauvinism is found by critics in Swahili peoples' apparent reluctance to learn and use other languages. As discussed earlier, multiple language use is one of the key characteristics of community life in Malindi among upcountry people. Indeed multi-lingualism is one of the keys to social and economic success in Malindi, due to the ethnic make up of the multi-ethnic Kenyan community, and, to the absolute necessity of communicating effectively in

several languages in exploiting the potential of the tourist industry.

In the survey, the Swahili respondents had the lowest average claim to number of languages spoken and understood. Swahili women, who are the most insulated from the surrounding community, were also found to be most likely to speak and understand only one language.

### Regionality

The connection between region of origin in promoting ethnic identity and ethnic competition is well established in the literature on ethnicity (Barth 1969, Horowitz 1985). In Kenya, as in many other former African colonial states, the ethnic makeup of the country is reflected very closely in district, provincial and regional boundaries.

For the purposes of this discussion, the political and ethnic regions in Kenya are considered as yet another axis along which ethnic interaction in Malindi revolves. Regionality and territoriality serves the dual purpose of helping to define ethnic identity while at the same time reinforcing ethnic identity when competition occurs over land. The initial division between those who belong to the land or the area and those who do not, can create further distinctions within the local group on a number of social features.

The dividing line that is perhaps most clear and most potent is that between the indigenous coastal populations (the Mijikenda peoples and the Swahili) and the relatively recent

upcountry migrants (the Kikuyu, Kamba, etc., collectively called "watu wa bara" or "wa-bara" [upcountry people] in Chapter 5). Other distinctions, however, can and will be made.

For the Swahili, especially, belonging to a particular geographic region, in this case the cities, towns and small settlements along the coast of East Africa, has historically been a crucial part of their cultural identity (Middleton 1993). "Ustaarabu", or high culture, (discussed in Chapter 4) was part and parcel of "sophisticated" urban living. Culture, learning and exposure to the ideas and wealth of the wider world were centered in Swahili urban settlements. The "bara", or wilderness, which included coastal areas outside of Swahili communities, contained none of these attributes and was therefore the opposite of civilization. Upcountry people and Mijikenda, living in the "bara" and on the coast are still sometimes pejoratively referred to as "wanyika" or bush people.

For the Mijikenda/Giriama, the connection between home areas and cultural identity is not as immediately obvious. The historic centers of Mijikenda civilization were the kayas, described in Chapter 4. The nine kayas represented the nine sub-tribes of the Mijikenda group and traditionally, the nine brothers whose migration into the area from the north several centuries ago, marked the beginning of the Mijikenda presence on the coast of Kenya (Spear 1973).

None of the original Mijikenda kayas are inhabited today and few Mijikenda know of their location. However, several of the kaya and some of their immediate antecedents are still in use as religious shrines and the burial markers of ancient ancestors buried there are said to possess great magical power.

Mijikenda settlements have historically provided much of the food production on the coast including that consumed in the Swahili towns (Cooper 1975, Nurse and Spear 1980). Small scale farming continues to be the major subsistence strategy employed by the masses of Mijikenda. Cattle and small livestock also play an important role in the economic life of Mijikenda communities.

Land for both activities has become increasingly scarce due to the growth of the indigenous community and to the sale of land to outside interests by the Mijikenda themselves. The constant loss of land by the Mijikenda has been a feature of their community for decades and has resulted in a large number of Mijikenda squatters in every area of the coast (Daily Nation, September 1, 1992).

Never-the-less, and despite the scarcity of land and other resources, migration out of coastal areas by Mijikenda is almost unheard of. Instead, the Mijikenda have continued to live in their small villages and, when necessary, work for wages or sell produce in larger towns. Dozens of Mijikenda/Giriama, for example can be seen every morning

commuting from the small villages that line the major road into Malindi, by bus or by foot, for a day at the market or at work and returning to the villages at night.

Both the Mijikenda and the Swahili recognize the other as belonging to the coast from a social and historical standpoint. The constant relationship that has existed between the groups for hundreds of years is known and widely accepted by members of both groups (Cooper 1977). This relationship and mutual belonging to the coastal area is not extended to newcomers to the areas and forms the basis for the regional distinction mentioned above.

In fact, some members of both groups are, by their own admission, threatened by the presence of other Kenyan groups and Westerners. For the Mijikenda, the reasons are largely economic. Several Giriama that I talked to expressed dismay that in addition to the established pattern of Europeans, Indians and "Arabs", Kikuyu and Kamba were also buying land on the coast and starting farms and other businesses. For the Swahili, the threat is not only economic, but more immediately cultural. The breaking down of moral and religious standards and the increasing Westernization of younger Swahili are seen, by some, as directly related to the increased presence of outsiders on the coast.

Beyond the initial coastal/non-coastal dichotomy, territoriality exists within and between other ethnic groups in Kenya as well. The Kikuyu, for example, distinguish

between Kikuyu from Kiambu and Nyali in Central Province, and those from Mu'anga. The latter said to be perpetually backward and unsophisticated. Among the Kamba, the same distinction is made between Machakos and Kitui. Both positive and negative stereotypes are often assigned to members of one sub-regional group by the other.

Between group regionality is less concerned with stereotypes as it is with real inter-ethnic competition. The ethnic clashes that occurred in the early part of 1992 in Northwestern Kenya between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin were officially described as "land clashes." The justification being that local people were having their land unfairly taken away by "outsiders" (read: Kikuyu).

This sort of antagonism, expressed as territoriality, has been especially directed toward the Kikuyu because of their seemingly ubiquitous presence throughout the country. The Kikuyu have become perhaps the "national" ethnic group in Kenya. The sheer number of Kikuyu combined with the relative scarcity of land in Central Province and their reputation as risk-takers has, for years, meant that Kikuyu are more prone than anyone else to look elsewhere in Kenya for opportunity. One Kisii, who was relating his frustration at the Kikuyu presence in Kisii, sarcastically told me that; "Even if I went to your country, I'm sure I'd find Kikuyu."

In addition to serving as a catalyst for inter-ethnic competition, territoriality is directly related to ethnic



identity in other ways. The wealth and security represented by land-ownership and the historical ties to home areas recognized by most Kenyan ethnic groups, makes access to the land a right most legitimately obtained through ethnic origin.

All of the major ethnic groups mentioned here have origin myths that recognize a specific place, or geographic feature of a place, from which the original ancestor sprung. For the Kikuyu, the ancestral home is Mt. Kenya and its environs, for the Kalenjin, Mt. Elgon, for the Maasai, the Rift Valley, for the Mijikenda, the Nine Kayas of the coastal forest.

The strength of regionality as a factor in determining inter-ethnic relations in all of the above cases is therefore related to three things (1) the emphasis placed upon territory as an exclusive resource belonging to the ethnic group, (2) the level of competition over that resource and (3) the recognition of similar rights extended to neighboring groups.

#### Political and Economic Integration

The last major axis of identification among ethnic groups in Malindi is concerned with the relative level of political and economic integration into the national economy. One of the strongest complaints voiced, especially by the coastal ethnic groups and by other ethnic groups in Kenya, is that they are marginalized from the political and economic center relative to the main players in both arenas, the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin. This axis of identity is therefore conceptualized as separating high levels of integration from

low levels in the domains of politics and economics (see Figure 9:1).

The major features thought to distinguish one level from another include; relative political strength locally and nationally, i.e., how much of a voice does the ethnic group carry in national affairs, either through its representatives or through its collective activities, the ability of the ethnic group to exercise a relatively high level of control over the political affairs of its own community, and, representation of the group by cabinet members or influential business people in the capital?

Relative economic integration includes the following factors, the ability of the group to have a say in the economic development of the home area, are jobs and resources as available in the home area as they are in other parts of the country, and, is there *de facto* economic discrimination against the group at the national level?

A full empirical examination of each of the above factors is beyond the scope of the present discussion. However, given these criteria, integration is conceptualized as including not only real, measurable differences in each of these categories but also, and more importantly for this discussion, the disparities as perceived by those supposedly affected by them. The analysis that follows is therefore based largely on aggregated qualitative interviews and discussions with people

Malindi and other places in Kenya and comments made in reaction to the survey instrument.

Given these terms, a ranking of ethnic groups in terms of national political integration looks something like this. Based on these qualitative data from Malindi.

TABLE 9:1  
Hypothetical Rankings of Ethnic Groups by National  
Integration

	<u>Political</u>	<u>Economic</u>
<u>High</u>	Kalenjin Kikuyu Luo	Kikuyu Kalenjin Luo
<u>Medium</u>	Luhya Kamba	Luhya Kamba
<u>Low</u>	Maasai, Kisii Swahili Mijikenda	Swahili Maasai, Kisii Mijikenda

The most clearly successful and dominant ethnic groups in both categories are the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin. The reign of the current president has led to Kalenjin political and economic success within the last two decades, as outlined in Chapter 5. Economic success in the Kalenjin community is concentrated in the hands of a very few of the wealthiest men in Kenya. The political influence of the Kalenjin has been accomplished both through the influence exerted by these figures and by the loading of the civil service with Kalenjin workers.

The Kikuyu and the Luo truly dominate the African economic, educational and political scene. They make up a large proportion of the population and, they are also dominant because of their demographic majority in the capital city (Central Bureau of Statistics 1991). In addition to these population data, both groups are highly influential politically and economically. Kikuyu entrepreneurial activity is synonymous with their ethnic identity. Likewise, the success of the Luo in educational endeavors is an often remarked upon positive ethnic stereotype.

The two groups represent, individually and collectively, the major threat to Kalenjin political domination. A member of either group is likely to become the next president. Neither group has been successfully dislodged from a prominent place in national politics despite several attempts to do so over the last two decades.

The remainder of the thirty or so Kenyan ethnic groups fare less well than the three major groups relative to the type of indicators utilized. The Luyha, for example, despite representing the second largest ethnic population in Kenya, would probably not be considered among the top three because of their lack of strong, unified political leadership and because of their geographic concentration in the remote regions of Western Kenya. One Kamba participant told me that the problem with political organization among the Luhya is that, "They can never keep a secret. If they agree in private

not to reveal their plans, the second the meeting is over someone announces the plan in the newspaper." Thus, in matters of political action, they are reputed as lacking unity in the face of individual competition for the limelight.

The coastal ethnic groups see themselves and are judged by others as among the most marginalized of the ethnic groups discussed here. The Mijikenda are seen as being particularly prone to the effects of this marginalization in terms of continued backwardness in terms of "development" indicators, such as educational attainment and economic success. Further, despite the relatively large combined size of the nine tribes (collectively the country's fourth largest ethnic group) representation in national government and at the seats of power is negligible.

The Swahili fare better in political and economic integration than their Mijikenda neighbors. This is due (in part) to (1) their influence (limited and decreasing as it may be) in Mombasa, Kenya's second city, and Malindi, (2) their close historical ties to the economically successful Arab and Indian communities, and (3) their own internal integration based on common cultural and religious identity.

Paradoxically, many Swahili see their religious and cultural identity as a two-edged sword when it comes to national integration relative to other ethnic groups. While most agree that these two features create unity within the community that may not otherwise be there, many Swahili

believe they are discriminated against nationally because they are Muslims, because of their history as slave traders, and because of their mixed "racial" ancestry.

### Case Studies

This section presents three case studies of multi-ethnic interaction in Malindi in order to further analyze the ways in which some of the divisions outlined above manifest in behavior and perception. The first two cases focus on inter-ethnic conflict. The last, focuses on inter-ethnic cooperation. Yet, to varying degrees, each illustrates the internal logic of conciliation and cooperation among ethnic groups.

The data presented in the first section of this chapter demonstrated some of the ways in which the ethnic groups in Malindi are deeply separated by social and cultural features. The following cases demonstrate some of the ways in which these divisions are reconciled. They also demonstrate how distinctions made within and between groups can, in practice, disappear in the face of common interests.

#### Case I: The Curio Village Brawl

The first case involves a personal conflict between members of two ethnic groups that briefly threatened to explode into a general ethnic riot. This particular conflict started as an argument over a torn tee-shirt in a local bar/hotel directly opposite the Malindi Curio Dealers' Curio Village.

Due to its convenient location, this open-air bar is a favorite place among the Curio Village workers to eat and drink during the day and after work. Often, workers would drink or eat at the bar while keeping a careful eye out for the approach of tourists to the Village right across the road. The hotel was also known as one of the preferred lodging places of prostitutes new to the Malindi area.

The argument in question began when an intoxicated Kisii curio worker challenged an equally intoxicated Swahili beach boy over a slurring remark he made regarding the reluctance of the Kisii to pay fare commissions to beach boys. This remark was made within earshot of several non-Kisii and apparently offended the Kisii greatly. The Kisii and the Swahili became involved in a tirade of insults against the other. The Kisii became violent and shoved the Swahili several times. The Swahili attempted to walk away. There were several Kisii present in the bar and he was the only Swahili. The Kisii grabbed the Swahili by his shirt and ripped it off.

At this point, a young Meru woman sitting near the fracas, leapt out of chair. She had been at another table talking with three other men. She started abusing the Kisii loudly for what he had done. She claimed that this particular tee-shirt (a black, Bob Marley tee-shirt, very popular and relatively expensive in Malindi) belonged to a good friend of her's. She demanded what was left of the tee-shirt from the Kisii.

The Kisii refused and hurled equally abusive language at her calling her a prostitute (which she was) and telling her to mind her own business. Instead, the woman rushed up to the Kisii and grabbed a part of the shirt. The two wrestled over the torn shirt between them for a few seconds and then, suddenly, the Kisii slapped the woman sharply across the face with his free hand. Several of the Kisii present immediately jumped up, grabbed the man by his arms and led him away from the bar and back to the village.

The woman sat back down with what was left of the tee-shirt. After a few seconds, she noticed blood drawn from her nose by the blow from the Kisii. This triggered an outburst of rage. She yelled out that even if she was fighting a man, she would not let him get away with drawing blood. She concluded her statement by shouting defiantly "I am a Meru!"<sup>4</sup> With that, she hurriedly left the bar and ran across the street to find the Kisii.

As she left the bar, several Kikuyu curio workers followed her attempting to calm her down verbally and mildly restrain her. She was waylaid several times in this fashion as she crossed the road to enter the Curio Village. She soon

---

<sup>4</sup>The Meru are the close relatives of the Kikuyu. The Eastern Kikuyu dialect and Meru are mutually intelligible. A political union briefly existed in the early 1980s called the Gikuyu-Embu-Meru Association (GEMA), linking these three closely related ethnic groups. The union was banned under the claim that it was an ethnically based political party. The Meru are also known for their long warrior tradition and are commonly considered one of the fiercest ethnic groups in Kenya in terms of their propensity and ability to fight.



found the Kisii in the village and immediately began throwing punches at him. Another Kisii tried to restrain her and was quickly set upon by several Kikuyu.

Almost immediately, there were a dozen Kisii and Kikuyu involved in the brawl. The action lasted only a few seconds. The main protagonists were soon separated by their respective fellows and led away. However, the Meru escaped her protectors/restrainers and got in a final blow striking the Kisii in the head with a large stone, drawing blood. The man was taken to a hospital and later reported the incident to the police.

I observed all this in the company of a Kisii friend, a young former primary school teacher now carving soapstone in the Curio Village. He is secretary of the Curio Village Association and generally well respected by his mates. He is also a quite large and strong young man. My friend was very upset by the whole incident but carefully declined to participate, even though he stood only a few feet away from the action. He explained to me after the fight had ended that, if he, as a local leader, were to become involved, all of the other Kisii present would have entered the fight and the incident would have led to "tribal clashes" (his words) at the Curio Village.

By the next day, everyone in the Curio Village had heard of the fight. I interviewed several of the participants and others to get their impressions of the incident and any

possible consequences. I was told by Kisii and Kikuyu alike that the worst part of the whole incident was that it had almost escalated into a general melee between the two groups. "If it is us against the Kikuyu, the Kamba here will become involved (on the side of the Kikuyu)." I was told by one Kisii. He elaborated by pointing out that the woman involved was not even really Kikuyu and that none of the people who participated in the fight actually knew her, but when they saw her fighting someone of another tribe, they were compelled to join in because of their close, traditional relations to the Meru.

A Kikuyu informant, agreed with this assessments and noted that the Kisii would do the same thing. It was therefore imperative to stop the fight before more people joined in. "These things are bad" one Kikuyu told me "if we all fight against each other, this place (the Village) would be burnt down."

I later learned that the rules of the Curio Village call for the expulsion of any member or associate who is involved in three physical altercations in the Village. This rule, I was told, refers to all fighting regardless of the ethnic makeup of the participants. In practice, however, it is used primarily to deter inter-ethnic conflicts. In discussing this point further, a Kamba friend explained that, "Nobody cares if a Kamba is fighting a Kamba as long as the tourists don't see it."

Several observations can be made from this example about the dangers inherent in inter-ethnic conflict and the rules governing such conflict in Malindi. The most clear-cut observation is that, in situations of inter-ethnic conflict, members of the same ethnic group rally to protect and defend their own. This was clearly the case for both the Kikuyu and the Kisii in the Curio Village who rushed to the aid of their ethnic fellows without even knowing the reasons for the confrontation.

For the Kisii, some of this willingness to defend their fellow Kisii and to become involved in what could have become a general interethnic outbreak in the Curio Village, is partially explained by the fact that all of the Kisii in the Village know each other. It could be argued, therefore, that the Kisii who became involved in the fight did so because their friendship. But, and this is the point, social distance in these friendships or acquaintances strongly affects ethnicity.

For the Kikuyu, this was less obviously the case. None of them, except one, knew the Meru involved in the fight. Chivalry may have played a role in their defence, but clearly the fight, brief as it was, went beyond mere defense. It would have been simple for the Kikuyu to have forcibly escorted the woman from the battle scene or otherwise restrain or protect from harm. Instead, several Kikuyu very quickly became involved, attacking the Kisii and escalating the fight.

Even under normal circumstances, tensions between Kisii and Kikuyu run high at the Curio Village. Kisii often accuse the Kikuyu of being lazy, deceitful and untrustworthy. The Kikuyu accuse the Kisii of being stingy and backward. One Kikuyu told me jokingly that they (the Kikuyu) had to teach the Kisii to eat with knives and forks when they first came to the coast. Both stereotypes are reflected in the differences roles of Kikuyu and Kisii at the Curio Village.

Kisii own the second largest proportion of kiosks at the Curio Village (Kamba own approximately 50%, Kisii about 30%). The Kisii also hold a virtual monopoly on the import and finishing of soapstone carvings<sup>5</sup>, even more so than the monopoly held by Kamba wood carvers over the production of wooden curios. In contrast, very few Kikuyu actually own kiosks in the Village (less than 10%). Most young Kikuyu males work for commission from the Kamba and Kisii owners of the kiosks.

The Kisii freely admit that the Kikuyu are better hawkers because they "know how to use the sweet tongue", as one Kisii told me. The Kikuyu are generally thought of by everyone in the village, as being the most adept in getting the attention of tourists, using foreign languages, and bargaining for

---

<sup>5</sup>The stone itself is commonly known in Kenya as "Kisii stone." This soft carvable material is quarried and transported from Kisii district in Western Kenya. Kisii, over the last two decades, have become expert at carving this stone. Their products, stone statues of animals and people, along with a variety of decorative stone containers, chess sets and engraved plates, are very popular among tourists.

prices. They are especially criticized by the Kisii, who see them as dishonest, shirking responsibilities, and wasting money on beer and revelry. The Kisii claim, for example, that the Kikuyu often under-report the amount of sales to tourists and pocket more than the agreed upon rate of commission. I have witnessed this behavior several times on the part of Kikuyu working for Kisii and Kamba. I have also observed the same activities on the part of Kamba and Giriama working there.

Despite the tensions inherent in the relationship between the two groups, a degree of symbiosis has evolved between them and all other ethnic groups within the Curio Village based on their complementary roles in the local economy. This was temporarily shattered the day of the fight. The quick restoration of order, both on that day and in the days that followed, is evidence of the importance of maintaining cordial, if not friendly, relations between all of the ethnic groups. The rapidity with which interpersonal conflict becomes interethnic, involving collective rather than individual tension and even outbreaks, indicates the fragility and dangers of conflict.

All parties recognize the self-defeating futility of ethnic fighting within the Village because of the money, income and trade that could be lost if either group decides to end the mutually beneficial relationship between the Kisii and Kikuyu. The same is true if continued tensions, escalating

into violence, would drive away possible tourist business. Both of these concerns are inherent in the de facto application of the above mentioned Village by-laws to inter-ethnic as opposed to internecine fighting.

Case II: The I.P.K.

The second case study deals with the growth in popularity of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) in Mombasa and Malindi. The IPK was formed as a political party in the early part of 1992 by young Muslim fundamentalist preachers in Mombasa. These preachers are particularly popular among young, unemployed Mombasa males. Often, they would give sermons outside the larger mosques in Mombasa after the afternoon and early evening prayers. The party leadership is composed of several of these young Muslim street preachers and their Arab and Indian backers. The latter claim is, however, part of their image and not easily corroborated.

The original IPK manifesto (released in Swahili and Arabic but not English), calls for a return to Islam as a source of political and social leadership and inspiration. Implied in the statement is the appointment of religiously inspired representatives on the coast. The IPK initially received little attention. Even in Mombasa, several prominent figures in the Swahili community have spoken out against the impracticality of establishing a national religiously based party.

In May of 1992, the Kenyan government officially refused to recognize the IPK as a political party on the grounds that it constituted a discriminatory political organization.<sup>6</sup> Permit applications for rallies or party registration activities were rejected by the government. Later that month, police in Mombasa attempted to break up an IPK rally in front of a mosque. Violence broke out between the police and the young Swahili IPK backers.

A few days later, one of the young leaders of the IPK, Sheikh Balala, tried once more to hold a rally in front of a mosque, insisting that it was a religious and not political meeting. Again, the police broke it up. Balala immediately took refuge inside the mosque. Police followed him into the mosque and arrested him.

Riots again broke out in Mombasa that same day. The disorders lasted three days. Several young demonstrators were shot and killed by police, several others wounded. Participants were not just members and supporters of IPK. Hundreds of young Swahili and Mijikenda Muslims in Mombasa were also involved.. The popularity of the IPK grew several-fold almost overnight. In Malindi, Lamu, and elsewhere, IPK graffiti began appearing on the walls and the chant "IPK juu, KANU chini (up with IPK, down with KANU!)" could be heard from young boys every day in the streets of Mombasa and Malindi.

---

<sup>6</sup>As of this writing, the IPK is continuing a process that begun in September 1992, of suing the government for recognition as a political party.

In the course of only a few days, the IPK went from a marginalized, often joked<sup>7</sup> about political party, popular only among the disaffected in Mombasa, to the representative of Swahili frustrations and aspirations for the entire coast. Apparently, the sacrilege committed by ordering armed and booted police into a mosque convinced many of the government's lack of respect for the Swahili and, perhaps more importantly for Muslims in general, and Islam in particular.

In the months that followed, the goals and public manifesto of the IPK also changed. The new manifesto called for a return of political sovereignty to the coast and the establishment of Islamic government there. It based its claims on the superiority of Islamic principles in guiding personal as well as political affairs. It also called expressly for an end to all tourist development, without the consultation and approval of the Muslim community.

The private wishes of several IPK supporters, at least in Malindi, were that social, political and economic sovereignty be returned to the coast. This meant addressing the problems of unemployment, particularly among Swahili youth, and the degradation of Swahili society due to outside influences. I overheard one Swahili only half-jokingly tell a group of Kikuyu at the Curio Village that "When the IPK comes to power, we will send all of you home (upcountry). We will only allow

---

<sup>7</sup>In the days preceding the actions by the government against the I.P.K., I had heard Swahili and non-Swahili alike refer to it as the "Ignorant People of Kenya."



you to sell your curios on the road to tourists and we (Swahili) will remain here (in Malindi) with the Giriama."

These sentiments were expressed again and again by the newly enlisted Swahili supporters of the IPK in Malindi. One local organizer told me that the only way the Swahili would survive on the coast, would be to reestablish control over coastal towns based on Islamic principles.

This particular man was also part owner of one of the largest Swahili owned tour companies in Malindi. He went on to say that tourism could continue on the coast but that it must be monitored carefully. Furthermore, certain areas should be off limits to tourists and tourist development.

The man went on to cite the construction of a tourist bar and restaurant in the Shela section of Malindi as an example of how little control the local community had over its own affairs, and how little respect outsiders (the developer was Italian) showed their concerns. Never-the-less, and despite the protests of the community, the bar was constructed despite on a site facing the beach in close proximity to three mosques.

Others cited the lack of employment among young Swahili and the growing use of drugs and prostitution in their community, as evidence of the evils inherent in contacts with the West and upcountry people. The need for Swahili to unite against these evils was a popular justification for supporting the IPK. To further emphasize this point, IPK banners and

flyers began featuring a drawing of the left and the right hands clasping one over the other with the word "Ummoja" (unity) beneath them soon after the incidents in Mombasa.

The IPK, therefore, came to represent, in the eyes of at least some members of the Swahili community, an opportunity to reclaim some of the political, economic and cultural ground lost to them through the development of tourism on the coast, and the associated immigration of non-coastal peoples. It also served to congeal in the minds of many Swahili, the differences in interests between the Swahili community and these outsiders.

#### Case III: Ruth's Baby

The third and final case involves not conflict but cooperation among members of several ethnic groups. The case revolves around a local "malaya" and her seriously ill child. The woman was known to be the mistress of an Italian who lived only seasonally in Malindi. Apparently, she had met this man and started the relationship while she was involved in prostitution. Unfortunately, she continued frequenting the bars and discos favored by prostitutes in Malindi with her own circle of friends despite that fact that he, according to the reports of others, supported her by sending money from Europe.

In late 1992, the newborn child of this woman and the Italian man was taken seriously ill. The child was hospitalized (the woman claimed that she had taken the child

to a clinic for an inoculation and the doctor had given him the wrong medicine).

I was approached one morning by a woman whom I knew as a "malaya" and asked if I would like to contribute something for the woman and her child while she stayed with the child in the hospital. I agreed. I then asked the woman why she had become involved in this problem. I knew several of the prostitutes/malaya in Malindi and I knew that this woman was not particularly friendly with the woman with the sick child.

Malaya in Malindi tend to be very "clique-ish," i.e., they travel, and socialize together in small groups of four to five. Often, but certainly not always, all of the members of each group will come from a single ethnic group, and sometimes a single home area. There is also a great deal of rivalry, gossip and back-biting between the groups. Rivalries are largely based on jealousy or competition over successfully seducing good "prospects" among the tourists and expatriates in Malindi. The most successful malaya, as mentioned earlier, become mistresses or even wives of Europeans.

Malaya are also differentiated by the venue in which they seek male acquaintances. Those who frequent (and are allowed to enter) the more expensive Italian hotels and discos usually will not be seen in the places frequented by Germans and other Westerners. The pattern is therefore reflected in the clientele sought after and, in language use. Fluency in Italian is a status symbol among malaya.

The woman who approached me for a donation was a Kikuyu whom I knew socialized with two other Kikuyu and a Kamba (the Kamba had told me once that she despised Luo and that she felt the same about most Kikuyu). The woman with the sick child was a Luo. The Kikuyu woman went on to explain that even though she was not particularly friendly with the woman, "When one of us (malaya) is hurt, we all feel it." She went on to say that some of the money would be used to buy food that she and her friends would cook and take to the hospital.

Ruth's child recovered after a few days and she was again appearing at the bar<sup>8</sup>. She also began keeping company with the women who had brought her the food. She apparently introduced them, at some point, to my landlady, who, after a similar start in Malindi is now one of the wealthier women in the town. Ruth and her new Kikuyu friends often came to the home of my landlady (a Kamba) over the next few months to watch videos and chew miraa. They also drove to discos together in my landlady's Land Rover.

I suspect they were being weaned away from the bar and disco scene and introduced to a more respectable form of prostitution. I do not know if this was done in gratitude for

---

<sup>8</sup>This particular bar and restaurant is called the Palm Garden. It sits squarely in the middle of the "tourist strip" along Lamu Road in Malindi. Its location makes it a popular place for the German and English tourists who stay in the big hotels along this same road. It is also right across the street from the post office and police station, making it a favorite after work spot for local civil servants. Many prostitutes also frequent the bar although relatively little soliciting goes on there.

their help or if the women had actually become friends over the course of the ordeal. Perhaps the Kikuyu women knew of the Luo's connections around town and attempted to endear themselves to her through these acts of kindness. However, several other women also expressed concern for Ruth's child and contributed money and food.

As was true in the first case, multi-ethnic links were established and maintained in the face of perceived common interests. Malaya in Malindi, as is true elsewhere in the world, are often young, alone and without familial and social support. The likelihood of misfortune and exploitation touching them is higher, perhaps, than for any other segment of the population. The common sentiment expressed by several of the women is mutual, support must come from within their own relatively small circle of friends. This is another example of how practical concerns determine rational choices that cross-cut ethnic boundaries.

#### Discussion of Cases

The common thread linking each of these cases is the coalescence of ethnic identity when faced with challenges, and the need for cohesion within or between ethnic groups when dealing with these challenges. In all three instances, a reconsideration of allegiances occurred as a result of some challenge posed by, in the first two cases, other ethnic groups, and in the third, misfortune outside of the realm of human activity.

In each instance, the level of cohesion increased with the level of challenge. The immediacy of violence instantly provided the Kikuyu and Kisii with reasons for acting on latent ethnic tensions. There was no question as to the loyalties involved and the necessity to act on those loyalties. As cooler heads prevailed, the futility of inter-ethnic violence and the recognition of mutual dependence in a rational cost/benefit analysis, led to a quick return to normalcy.

In the second case, the latent threat of decreasing cultural and political autonomy among the Swahili was again made immediate by the actions taken against the IPK by the non-Swahili, non-Muslim government, as represented by the police. The answer, as provided by the leadership of the IPK, was political autonomy and the return of cultural hegemony by way of appealing to one of the most basic elements of Swahili ethnic identity, their faith in Islam.

The quick acceptance of the IPK as a viable political alternative, when it had not been perceived as such before, is best understood as the immediate response to the attack on the fundamental symbol of Muslim-hood, the mosque. However, the continued popularity of the party even after the initial violence in Mombasa had passed, can be interpreted in the context of a renewed sense of ethically based solidarity among the Swahili. Again we see the cohesion of ethnic identities in response to threat.

The final case is evident of an important and opposite trend. Ethnic identities were ignored, in this case, and common social identity respected, when a commonly relatable threat occurred. Again the immediate threat called for a response that served to illustrate the underlying rules for behavior among this particular segment of the Malindi population. The common social status of malaya in Malindi allows for the reasonable negation, at least temporarily, of ethnic boundaries.

The implications, given these three examples and many other examples in Malindi, are several. Among the most important is that ethnic tensions are latent in many of the interrelationships that have developed as a result of increased contact. Many of these tensions are the result of close economic interdependence among ethnic groups combined with fierce competition over available and potential resources.

The common strategy of ethnic group mobilization in pursuit of these resources is not always available given the physical integration of the entire community. No one ethnic group, and certainly none of the upcountry groups, is powerful enough within itself to dominate politics and economics at the local level. In addition, each group may possess different talents and specializations that are marketable to different segments of the tourist industry.

The need to cooperate in maximizing access to these opportunities is locally acknowledged as a benefit open to all. During the ethnic tensions and clashes of early 1992, the general appraisal of the situation in Malindi and Mombasa was that the threat of violence was minimal. "We don't want the tourists to be afraid of coming here." was the general sentiment in Malindi during that period. Clearly, ethnic conflict has serious costs that enter into decisions about the social order.

The question remains, at what level of perception are these forms of cooperation and conciliation generalized to national identity, national integration, and the extension of the acceptance of mutual dependence on the national level? Returning again to the three cases, a pattern exists in which the response to the threat is extended to the widest possible community of interest.

For example, after the immediate fissioning effect of the brawl, the recognition of a wider community of interests nullified what could have been grounds for further violence. The Swahili invoked the names of their Mijikenda, Arab, Indian, and even Kamba, Muslim brothers in stressing the potentiality of an Islamic society on the coast. The malaya found comfort in each other cross-ethnically despite rivalries within and between cliques.

The community of interest hypothesized as existing in Malindi, owes its origin and maintenance to the developing



tourist industry and the associated immigration and outside contact previously discussed. It stands to reason, therefore, that the changing identities associated with the development of the hypothesized community of interest, are contrasted with those outside of the community. By this I refer specifically to the cross-ethnic allegiance that comes about as a result of contact with outsiders not sharing the same interests, or who, in fact, hold competing interests.

Such a relationship is believed to exist between the Kenyans of Malindi and the foreigners, tourists and expatriates, who, in one form or another, exploit the inferior economic position of coastal and upcountry Kenyans while paradoxically, providing the sources of income that keeps Kenyans involved in the tourist industry. The data analyses of the last chapter suggests that an awareness of this relationship, and of the similar problems faced by all Kenyan ethnic groups in Malindi, comes about partially as a result of exposure to the industry, and/or contact with other Kenyans facing similar difficulties.

When the interests of the Kenyan community is in conflict with the interests of outsiders, Kenyans tend to unite against European foreigners most of the time. The dynamics of economic exploitation certainly play a major role in this trend. At one level, the trend towards group cohesion in the face of outside threat can be thought of in terms of a "class struggle" between the European "haves" (tourists, investors

and expatriates) against the Kenyan "have nots." However, the fact that the trend is most often expressed in ethnic terms has serious implications for this discussion.

An analysis of one further case serves to illustrate this point. During the summer of 1992, a controversy erupted over the eviction of several dozen Malindi and Watamu fisherman from a beachside area used for years by the fisherman as a port depot (Daily Nation August 27, 1992). The plot had reportedly been sold to an Italian developer who planned to build a tourist resort club. The Italian claimed that he had bought the plot from a local Arab in 1988. The fisherman claimed that they had operated at the site for decades without ever being aware of a legal owner.

On August 28th, 1992, an attempt was made to forcibly evict the fisherman by the new Italian owner. The attempt failed. On the 29th, an injunction against the fisherman was filed by the District Council. The fisherman were given three days to vacate the area. On the 31th, over 1000 Malindi residents held a rally to protest the allotment of the land and the allegedly corrupt way in which the title deed for the land was handed over to the Italian (Daily Nation, September 1, 1992).

The protesting residents went as far as to send representatives to Nairobi to ask the president to become personally involved. The Council took it upon themselves to conduct a brief investigation. They found that the land was

legally sold to the Italian and that the fisherman were, therefore, squatters. The Council refused to entertain further appeals. On September 7, the police forced the removal the fisherman and construction of the club began.

This case was one of several involving land disputes between local people and foreign developers that occurred in Malindi during 1992. In each case, the local population involved in the dispute was multi-ethnic and received support, from people not directly effected, across ethnic lines. The feeling that the rights of Kenyans should supersede those of foreigners was an integral part of the response of many Kenyans when considering these cases.

The fact that local political representatives often sided with the foreigners, was seen by many as an example of the deleterious effect of outside interests on their community. Local political representatives were seen as being open to bribes from foreigners to the point of acting against their own people. The sudden appearance of documents and the secrecy involved in the transfer of land and property gives some credence to this perception.

The trend towards the exclusive extension of rights is most clearly demonstrated in the survey by the response to three questions. The first question "Do all Kenyans have the same rights and privileges?" received an expectedly overwhelmingly positive reply among the respondents (93%). By contrast, the second question, "Do wazungu and indians born in

Kenya have the same rights as everyone else?" received a decidedly mixed response. Only 64% of the respondents agreed with this statement. This reluctance to extend rights to outsiders was again reflected in the question "Should whites be allowed to buy as much land for tourism development as they want?" Thirty percent of the population responded positively to this statement.

The Swahili and Mijikenda respondents predictably showed much more unanimity in their negative response to this question. Their general feeling of powerlessness in the face of change largely determined their response. However, a majority of respondents from other ethnic groups, whose livelihood depends on continued foreign investment, also answered negatively a significant amount of the time.

It is interesting to note that on all three questions, people involved in the tourist industry were more likely to extend rights to all Kenyans and to see those rights as also pertaining to foreigners. The fact that some of them questioned the rights of Westerners, at least in these two contexts, is significant in that it points to a separate consideration. This separate consideration is most likely based on cultural and political aspects of foreign status and on the perceived contrasts in wealth and power discussed in Chapter 6.

Individualized ethnic identities within Kenya are therefore of less importance than community cohesion when

confronted with stronger, more powerful outside forces. The combination of prolonged contact, complementary roles, and similar challenges for the ethnic groups of Malindi, serves to catalyze changes in individual considerations of national identity.

### Conclusions

There are several important issues raised by this study with direct implications for the future of national identity in Kenya and elsewhere. Among the most important of these issues addressed in the preceding discussion are, the roles of real and stereotyped cultural differences in maintaining ethnic boundaries, the variation in determinations of ethnic "distance" within and between groups, the elasticity of ethnic identity and allegiances, and the extension of ideas of citizenship.

Each of these major areas individually represent part of the overall process of personal and group identity discussed in Chapter 2. Collectively, they may hold the key to understanding the dynamic process of national integration.

It appears that the foundation for continued integration is very much present in Malindi. The boundaries of ethnicity among the Kenyan population, although clear and potent, are mitigated against by the sheer diversity of the multi-ethnic population. The fact that no one ethnic group holds a monopoly on power or resources within the town means that

competition, which often creates and reinforces boundaries, is not often expressed in exclusively ethnic terms among Kenyans.

Importantly, competition and conflict between the local community and transient or permanent Westerners is expressed in ethnic terms. At the most simplistic level, the conflict is expressed by people in Malindi as a struggle for control between "wazungu" (whites) and "waafrika" (Africans). More sophisticated assessments of the situation take note of the importance of economic differences and exploitation regardless of the color or ethnicity of the exploiter.

The community of interests discussed in the latter section of this chapter recognizes the economic and ethnic features of conflict and further mitigates against the maintenance of strong ethnic boundaries within the Kenyan community. The rational choice made between collective cooperation and mutual impedance makes the boundaries even more fragile, at least at the level of expressed behavior, if not attitude.

The precedent for collective action and the suspension of ethnic antagonisms, at least temporarily, is present in all of the case studies discussed. Even the IPK example of ethnic cohesion formed on the basis of religious exclusion can be interpreted as broadening the scope of Swahili identity to include Muslims nation-wide.

In order to begin understanding the dynamics of the multivocal process of ethnic identity change and national

integration, further research into the role of some of the factors explored in this dissertation, and others not commented on, is needed. For example, a comparative analysis of economic and political competition and the resolution of conflict in other parts of Kenya may provide more information.

The data from the "Kenyaness" scale suggest that exposure to other Kenyans and to outsiders may play a part in increasing national identity. There are probably few places in Kenya that can match the frequency of contact and the magnitude of ethnic and cultural diversity found in Malindi. The distinctive modes of interaction between all of the groups present in the town, Kenyan and non-Kenyan, are important in determining the future directions of identity change and formation in Kenya as a whole.

APPENDIX A  
SURVEY

Part 1. Demographic Data

1. Sex
2. Age
3. Tribe
4. Occupation (if employed in the tourist industry  
what do you do during the off season?)
5. Are you married?
  - a. What is your wife\husband's tribe?
  - b. How many children do you have?
6. Where do you live in Malindi (which estate)?
7. How long have you lived in Malindi?
8. Orignial Home Area?
  - a. Do you want to go back there to live someday?
9. What level of school have you completed?
10. Which languages do you speak?
  - a. List in order of fluency.
11. What is your religion?
12. What is the tribe of the people living on either  
side of were you live?



13. Have you ever travelled outside of Kenya?  
a. Where?
14. From what source do you get most of your information about what is going on in the country?  
a. newspapers b. radio c. television  
d. conversations with other people.
15. Do you belong to any organizations or groups that consist of people from several different tribes?
16. How often do you have conversations with people from other tribes?  
a. very often b. often c. sometimes d. hardly ever e. almost never

## Part 2.

Please circle two choices for each question, mark your first choice with a circle, and your second with an underline.

1. Who would you most like to live next to?  
a. A Kikuyu b. A Kamba c. A Giriama d. A Swahili  
e. A Kalenjin f. A Luo g. A Maasai h. A Kisii
2. Who would you not like to live next to?  
a. A Kikuyu b. A Kamba c. A Giriama d. A Swahili  
e. A Kalenjin f. A Luo g. A Maasai h. A Kisii
3. Who would you most like to work with?  
a. A Kikuyu b. A Kamba c. A Giriama d. A Swahili  
e. A Kalenjin f. A Luo g. A Maasai h. A Kisii
4. Who would you not like to work with?  
a. A Kikuyu b. A Kamba c. A Giriama d. A Swahili  
e. A Kalenjin f. A Luo g. A Maasai h. A Kisii
5. Who would you most like to work for?  
a. A Kikuyu b. A Kamba c. A Giriama d. A Swahili  
e. A Kalenjin f. A Luo g. A Maasai h. A Kisii
6. Who would you not like to work for?  
a. A Kikuyu b. A Kamba c. A Giriama d. A Swahili  
e. A Kalenjin f. A Luo g. A Maasai h. A Kisii
7. Who would you like to see as president?  
a. A Kikuyu b. A Kamba c. A Giriama d. A Swahili  
e. A Kalenjin f. A Luo g. A Maasai h. A Kisii

8. Who would you not like to see as president?  
 a. A Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
9. Who would you vote in as local councilor?  
 a. A Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
10. Who would you not vote in as councilor?  
 a. A Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
11. Whom would you prefer marrying?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
12. Who would you not marry?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
13. Who would you most like to work for you?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
14. Who would you not like to work for you?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
15. Who would you most prefer to do business with?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
16. Who would you not like to do business with?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
17. Who is most likely to cheat in business?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
18. Who is not likely to cheat in business?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
19. Who is most likely to commit a crime?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii
20. Who is not likely to commit a crime?  
 a. a Kikuyu   b. A Kamba   c. A Giriama   d. A Swahili  
 e. A Kalenjin   f. A Luo   g. A Maasai   h. A Kisii

Part 3

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement by writing "agree" or "disagree" next to the statement.

1. I can get along with people from any tribe.
2. Individual people from different tribes cause most of the tribalism in the country.
3. If you are in a position to get a fellow tribesman a good job or into university you should do so.
4. Whites and Indians born in Kenya have as much of a right to Kenya as anyone else.
5. Coast Province should become more involved in national politics.
6. Politicians cause most of the trouble with tribalism.
7. There aren't really any differences between the different tribes in Kenya.
8. Foreigners should be allowed to buy as much land as they like to build tourist facilities.
9. Each tribe should have its own security force.
10. The majority of the police working in a given district should come from that district.
11. Everyone in Kenya should have equal protection under the law.
12. Kenyan citizenship is more important than belonging to a tribe.
13. If I had the choice of voting for a good person from my tribe or a better person from another tribe, I would vote for the person from my tribe.

Part 4

Answer each question with short (1-3 lines) answers.

1. Most tourists in Malindi come from which countries?
2. The best thing about tourism in Malindi is...?

3. What are some of the bad things that happen in Malindi because of tourism?
4. Most tourists in Malindi come here to do what kinds of activities?
5. Overall, has tourism been good or bad for Malindi?
  - a. mostly good    b. partly good
  - c. neutral    d. partly bad    e. mostly bad

APPENDIX B  
RESPONSE FREQUENCY FOR ETHNIC DISTANCE SCALE.

Question 1

1 [REDACTED] 291

2 [REDACTED] 97

Question 2

1 [REDACTED] 222

2 [REDACTED] 66

Question 3

1 [REDACTED] 219

2 [REDACTED] 68

Question 4

1 [REDACTED] 187

2 [REDACTED] 101

Question 5

1 [REDACTED] 168

2 [REDACTED] 120

Question 6

1 [REDACTED] 224

2 [REDACTED] 64

Question 7



1 [REDACTED] 117

2 [REDACTED] 171

## Question 8

1  87  
2  200

## Question 9

1  83  
2  205

## Question 10

1  98  
2  190

## Question 11

1  282  
2  6

## Question 12

1  269  
2  19

## Question 13

1  100  
2  188

1 = Agree with statement. 2 = Disagree with statement.

## REFERENCES

- Allen, J. de V. (1979). Swahilisation: A Cultural Concept and its Significance in Kenya Today. Paper #125. Institute of African Studies. University of Nairobi.
- Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.
- Archer, E. D. G. (1980). Effects of the Tourist Industry in Barbados, West Indies. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, Austin.
- Arens, W. (1976a). Changing Patterns of Ethnic Identity and Prestige in East Africa. In A. Arens (Ed.), A Century of Change in Eastern Africa. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Arens, W. (1976b). A Century of Change in Eastern Africa. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Ashton, A. O. (1944). Swahili Grammar. Essex: Longman Press.
- Banton, M. (1987). Racial and Ethnic Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Banton, M. (1965). Social Alignment and Identity in a West African City. In H. Kuper (Ed.), Urbanization and Migration in West Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Barth, F. (1969). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Bascom, W. (1976). Changing African Art. In N. Graburn (Ed.), Ethnic and Tourist Art: Cultural Expressions from the Fourth World. Berkely: University of California Press.
- Bates, N. (1983). Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa. In D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola (Eds.), State vs. Ethnic Claims: Ethnic Policy Dilemmas. Boulder: Westview Press.

- Bell, W. (1974). Ethnicity, Decisions of Nationhood, and Images of the Future. In W. Bell and W. E. Freeman (Eds.), Ethnicity and Nation Building. London: Sage Publications.
- Bendix, R. (1964). Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Berg-Schlosser, D. (1984). Tradition and Change in Kenya. Munich: Ferdinand Schoningh.
- Berg, F. J. (1971). The Coast from the Portuguese Invasion. In B. Ogot (Ed.), Zamani: A Survey of East African History. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
- Birch, A. (1989). Nationalism and National Integration. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Bloom, W. (1990). Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brain, J. (1979). Ancestors as Elders in Africa: Further Thoughts. In W. Lessa and E. Vogt (Eds.), Reader in Comparative Religion. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.
- Brantley, C. (1981). The Giriama and Colonial Resistance in Kenya: 1800-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Breuilly J. (1982). Nationalism and the State. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Brislin, R. (1981). Cross-Cultural Encounters: Face to Face Interaction. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Britton, R. (1979). The Image of the Third World in Tourism Marketing. Annals of Tourism Research, 6(3): 318-329.
- Brown, B., and W. Brown (1976). East African Trade Towns: A Shared Growth. In W. Arens (Ed.), A Century of Change in Eastern Africa. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Brydan, J. (1973). Tourism and Development: A Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bugnicourt, J. (1977). Tourism with No Return. Development Forum, 5, 2-3.



- Calvert, P. (1982). The Concept of Class: An Historical Introduction. London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd..
- Central Bureau of Statistics. (1991a). Statistical Abstract. Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Planning and National Development.
- Central Bureau of Statistics. (1991b). Tourism Survey. Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Planning and National Development.
- Central Bureau of Statistics. (1992). Economic Survey. Nairobi, Kenya: Ministry of Planning and National Development.
- Chai, H. C. (1978). Political Change, Education and Group Identity. In R. Rothberg (Ed.), The Mixing of Peoples. New York: Greylock Inc.
- Champion, A. (1967). The Agiryama of Kenya. Occasional Paper Number 25. In John Middleton (Ed). London: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.
- Chazan, N. (1986). Ethnicity in Economic Crisis: Development Strategies and Patterns of Ethnicity in Africa. In D. Thompson and D. Ronen (Eds.), Ethnicity, Politics and Development. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Chittick, N. (1965). The 'Shirazi' Colonization of East Africa. Journal of African History, 6(3), 275-294.
- Chittick, N. (1971). The Coast Before the Arrival of the Portuguese. In B. Ogot (Ed.), Zamani: A Survey of East African History. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
- Claessen, H. and P. Skalnik (1978). The Early State. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Cleverdon, R. and A. Edwards (1982). International Tourism to 1990. Cambridge: Abt Books.
- Cohen, A. (1974). Urban Ethnicity. London, New York: Tavistoc Publications.
- Cohen, E. (1972). Toward a Sociology of International Tourism. Annals of Tourism Research, 39, 164-82.
- Cohen, E. (1979). A Phenomenology of Tourist Experiences. Sociology, 13, 179-202.

- Cohen, R. (1978). Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 7: 379-403.
- Cohen, R. (1993). Ethnicity, the State and the Moral Order. in J. Toland (Ed.), Ethnicity and the State. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Cohen, R., and J. Middleton (1970). From Tribe to Nation in Africa. Scranton, PA: Chandler Publishing.
- Cohen, R. and E. Service (1978). Origins of the State. Philadelphia: ISHI.
- Cohen, R., and J. Toland (1988). State Formation and Political Legitimacy. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Constantin, F. (1989). Social Stratification on the Swahili Coast: From Race to Class? Africa, 59(2), 145-159.
- Cooper, F. (1980). From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labour and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya 1890-1925. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Cruse, H. (1975). The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual. New York: Morrow.
- Curtin, P., Feierman, S., Thompson, L. and Vansina, J., (1989). African History. London: Longman.
- DeKadt, E. (1976). Tourism: Passport to Development? New York: Oxford University Press.
- Depres, L. A. (1975). Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies. The Hague: Mouton.
- Devereux, G. (1982). Ethnic Identity: Its Logical Foundations and Its Dysfunctions. In George De Vos and Lola Romanucci (Eds.), Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- De Vos, G. (1982). Ethnic pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation. In George DeVos and Lola Romanucci (Eds.), Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Donley, L. (1989). Swahili Material Culture. In E. Linnebuhr (Ed.), Transition and Community in East Africa and Beyond: In Memoriam David Miller. Bayreuth, Germany: Bayreuth University.

- Dovidio, J. F., and Gaertner, S. C. (Eds.), (1986). Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism. San Diego: Academic Press.
- Durham, W. (1989). Conflict, Migration, and Ethnicity: A Summery. In N. Gonzalez and C. McCommon (Eds.), Conflict, Migration and the Expression of Ethnicity. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Eastman, C. M. (1971). Who are the Waswahili? Africa, 41(3), 228-236.
- Edari, R. (1980). Social distance and social change among four ethnic groups in Mombassa. In John Paden (Ed.), Values, Identities, and National Integration: Empirical Research in Africa. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Ehret, C. (1971). Cushites and the Highlands and Plains Nilotes. In B. Ogot (Ed.), Zamani: A Survey of East African History. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
- English, E. P. (1986). Great Escape? Ottawa: The North-South Institute.
- Enloe, C. (1973). Ethnic Conflict and Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Enloe, C. (1983). Ethnicity, the State, and the New International Order. In Stack, J. (Ed.), The Primordial Challenge: Ethnicity in the Contemporary World. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Fischer, L. (1980). Mass Education and National Conflict in Thirty African States. In J. Paden (Ed.), Values, Identities and National Integration: Empirical Research in Africa. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Forbes, H. D. (1985). Nationalism, Ethnocentrism and Personality: Social Science and Critical Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Freeman, W. E. (1974). Functions of Ethnic Conflict and Their Contributors to National Growth. In W. Bell and W. E. Freeman (Eds.), Ethnicity and Nation-Building. London: Sage Publications.
- Freeman-Grenville, G.S.P. (1975). East African Coast: Select Documents. London: Rex Collins Ltd.

- Freeman-Grenville, G. S. P. (1982). The Coast, 1498-1840. In R. Oliver and G. Matthew (Eds.), The History of East Africa: Volume I. Nairobi: Oxford University Press.
- Fried, M. (1975). The Notion of Tribe. Menlo Park, California: Cummings Publishing Company.
- Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
- Geschwender, J. A. (1978). Racial Stratification in America. Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown.
- Geshekten, C. L. (1978). International Tourism and African Underdevelopment: Some Reflections on Kenya. In V. Smith, (Eds.), Tourism and Economic Change, Studies in Third World Societies No. 6, pp. 57-88. Williamsburg, VA: William and Mary Press.
- Glazer D., and Moynihan, D. (1975). Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Graburn, N. (1983). The Anthropology of Tourism. Annals of Tourism Research, 9(1), 9-33.
- Greenberg, S. (1980). Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative Perspectives. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Greenwood, D. (1989). Culture by the Pound: An Anthropological Perspective on Tourism as Cultural Commoditization. In V. Smith (Ed.), Hosts and Guests: The Anthropology of Tourism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Gulliver, P. H. (1969). Tradition and Transition in East Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Janmohamad, K. (1976). Ethnicity in an Urban Setting: A Case Study of Mombasa. In B. Ogot (Ed.), History and Social Change in East Africa. Nairobi: East Africa Literature Bureau.
- Hechter, M. (1975). Internal Colonialism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hirst, P. (1989). The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis, and H.J. Laski. London: Routledge.
- Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (1989). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Howard, M. (1989). Ethnicity and Nation-Building in the Pacific. Tokyo: The United Nations University.
- Hughes, A. (1981). The Nation-State in Black Africa. In L. Tivey (Ed.), The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics. New York: St. Martins.
- Hutnik, N. (1991). Ethnic Minority Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hyden, G. (1983). Problems and Prospects of State Coherence. In D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola (Eds.), Ethnic vs. State Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Issacs, H. (1975). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. New York: Harper.
- Jacobson, D. (1991) Reading Ethnography. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Jules-Rosette, B. (1986). Aesthetics and Market Demand: The Demand: The Structure of the Tourist Art Market in Three African Settings. African Studies Review, 29(1), 41-59.
- Kellas, J. (1991). The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Keller, E. (1983). The State, Public Policy and the Mediation of Ethnic Conflict in Africa. In D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola (Eds.), Ethnic vs. State Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Kenyatta, J. (1965). Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu. New York: Vintage Books.
- Kopytoff, I. (1971). Ancestors as Elders in Africa. Africa, 41(2), 129-142.
- Kopytoff, I. (1989). The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kuper, L. (1975). Race, Class and Power. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.

- Kuper, L. and Smith, M. G. (1969). Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things; What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Le Geunneec-Coopens, F. (1989). Social and Cultural Integration: A Case Study of the East African Hadramis. Africa, 59(2), 185-195.
- Lehmann, A. C. (1980). Tourists, Black Markets and Regional Development in West Africa. Annals of Tourism Research, 6(3), 102-119.
- Lewis, I. M. (1971). Escatic Religion: An Anthropological Study of Spirit Possession and Shamanism. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- MacCannell, D. (1984). Reconstructed Ethnicity: Tourism and Cultural Identity in Third World Communities. Annals of Tourism Research, 11(5), 376-391.
- Mackey, W., and Verdoodt, A. (1975). The Multinational Society. Rowley, MA: Newbury House Publishers.
- Martin, E. B. (1973). The History of Malindi: A Geographical Analysis of an East African Coastal Town from the Portuguese Period to the Present. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau.
- Mathieson, A. and Wall, G. (1982). Tourism: Economic, Physical and Social Impacts. London: Longman Press.
- Matthews, H. (1977). International Tourism: A Political and Social Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.
- Maxon, R. (1986). East Africa: An Introductory History. Morgantown: West Virginia University Press.
- Mazrui, A. (1983). Francophone Nations and English-Speaking States: Imperial Ethnicity and African Political Formations. In D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola (Eds.), Ethnic vs. State Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Boulder: Westview Press.
- McKown, R. (1974). The Impact of Education on Ethnic Groups in Ghana and Kenya. In W. Bell and W. E. Freeman (Eds.), Ethnicity and Nation-Building. London: Sage Publications.

- Middleton, J. (1992) The World of the Swahili: An African Mercantile Civilization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mintz, S. (1985). Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History. New York: Viking Press.
- Mitchell, J. (1974). Perceptions of Ethnicity and Ethnic Behavior: An Empirical Explanation. In A. Cohen (Ed.), Urban Ethnicity. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Mizra, S., and Strobel, M. (1989). Three Swahili Women: Life Histories from Mombasa, Kenya. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Morton, F. (1990). Children of Ham: Freed Slaves and Fugitive Slaves on the Kenya Coast, 1873 to 1907. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Moynihan, D. P. (1993). Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Murphy, P. E. (1985). Tourism: A Community Approach. New York: Methuen, Inc.
- Nash, D. (1989). Tourism as a Form of Imperialism. In V. Smith (Ed.), Hosts and Guests: The Anthropology of Tourism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Navari, C. (1981). The Origins of the Nation-State. In L. Tivey (Ed.), The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics. New York: St. Martin's.
- Ndege, G. (1992). Tourism in Kenya: Genesis, Growth and Impact. In W. R. Ochieng and R.M. Maxon (Eds.), An Economic History of Kenya. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd.
- Nicholls, C.S. (1971). The Swahili Coast. New York: Africana Publishing House.
- Nunez, T. (1989). Touristic Studies in Anthropological Perspective. In V. Smith (Ed.), Hosts and Guests: The Anthropology of Tourism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Nurse, T. and Spear, D. (1985). The Swahili. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

- Ochieng, W.R. and Maxon, R. M. (1992). An Economic History of Kenya. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- Ogot, B. (1971). Zamani: A Survey of East African History. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
- Ogot, B. (1976). History and Social Change in East Africa. Nairobi: East Africa Literature Bureau.
- Ottenheimer, M. (1976). Multiethnicity and Trade in the Western Indian Ocean Area. In W. Arens (Ed.), A Century of Change in Eastern Africa. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Paden, J. (1980). Values, Identities, and National Integration Empirical Research in Africa. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Paranjpe, A. (1986). Ethnic Identities and Prejudices. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Parkin, D. (1972). Palms, Wine, and Witnesses. San Francisco: Chandler.
- Parkin, D. (1985). Entitling Evil: Muslims and Non-Muslims in Coastal Kenya. In D. Parkin (Ed.), The Anthropology of Evil. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Inc.
- Parkin, D. (1989). Swahili Mijikemnda: Facing Both Ways in Kenya. Africa, 59(2), 161-175.
- Peake, R. (1989). Swahili Stratification and Tourism in Malindi Old Town, Kenya. Africa, 59(2), 209-220.
- Perez, L. (1974). Aspects of Underdevelopment. Science and Society, 37, 473-80.
- Posnansky, M. (1971). The Prehistory of East Africa. In B. Ogot (Ed.), Zamani: A Survey of East African History. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House.
- Pouwels, R. (1987). Horn and Crescent. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Raanan, U. (1980). Ethnic Resurgence in Modern Democratic States. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Remnick, R. (1983). Theory of Ethnicity. New York: University Press of America.



- Richter, D. (1978). The Tourist Art Market as a Factor in Social Change. Annals of Tourism Research, 5(3): 323-338.
- Romney, S. and Weller, J. (1988). Systematic Data Collection. London: Sage Publications.
- Roosen, E. (1989). Ethnogenesis: The Process of Creating Ethnicity. London: Sage.
- Ross, M.C. (1980). Political Alienation, Participation, and Ethnicity in the Nairobi Urban Area. In J. Paden (Ed.), Values, Identities and National Integration: Empirical Research in Africa. Evanston: Northwestern University
- Rothchild, D. (1983). Collective Demands for Improved Distributions. In D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola (Eds.), Ethnic vs. State Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Rothchild, D. (1986). Hegemonial Exchange: An Alternative Model for Managing Conflict in Middle Africa. In D. Thompson and D. Ronen (Eds.), Ethnicity, Politics and Development. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Salamone, F. (1986). Colonialism and the Emergence of Fulani Identity. In A. Paranjpe (Ed.), Ethnic Identities and Prejudices. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Salim, A.I. (1976). Native or Non-Native? The Problem of Identity and the Social Stratification of the Arab-Swahili of Kenya. In B. Ogot (Ed.), History and Social Change in East Africa. Nairobi: East Africa Literature Bureau.
- Salim, A.I. (1973). Swahili Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast: 1895-1965. Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House Press.
- Sawyer, A. (1980). Social Stratification and National Orientations: Students and Nonstudents in Liberia. In J. Paden (Ed.), Values, Identities and National Integration: Empirical Research in Africa. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Schlee, G. (1989). Identities on the Move. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Sithole, M. (1986). The Salience of Ethnicity in African Politics: The Case of Zimbabwe. In A. Paranjpe (Ed.), Ethnic Identities and Prejudices. Leiden: E.J. Brill.


- Smith, A. D. (1979). Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1981). The Ethnic Revival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1986). The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwood.
- Smith, V. (1976). Tourism and Culture Change. Annals of Tourism Research, 3(3), 122-26.
- Smith V. (1989). Hosts and Guests: The Anthropology of Tourism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Southall, A. (1976). Forms of Ethnic Linkage Between Town and Country. In W. Arens (Ed.), A Century of Change in East Africa. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
- Spear, T. (1978). The Kaya Complex. Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau.
- Stack, J. F. (1986). The Primordial Challenge: Ethnicity in the Contemporary World. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Stavenhagen, R. (1990). The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Strandes, J. (1961). The Portuguese Period in East Africa. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- Swartz, M. (1991). The Way the World Is: Cultural Processes and Social Relations Among the Mombasa Swahili. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Thompson, D. and Ronen, D. (1986). Ethnicity, Politics and Development. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Thurot, J., and Thurot, G. (1983). The Ideology of Class and Tourism: Confronting the Discourse of Advertising. Annals of Tourism Research, 10(1), 173-190.
- Tivey, L. (1981). The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics. New York: St. Martin's.
- Toland, J. (1993). Ethnicity and the State. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Tonkin, E., Chapman, M. and McDonald, M. (1989) History and Ethnicity. New York: Routledge.

- Trimingham, J. (1964). Islam in East Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Turner, L. (1976). The International Division of Leisure: Tourism and the Third World. World Development, 4, 253-260.
- Turner, L. and Ash, J. (1976). The Golden Hordes. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Vail, L. (1989). The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Van de Berghe, P. (1970). Race and Ethnicity. New York: Basic Books.
- Van de Berghe, P. (1981). The Ethnic Phenomenon. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Vogt, J. W. (1978). Wandering: Youth and Travel Behavior. In V. Smith (Ed.). Tourism and Economic Change, Studies in Third World Societies No. 6. pp. 57-88. Williamsburg, VA: William and Mary Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press.
- Whitely, W. H. (1969). Swahili: The Rise of a National Language. London: East Africa Publishing Company.
- Williams, A., and Shaw, G. (1988). Tourism and Economic Development. London: Belhaven Press.
- Wood, R. (1984). Ethnic Tourism, the State, and Cultural Changes in South-East Asia. Annals of Tourism Research, 11(5), 354-373.
- Young, C. (1976). The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.


## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

David Jamison was born on March 11, 1964, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was raised in Philadelphia, and graduated with honors from John Bartram High School in 1982. David graduated cum laude from Howard University in 1987 and earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in anthropology. In July 1987, he enrolled in the Department of Anthropology, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, at the University of Florida to pursue a doctorate in anthropology. David received his Master of Arts degree in 1989.


I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

  
Ronald Cohen, Chairman  
Professor of Anthropology


I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

  
Peter Schmidt  
Associate Professor of  
Anthropology


I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

  
Anthony Oliver-Smith  
Professor of Anthropology

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

  
R. Hunt Davis  
Professor of History

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

  
Olabiyi Yai  
Professor of African  
Languages and Literatures

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Anthropology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 1993

---

Dean, Graduate School